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ABSTRACT

This publication contains the proceedings of the 1980 annual meeting of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society (OVPEs) held at the University of Kentucky. There are four parts to the proceedings. The first part presents the presidential address "Strategic Thinking, Reason, and Education: A Critique of Re-Industrialization" and a response to it. The papers delivered at the general sessions are included in Part II. They are: "Aspects of the Reproduction Thesis" and "Theoretical Approaches to Education and Social Inequality." Part III, which comprises the bulk of the proceedings, contains the 16 papers delivered at the concurrent sessions. Topics discussed include: Dewey's aesthetics; the aesthetic-moral connection; evaluating intrinsic values; education and the imagination; marriage and divorce; a philosophical critique of special education; the role of coercion in teaching; Cremin's concept of education; the hidden curriculum; and the teaching of ethics. Part IV contains the minutes and treasurer's report for 1980, a membership list; and OVPEs style guidelines. (Author/RM)

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE OHIO VALLEY
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
SOCIETY - 1980

Hyatt-Regency Hotel
November 21-22, 1980

University of Kentucky,
Host Institution

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The Society accepts papers which treat philosophically topics of educational significance. Papers read at the annual meeting are reviewed for publication by the program committee. Papers must conform to OVPEs Style Guidelines (p. 149, this issue) or the University of Chicago's *Manual of Style*, 12th Edition. Papers must not exceed 15 pages in length. They are submitted to the program committee for consideration during the summer preceding the annual fall meeting. Inquiries concerning submission guidelines, deadlines, and meeting dates may be addressed to the editor.

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Dennis M. Senchuk, Editor

CONTENTS

Official Program of the 1980 Annual Meeting	v
INTRODUCTION	1

PART I PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

STRATEGIC THINKING, REASON, AND EDUCATION: A CRITIQUE OF RE-INDUSTRIALIZATION by Richard LaBrecque	4
RESPONSE TO LA BRECQUE by David Engel	13

PART II PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL SESSIONS

ASPECTS OF THE REPRODUCTION THESIS by Walter Feinberg	18
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO EDUCATION AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY by Eric Bredo	24

PART III PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS

DEWEY'S AESTHETICS AS EXPERIENCE IN EDUCATION by J. Christopher Eisele and Charlotte Landvoight	39
THE AESTHETIC-MORAL CONNECTION: MORE CLAIMS, MORE PROBLEMS by Marilyn G. Stewart	48
RESPONSE TO STEWART, EISELE, AND LANDVOIGHT by Walden Crabtree	56
EVALUATING INTRINSIC VALUES: SOME REMARKS ON PHILLIP G. SMITH'S "FORMS OF EXTRINSIC VALUE" by Dennis M. Senchuk	59
REPLY TO SENCHUK by Clinton Collins	66
EDUCATION AND THE IMAGINATION by Karen Hanson	70
MARRIAGE OR DIVORCE: PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN AND MORAL EDUCATION by Jo Ann Freiberg	78
MORAL FORESIGHT: A RESPONSE TO FREIBERG AND HANSON by Frederick S. Oscanyan	87
ARE DIFFICULT STUDENTS SICK? A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION by Joseph Watras	90

THE ROLE OF COERCION IN THE TEACHING ENTERPRISE by H. Michael Sokolow	96
THE FINE LINE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND ITS ANTITHESIS: COMMENTS ON MATRAS AND SOKOLOW by Ralph C. Page	104
CREMIN'S CONCEPT OF EDUCATION by Robert Skovira	108
DOES THE "HIDDEN CURRICULUM" CONCEPT WARRANT RECONSIDERATION? by John Scahill	115
COMMENTS ON SKOVIRA AND SCAHILL by Michael J. Carbone	121
A MODIFIED "KELLER PLAN" CURRICULUM FOR INTRODUCTORY ETHICS by Craig K. Lehman	126
THE TEACHING OF ETHICS by Bernard Rosen	133

PART IV

MINUTES AND TREASURER'S REPORT FOR 1980	138
MEMBERSHIP LIST	141
OVPE'S STYLE GUIDELINES	149

OFFICIAL PROGRAM
OF THE
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1980 ANNUAL MEETING
NOVEMBER 21-22, 1980
HYATT-REGENCY HOTEL
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY
HOST INSTITUTION
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

FRIDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 21

REGISTRATION AND
COFFEE HOUR - HYATT SUITE 9:00 - 10:00

OPENING SESSION 10:00 - 12:00
HYATT SUITE

Chair: John Carter (Indiana State University)

Welcoming Remarks: Harry S. Barnard, Associate Dean of the College
of Education (University of Kentucky)

Presidential Address: Richard LaBrecque (University of Kentucky)
"Strategic Thinking, Reason, and Education:
A Critique of Re-Industrialization"

Response: David Engel (University of Pittsburgh)

Lunch: 12:00 - 1:30

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 21

REGISTRATION: 12:30 - 1:30
HYATT SUITE

CONCURRENT SESSIONS: 1:30 - 5:15

Session A - HENRY CLAY ROOM - 1:30 - 3:15

Paper: J. Christopher Eisele and Charlotte Landvoigt (West Virginia
University) "Devey's Aesthetics as Experience in Education"

Paper: Marilyn G. Stewart (Ohio State University) "The Aesthetic-Moral
Connection: More Claims, More Problems"

Response and Chair: Walden Crabtree (University of Akron)

Session B - MARY TODD LINCOLN ROOM - 1:30 - 3:15

Paper: Dennis Senchuk (Indiana University) "Evaluating Intrinsic Values:
Some Remarks on Phillip G. Smith's 'Forms of Extrinsic Value'"

Response and Chair: Clinton Collins (University of Kentucky)

Session C - HENRY CLAY ROOM 3:30 - 5:15

Paper: Karen Hanson (Indiana University) "Education and the Imagination"

Paper: Jo Ann Freiberg (Ohio State University) "Marriage or Divorce:
Philosophy for Children and Moral Education"

Response and Chair: Fred Oscanyan (Berea College)

SESSION D - MARY TODD LINCOLN ROOM - 3:30 - 5:15

Paper: Joseph Matras (University of Dayton) "Are Difficult Students Sick? A Philosophical Critique of Special Education"

Paper: H. Michael Sokolow (Illinois State University) "The Role of Coercion in the Teaching Enterprise"

Response and Chair: Ralph Page (University of Illinois)

Reception: 5:30 - 6:30 - THE TREE TOPS LOUNGE

Dinner: 6:30 - 8:30

FRIDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 21

GENERAL SESSION: 8:45 - 10:30
HYATT SUITE

Topic: "Cultural Reproduction Theory: What Is It and What of It?"

Chair: Richard Brosio (Ball State University)

Paper: Walter Feinberg (University of Illinois)
"Aspects of the Reproduction Thesis"

Paper: Eric Brede (University of Illinois) "Theoretical Approaches to Education and Social Inequality"

Discussion

SATURDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 22

COFFEE: 8:30 - 9:00
HYATT SUITE

CONCURRENT SESSIONS: 9:00 - 10:45

Session A - HENRY CLAY ROOM

Paper: Robert Skovira (University of Houston, Victoria) "Cremin's Concept of Education"

Paper: John Scahill (University of Kentucky) "Does the 'Hidden Curriculum' Concept Warrant Reconsideration?"

Response and Chair: Michael Carbone (Ball State University)

Session B - MARY TODD LINCOLN ROOM

Paper: Craig Lehman (University of Kentucky) "A Modified 'Keller Plan' Curriculum for Introductory Ethics"

Response and Chair: Bernard Rosen (Ohio State University)

BUSINESS MEETING: 11:00 - 12:00
HYATT SUITE

INTRODUCTION

Buried deep in our cultural imagination there lies a presumption in favor of representing all educational questions as questions about what should be taught and how we might teach it better. The American faith (if indeed we should think of it as exclusively American at all) has not been in education per se, but in the official pedagogic set. Whether we looked to the teacher's 'character' as we did in the nineteenth century for guarantees that the promise of the act would be fulfilled, or to the teacher's 'skill' as we so commonly do today, the image of formal pedagogic endeavor itself has presided as master trope, enabling us to speak with measured assurance about the otherwise hopelessly tangled transactions between the generations and the material and symbolic world they share.

This was not Paul Goodman's faith, of course. Drawing inspiration from classical sources and Gestalt psychology, as well as from what he took to be the deepest impulses in Progressivism, he wrote incisively until the end on behalf of an educational horizon broad enough to reckon with the overall character of civic life and its net effect. Pedagogy certainly had a role to play in Goodman's world, but it was a limited role at best. "It's hard to grow up when there isn't enough man's work," he insisted in *Growing Up Absurd*. Fourteen years later he had changed his mind on some matters, but the educational emphasis in *New Reformation* was still the same: "If the institutions are such that there is entry into them and freedom is possible in them, the young will pick up their principles It is not that good institutions make possible a good educational system; they are the good educational system." Yet Goodman's voice was that of a civic intellectual, not an academic -- the voice of an old-fashioned citizen, as he might say, not a 'theorist' -- and so his relevance was of a special kind. Writing outside the protocols of academic utterance, he was free to cast his arguments with an amplitude and rhetorical bite otherwise impossible. But because he was not protected by those protocols either, his work remained marginal, along with the educational emphasis it represented, vulnerable enough to be dismissed as the efforts of a talented crank.

The climate within educational studies over the past generation takes on special cultural and historical significance against this backdrop. The faith has by no means been abandoned; we would hardly recognize ourselves if it were. But alongside the work that continues to honor it, as we must, we also find a self-conscious resistance to the presumption that educational questions are pre-eminently pedagogic and curricular -- not the flat breach of faith we find in one like Goodman, but at least an effort to hedge in the presumption, to tame its power, if only because we sense that subscribing to it lets more in the door (or keeps more out) than we would like. Apart from its timing, the pervasiveness of this resistance is striking, for it runs deep enough to cut across subspecialties and political ideology as well. Thus if *Schooling in Capitalist America* comes to mind as an obvious example here, so does Cremin's *American Education* and the efforts of revisionist historians more generally to overturn Cubberley's synthesis, as well as the now dormant philosophical disputes over whether teaching implies learning. This resistance is also striking precisely because it takes an academic form. Few of us could satisfy the conditions necessary to write as Goodman wrote. But because the discursive practices of academic life accommodate and encourage a wide range of talent, writing and speech that strive to acknowledge the idea that learning is not as scholastic a matter as we are apt to suppose are no longer the exclusive province of the avant garde or the unusually gifted. We can only speculate about the long-term consequences of all of this. The dangers of an ossified logic-chopping are here, of course; but so are intimations that one day the educational imagination will no longer be the pedagogic imagination we have known for well over one hundred and fifty years.

Appropriately enough, several papers read at this year's meeting of the OVPES display the vitality and continued pertinence of the well-established line, working as they do within an educational horizon circumscribed by the exigencies of a deliberate and systematic pedagogy. These papers ask: What sort of guidelines for

the classroom teacher can we derive from Dewey's views on "art as experience"? What is the nature of the connections between moral and aesthetic development, and what curricular recommendations are we warranted in making as a result? Is being more imaginative really the unimpeachable curricular aim that some have made it out to be? What curricular means are likely to enhance the imagination, and by what standard do we know if we are successful? Are the claims that an adequate moral education cannot be divorced from a philosophical education advanced by advocates of "Philosophy for Children" in any way convincing? Should we adapt the "Keller Plan" to the teaching of ethics, and if we did, what would such a course look like?

But we also find efforts here to depict and explore an educational horizon extending well beyond the last desk at the rear of the classroom, or to deepen our appreciation of the moral ambiguities implicit in the official teaching act itself. What are the educational implications of current proposals to "Get America Going Again" through 'Reindustrialization'? Wherein lies the distinctiveness of 'Cultural Reproduction Theory' and its approach to education and inequality? Are there reasons to think that the efforts of Michael Apple and others will carry us further than quarrels over the 'hidden curriculum' did? Is Cremin's conception of education as "intentional activity," one in which the school figures as but a single instance, as useful analytically as Cremin thinks it is? After all has been said and done about the "restrictions of manner" which make 'teaching' different from 'indoctrinating,' do both warrant--and unwarranted varieties of coercion continue to cling to the enterprise? What are the sources of these forms of coercion, and how, if at all, can they be avoided?

Readers interested in pursuing some of the implications of this broad division in educational sensibility -- the variety of problems it poses, and the forms these problems take -- will find much that is worthwhile here. There are other ways to read these papers, however, for they represent a good deal more than a reflection of the climate in educational studies generally. Just as "Claims of Educational Purpose" thematically joined several papers read at last year's meeting, we can trace a common interest in the "nature and limits of reason" through many of the pieces in this collection. As in years past, moreover, we find a version of this theme sounded initially in the presidential address.

Proposals for the "Reindustrialization of America" will be miseducative in their overall effect, Richard LaBrecque argues, because they exemplify and encourage "strategic thinking" only, a brand of thinking inimical to the evaluation of ends as well as means, and therefore inimical to reason itself. But in addition to the dangers posed by the prospect of this "truncated form of rationality" tightening its grip on civic life even further, LaBrecque is also worried about the kind of analytic leverage the traditional distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' (or 'instrumental') value affords in understanding this threat. On his view, the traditional distinction bogs down into "infinite regress" when we pose questions about the "worthwhileness" of policies directed toward 'reindustrialization.' He argues for a conception of "imperative value" as a remedy, one that can not be wielded in a conceptual vacuum but is necessarily linked to empirical social research. In reply, David Engel concurs, at least insofar as LaBrecque's dismay about reindustrialization is concerned, but he expresses one reservation: Has LaBrecque underestimated "self-interest," he asks, or perhaps overestimated reason's ability to conquer it?

The exchange between LaBrecque and Engel considers the nature and limits of reason as both educative aim and as analytic tool in the context of public policy discussion. An interest in reason solely as educative aim is by far the most common emphasis in the papers that follow, however, an interest which works itself out in a curricular context. As their titles suggest, we do not find reason held captive here by the requirements of material productivity and profit or rebuffed by selfishness, but reason as an organ of understanding necessarily augmented by aesthetic or moral sensibilities.

Greetings to you all.

Richard Angelo
Associate Editor

PART I

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

STRATEGIC THINKING, REASON, AND EDUCATION:
A CRITIQUE OF RE-INDUSTRIALIZATION

Richard LaBrecque
University of Kentucky

In recent years a group of educational theorists, both here and across the Atlantic, have attempted to develop an explanation for educational and economic inequalities, an explanation based on what they refer to as the process of cultural reproduction. This address recognizes the significance and import of that theoretical perspective and seeks to contribute to a clarification of the dynamics resulting in cultural reproduction. In this paper the "re-industrialization of America," understood both as a diagnosis of our economic crisis and as a solution to it, will be critically appraised. The re-industrialization of America, if successful, would mean the cultural reproduction of a form of life, and its *exemplum bonum* form of thinking, that represents a massive assault upon and an egregious insult to reason and rationality as both the ends and means of the good society. "Strategic thinking" is the form of minding of re-industrialization. This mode of thinking is a truncated form of rationality, the continuation of which threatens not only the material well-being of millions of people, but also the existence and survival of much of mankind. And, whereas education transmits the culture in which it is embedded as a basic institutional process, the justification for this critique of the re-industrialization of America from an educational standpoint is that the realization of the goals of re-industrialization of America spells doom for an educative process aimed at the development of persons committed to what has been called a "passion for reason."¹ The re-industrialization of America will not be educative; it will be mis-educative. Thus, because of both its social and educational consequences, the re-industrialization of America should be criticized, resisted, and replaced by an alternative possibility for industrial society which, as a form of social life, I have chosen to call the "re-humanization of America."

Back in the nineteen forties a group of philosophers and social theorists associated with the Frankfurt School emigrated to the United States and settled at Columbia University where they published a journal, *Philosophy and Social Research*. Their integrative approach to philosophy and the social sciences is one that will be employed to explicate the basic thesis of this paper, which is that re-industrialization will be mis-educative. The methodological approach to a critique of the re-industrialization of America is one that will bring together the interpretative and valuational functions of philosophy and the explanatory function of the social sciences. Three parts follow: the first part is a description and interpretation of the re-industrialization of America. In this part I will argue that the employment of the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values is of limited use for a critique of re-industrialization. The next part will be a philosophical critique of the re-industrialization of America in which I will construct a normative model of *entitlement*, which I call "educative justice." In this part it will be argued that the re-industrialization of America is a primary barrier to "educative justice," the underlying dimension of which is reason as a conflation of cognitive and moral development.² The final part will suggest a focus for educational theory and research that would aim at an explanation of why it would be difficult to prevent the reproduction of the irrational form of social life symbolized by the quest for the re-industrialization of America. The paper will close with recommendations for "what is to be done" by educators concerned with constructing a form of life guided by reason and not by strategic thinking.

The re-industrialization of America is, in the language of Stuart Ewen, a "theatre of daily life" in which "within the intimacies of that reality a corporate *piece de theatre* [is] being scripted."³ As Ewen would likely state the issue, what would occur with the re-industrialization of America would be an intensified contestation for the control of consciousness and everyday life.⁴ The re-industrialization of America, from the standpoint of Herbert Marcuse, would be an "assault on historical sensibility," because moral imagination is repressed during

the formation of concepts for the direction of industrial society, with a resulting "confinement of experience" and a "restriction of meaning."⁵ For Marcuse, the re-industrialization would be one-dimensional thinking and "an assault on thinking itself."⁶ Let us take a closer look at this attack on thinking, by which Marcuse means restricting thinking to instrumental or technological rationality in which concepts are tools for actions deemed good because they are programmatically good for a given set of ends considered good in themselves. In this regard, Steiner might refer to the re-industrialization of America as being premised on the "pragmatic fallacy," i.e., if it is effective or works it is necessarily -- intrinsically -- good.⁷

What intrinsic and instrumental values characterize the re-industrialization of America? *Business Week*, in a special issue devoted to selling the idea of the need for a re-industrialization of America, identified many of the values associated with this economic policy prescription for solving the problems of our ailing economy.⁸ The chief problem of our economy, as *Business Week* sees it, is the inability of American business, as a whole, to compete effectively on the world market.⁹ The solution to that problem is instituting a national policy for revitalizing our industrial apparatus and for stimulating investment and export by those companies showing promise they can effectively conduct international economic warfare.¹⁰ Such a policy will require a "new social contract," one that should be "hammered out" by business, labor, and academic leaders.¹¹ This "new social contract" will bind all to a "general will" aimed at the "common good" by spelling out what each group in society should contribute to the re-industrialization of America and what each group may expect in return.

Business Week has already determined what the "general will" ought to look like in the new social contract. The key image governing *Business Week's* notion of the "general will" is thousands of Japanese crowding the port of Yokohama screaming "bansai" while filling out advance purchase orders for Chrysler K-Cars and RCA televisions being unloaded from American ships. Meanwhile, Toyota and Panasonic employees are crying in their imported Budweiser beer.

This goal of global economic dominance can only be achieved, claims *Business Week*, by the following steps: First, the social contract must give less priority to the goals of the poor, minorities, and the environmentalists.¹² Second, the federal government should concertedly aid and abet the re-industrialization of America. *Business Week* perceives the federal government as "probably the root cause of the nation's stagnating productivity."¹³ The government, in order to assist in the re-industrialization of America, must pursue an "active industrial policy" that will allow able American companies to take advantage of the "realistic opportunities available in the world economy."¹⁴ An active policy means that the government will modify or change a number of existing practices. Instead of, for example, continuing a "demand management" economy that aims at increasing consumer spending, the government will now institute measures that will move the country from a "high consumption economy to a high savings economy."¹⁵ Instead of stimulating business investment by creating larger domestic markets, the government will encourage savings and increase tax cuts to business in order to "provide new incentives for capital investment."¹⁶ If the government does this, it would, says *Business Week*, represent an end to Washington politicizing the American economy! The purpose of these tax and investment policies is to contribute to a total and comprehensive strategy for regaining global economic supremacy.¹⁷

Third, with the re-industrialization of America there would be an end to "lemon socialism." The government would not attempt to salvage inefficient companies.¹⁸ Fourth, the concept of "entitlement" would undergo a changed stipulation so that it would be more facilitative in its consequences for re-industrialization. Although the "general will" is to include "fairness" as a social principle, whereby "sacrifice is not exacted from those least able to bear it," "each group's income is to be determined by its economic achievement."¹⁹ Fifth, the government is to redirect the flow of capital to high technology industries, for these are the sector of the economy that must triumph against the most potent industries of the competitive economies of the "free world."²⁰ Sixth, the multi-national

corporations are to be viewed as a chief economic weapon for conducting the international trade war existing among the capitalist economies of the world, for the multi-nationals "may be the surest means for marketing the output of a revitalized U.S. industry."²¹ Thus, the federal government should cease and desist from prosecuting and penalizing multi-nationals that resort to bribery for invading a particular foreign market. The elimination of "moralistic conditions of trade" will assist us in the "scramble for world market shares."²²

Seven, the federal government must curtail its policy of redistributing income from the rich to the poor. Control over the budget, according to *Business Week*, means that "we have to attack programs that are exploding and that means entitlements."²³ The poor and near-poor are to adjust themselves to a lower standard of living so that an accumulation of capital necessary for financing re-industrialization may be more easily secured. Finally, the government must not only free itself of an over-concern for the dispossessed but for the environmentalists as well. Government regulation of industry, in terms of the environment and the safety needs of workers, is to be overhauled and reduced in its scope and intensity. Unless we alter drastically federal government regulatory policies, says *Business Week*, we will continue to divert dollars from the "basic function of producing goods, financing growth, and nurturing innovation."²⁴ In sum, *Business Week* advocates the lifting of restraints on the economic system so as to unleash its productive potential.

Besides these changes in governmental policy, American industry itself must clean up its act, says *Business Week*. The elements in this redemptive process include: First, stop thinking tactically, i.e., pursuing short-term, quick profits; instead, think strategically, i.e., seek an optimization of profits over the long-run. One establishment-oriented analysis of the "marked deterioration of competitive vigor" of American industry argues that it was due not to government policies, OPEC cartel oil prices, or a shortage of capital, but to short-term, tactical, "quick buck" thinking on the part of American managers. This analysis claims that salvation for the American economy is to be found through a long-term strategy of developing new and technologically superior products and processes that will have the affluent of the world panting for our commodity production.²⁵ (The Yokohama port image syndrome again.)

A second clean house move for American industry is to provide a more rewarding work climate for its employees. The new social contract will assist in "creating a new sense of teamwork" between management and labor.²⁶ New incentives should be offered to workers in order to "motivate them to higher levels of productivity."²⁷ "on-financial criteria" are to be included in "management-by-objectives."²⁸ These criteria will involve new work relationships wherein workers will be granted a "voice in work-place decisions," authoritarian supervision will be eliminated, problem-solving skills will replace adversarial skills, and cooperation between management and labor in the determination of broad economic goals for the nation will be increased.²⁹

Although *Business Week* suggests other policies for solving the economic crisis of stagflation, its major proposals for reform have been cited.³⁰ Let us now move from description to interpretation. What is the meaning of the re-industrialization of America? In asking that question we are really asking what are the intended and what will likely be the unintended consequences of re-industrialization. The identification of these consequences brings us back to the question that preceded the description of the re-industrialization of America -- that question being what intrinsic and instrumental values are the woof and warp of the re-industrialization process?

With regard to that question the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values, which philosophers often utilize as a device for valuational analysis and as a device for normative reform, is of limited value in a critique of re-industrialization aimed at altering those values. I will attempt to show why by identifying the instrumental and intrinsic values of re-industrialization. Some of the chief instrumental values of the re-industrialization of America are:

- 1) the federal government stops badgering industry and does everything in its

power to assist corporate America in improving its ability to export products, 2) the mass majority of Americans resign themselves to a lower standard of living so that capital accumulation can be facilitated even more rapidly for the modernization of industry, 3) capital is concentrated in high-technology industries for the purpose of developing sophisticated and competitive commodity production, 4) the adversarial relationship between management and labor is replaced by an atmosphere of collaboration, 5) strategic, long-term thinking replaces short-term, tactical thinking aimed at quick profits.

These and other instrumental values are aimed at what appears to be the intrinsic values of productive growth and global economic supremacy. But, those values represent ends-in-view instrumental to other values. These other values include full employment with jobs, therefore, for the poor and minorities; the creation of tax revenues the government can use for quality-of-life factors such as a cleaner and safer environment and an enhancement of national military strength. But, one could argue that these values are instrumental to yet other values. Such might include strengthening the family through job security, improved life chances for minorities, longer life for all through a reduction in environmentally-induced carcinogens, and freedom from domination of totalitarian social orders.

The preceding suggests that the employment of the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values in appraising the worthwhileness of re-industrialization gets us into the problem of infinite regress in a valuational analysis of re-industrialization. This traditional philosophical tool for analysis and judgment, in-and-of-itself, appears quite useless. It still has value, though, if it is employed with a social research perspective on values philosophical in its consequences. The social research perspective would cite empirical data--for example, the track record of corporate industrialism, with regard to what have been the consequences in the past of corporate industrialism achieving its purposes of productivity and growth. Is there any set of arguments and accompanying evidence to suggest that "unleashing" the corporations will result in consequences unlike those we have experienced in the past? Are we not likely to intensify a process resulting in the exhaustion of resources and the pollution of the environment? Inquiry into those questions may suggest that proponents of re-industrialization are a sub-culture which is a shrunken cocoon of hallucinatory thinking. They may likely not be engaging in minding activities they believe are absolutely essential for revitalizing the economy. *Business Week*, for example, claims that we need: 1) complete rethinking of economic policy, 2) sweeping changes in basic institutions, 3) a reprogramming of the way Americans think about their economy, 4) a coherent national policy for economic development, and 5) a sense of "totality" in our attitude towards economic changes.³¹ But, all these recommendations are to be viewed within the context of an existing social construction of reality that has as its epistemology instrumental (or technological) rationality. Interestingly, *Business Week* has declared that "it will not be legitimate for government to legislate a new industrial structure."³² Strategic thinking on behalf of the existing industrial structure and its goals is the order of the day. Is this not a begging of the question, as rationality involves both a reconsideration of the ends to which strategic thinking is instrumental and of the structures requisite to the chosen ends?

But, more basically, the consideration of ends and structure of means returns us to the problem of infinite regress in a consideration of instrumental and intrinsic values. The way out of this dilemma is to synthesize philosophy and social research. An adequate critique of re-industrialization must include a concern with the imperative value(s) of the economic system of our culture. The practical, mundane problem faced by corporate America is the problem of recurrent recessions. We are in a recession now, which is a problem of over-production. The state in capitalist society attempts to mitigate that problem through credit expansion, enlargement of the money supply, public works, transfer payments to the poor, and military expenditures. But, these policies create inflation, so that we now experience the phenomenon of "stagflation." The state faces a situation of "damned if you do and damned if you don't," which Americans experience as the trade-off between unemployment and inflation. It is a classic

double-bind or as our Marxist friends might say, a contradiction internal to the capitalist political economy.

Re-industrialization represents an effort for solving the problem of recession. This brings us to the significance of the point about *imperative value*. The imperative value of our economy is profit. If one doesn't make enough return on capital investment then one goes down the drain (or goes on welfare as Chrysler has done). The crisis of over-production is a function of inadequate domestic demand. The function of the re-industrialization of America is to build an export market that will pick up the slack in domestic demand, thus restoring profits and insuring the continuation of the existing structure of the American economy. The consequences of an inability to develop a thriving overseas economy -- what *Business Week* calls global economic supremacy -- is a set of conditions that could lead to a command economy.

By recognizing the pursuit of profits as the imperative value of the American economy we can more fruitfully evaluate the merits of that economy. Whereas all values have externalities -- rationality itself, for example, is not sought without other outcomes in mind and feeling -- the employment of the concept of *imperative value* enables us to be more operationally relevant in making valuational judgments about social processes and institutions. What, for example, are the necessary consequences that follow from the pursuit of profit as the imperative value -- the chief rule of our economic system? The consequences of the necessities built into a form of life governed by the imperative value of profit lead inexorably to a set of *operative principles*. That is, the imperative value of our economic system leads people to act in patterned ways that reflect principles which influence their everyday-life behavior. These operative principles include: 1) squander resources, 2) neglect survival needs of people, 3) dangerously pollute the environment, 4) treat others, as well as oneself, as objects to be manipulated for the purpose of meeting the challenge of an imperative value, and 5) innovate well-made and serviceable products so as to make them obsolete.

The operative principles resulting from the imperative value of our economic system compel people to act in ways that result in consequences they would rather avoid. But as our economic system is the only game in town and its dynamics are determined by the imperative value of profit, just how useful is it to argue with its participants with regard to the operative principles of the system in terms of a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values? From a purely philosophical perspective that distinction has enough problems in itself. The distinction may be arbitrary, as intrinsic values are instrumental in two ways. First, an intrinsic value -- a good-in-itself -- is necessary, i.e., instrumental, for identifying the means to its realization. Second, intrinsic values have externalities as well -- the problem of infinite regress. A practical philosophical perspective, one anchored in social research, would recognize that unless people had available to them an economic game to play that involved different imperative values or none that were imperative, then it would not be very fruitful to analyze and judge (or have them do so) their actions on the basis of the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values. The use of that distinction, in operationally relevant ways, would seem to require the option of an economy not subject to the imperative values of our existing system. Thus, a focus on the imperative values of our economic system would seem to make greater sense for social and philosophical purposes than would employing the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values.

A consideration of the imperative value in our economic system is also crucial for entitlement theory. And from an educational perspective, entitlement theory is closely intertwined with the concept of educational opportunity. The latter may be viewed as one pattern of the former. From this perspective several concepts of equality of educational opportunity as types of educational entitlements compete for our allegiance. In this part of the paper four meanings of equality of educational opportunity will be reviewed. I will argue that only one meaning of equality of educational opportunity is incompatible with the imperative value of profits and with strategic thinking as a penultimate form of rationality. The inference to be drawn from this part is that re-industrialization will function

as a fundamental barrier to genuinely rational thinking as well as to equality of educational opportunity conceived as being entitled to "an educative social role."

The central tenets of the classic liberal view of equality of educational opportunity are fully compatible with the imperative value of re-industrialization.³³ Those tenets include the principle of selection through achievement not ascription -- the meritocratic principle; matching power for making decisions to technical intelligence; discarding irrelevant criteria, such as race, for discriminating between people; and emphasis upon efficiency; and randomizing poverty among all groups of people. A critique of the classic liberal view would include the question of efficiency for what; the fact that the meritocracy operates within a society characterized by structural inequalities of wealth and income; that the classic liberal view, therefore, is based upon a win/lose situation in which poverty, at best, would be randomized and not minimized or eliminated; that it is legal and formalistic in approach; that in encouraging divisive and insidious competitiveness the classic liberal view distorts and queers human relationships; and, finally, that the classic liberal view is based upon the fundamental social principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his ability."

Although none of these tenets is detrimental to the imperative value permeating re-industrialization, it is the social principle of the classic liberal view that led John Rawls to develop his alternative conception of "justice as fairness." This societal ethic represents a rejection of the principle of the good society as that in which the individual is simply entitled to an equal chance to become a member of the meritocracy. For Rawls the great social problem is to find an efficient distributor of rights and duties that is also fair. The classic liberal view isn't fair as it is based upon the genetic lottery, which, Rawls argues, is as arbitrary as are social differences. Rawls' strategy for combining efficiency and fairness and for handling the genetic lottery is to bend the classic liberal principle of meritocracy along utilitarian lines. Rawls enunciates a new conception of entitlement, viz., that all social values such as educational opportunity are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of those values benefits the least advantaged. Thus, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both "Attached to positions open to all and reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage." Concomitant with that principle is the idea that one is to perceive of one's talents as a social asset the fruits of which are to be available to all members of society.

Several problems with Rawls' position have generally been overlooked. A basic weakness is that it can be easily bent to fit the imperative value of our economic system. *Business Week*, for example, argues that freeing up the corporations for the scramble for world markets requires meritocracy and efficiency. Adherence to those two principles for guiding the economy will enlarge the size of the economic pie and bring benefits to the least advantaged. Thus, the old trickle-down argument could be used as a ploy to neutralize the potentially radical thrust of Rawls's outlook. Rawls's position could, therefore, leave much of the population in a passive, dependent position. Additionally, it does not address quality-of-life issues such as workplace democracy. Rawls's position, although not intended as such, would likely function as a justification for what has come to be called "welfare capitalism."³⁴ This form of life is one that is not incompatible with re-industrialization and may represent the final convulsion of the capitalist epoch, becoming an aspect of the "friendly fascism" Bertram Gross speaks of.³⁵

Daniel Bell offers a conception of equality of educational opportunity that is not dissimilar to that of Rawls. Bell has his own strategy for modifying the meritocratic principle. Nothing that "some deserve praise, but all deserve respect" Bell argues that the losers are entitled to a basic set of services and income from society. His social principle seems to be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." Bell's outlook, though, would be subject to the same criticism made of Rawls's. Bell accepts the main features of contemporary American capitalism and seeks to "humanize," legitimize, and stabilize the welfare

state. Such a strategy also leaves much of the population in a passive, dependent position and poses no serious problem to the ethics of re-industrialization.

From an educational standpoint a theory of entitlement -- a conception of equality of educational opportunity -- is needed that represents a qualitative change in the evolution of our society. Equality of educational opportunity as *entitlement to an educative social role* is such a change and symbolizes a rejection of re-industrialization. Entitlement to an educative social role would involve a basic criterion incompatible with the imperative value of re-industrialization. That criterion also symbolizes an alternative form of life entailing a reproduction process transmissive of a form of thinking supportive of the continual reconstruction, not reproduction, of experience.

Entitlement conceived as access to an educative social role entails the principle that reason rather than just strategic thinking is elicited in whatever social role we may find ourselves. Such an assertion calls for distinguishing the former from the latter and relating both to education; hence the title of this address. Strategic thinking, as a form of rationality, is concerned solely with the identification and evaluation of the most promising means for achieving a given end. Strategic thinking is, therefore, what Weber calls functional rationality and contemporary philosophers and social theorists refer to as technological, instrumental, or praxiological rationality. Reason, as distinguished from strategic thinking, concerns itself with ends as well as means. Reason, as a form of thinking, focuses upon the substance of an issue, i.e., upon what is to be considered a desirable goal or end to pursue. Substantive rationality grapples with the issue of the good-in-itself, whereas functional rationality is concerned with instrumental goods, i.e., with efficacious actions (what will work) for achieving a specific end.

Reason -- as stipulated -- is to be equated with the meaning of education, for reason is the pre-condition for determining what ought to be the ends of education. The educational process presumes reason, viz., the inexorable tie between substantive and functional rationality, as both its ends as well as its means. The dualism between instrumental and intrinsic values breaks down; what becomes most salient is the concept of imperative value. In order to more fully realize education, i.e., reason, as a value we need to identify the barriers to it. The fundamental barrier is the imperative value of the pursuit of profits. That imperative activity represents the rules of the game governing re-industrialization. One consequence of this imperative is that strategic thinking (instrumental rationality) as an operative ideal for cognitive development is the social and educational content of re-industrialization as a social construction of reality.³⁶ The actual goal for cognitive development strategic thinking is mis-educative as it violates the meaning of education as the promotion of reason.

Promoting reason as a form of thinking requires a new form of life. Instead of re-industrialization, a cultural reproduction of a mis-educative form of life, we need a re-humanization of America. Re-humanization would call for reasoned discourse as to the ends to which the productive capabilities of our economic system should be geared. Not inconceivably those ends might include an elimination of world poverty and as the means to that what third world spokesmen call "a new international economic order."

The re-humanization of America represents an "educative meaning structure." Reason, not just strategic thinking, would be the operative norm for institutional discourse. A new social contract would be more like that posited by Rousseau in which the general will stood for responsible and reasoned behavior in community as against the instrumental behavior of the particular wills. The role for educational theorists committed to reason as the meaning of education is not to persuade people to a genuine employment of Rousseau's social contract, though. Instead, their role should be to seek an explanation as to the emergence of a distorted view of Rousseau's social contract and concept of the general will. For the social contract was Rousseau's post-revolutionary educational doctrine. The social contract symbolized a form of life in which reason was the form of thinking. The educational process was participation in the formation of the

general will. Strategic thinking is the form of thinking of the pre-revolutionary form of life that led Rousseau to write *The Social Contract*. The mission of cultural reproduction theory should be to discern the strategic barriers to education as the life of reason. The concept of imperative value is a clue to those barriers. As more people understand how the imperative value of our economy functions as an alien force over our society, then perhaps we can hasten the day when this twilight zone of rationality, this wasteland of morality, this monologic form of life, this constriction of moral imagination, this cognitive house of bondage is put behind us.³⁷

NOTES

1. R.S. Prters, *Education and the Education of Teachers* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 121.

2. I am indebted to Joe R. Burnett, Dean, College of Education, University of Illinois, Urbana and to Arthur G. Wirth, Professor of Education at Washington University, St. Louis, for sharing with me their recent papers on the relevance of Dewey's thought to contemporary issues associated with work, education, democracy, and rationality. Their ideas resonate throughout this paper. Dewey's concept of "social intelligence" is a conflation of cognitive and moral development.

3. Quoted in Henry Giroux, "Schooling and the Culture of Positivism: Notes on the Death of History," *Educational Theory*, vol. 29, no. 4 (Fall, 1979), p. 267.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Elizabeth Steiner, et al., *Education and American Culture* (New York: Macmillan, 1980), p. 11.

8. *Business Week*, June 30, 1980.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
25. Robert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy, "Managing Our Way to Economic Decline," *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 58, no. 4 (July-August, 1980).
26. *Business Week*, 6/30/80, p. 86.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
30. *Time*, in its April 21, 1980 (vol. 115, no. 16) issue makes essentially the same policy prescriptions, which may illustrate the relevance of Gramsci's concept of "cultural hegemony."
31. *Business Week*, 6/30/80, *passim*.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
33. This section on alternative conceptions of equality of educational opportunity is largely taken from Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
34. Cf. Robert Paul Wolff, *Understanding Rascals* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 195.
35. Bertram Gross, *Friendly Fascism* (New York: Evans, 1980).
36. The phrase "social and educational content" is borrowed from the brilliant critique of contemporary theories of moral education by Yanarella and Reid. See Herbert G. Reid and Ernest J. Yanarella, "Critical Political Theory and Moral Development," *Theory and Society*, vol. IV (Winter 1977-78).
37. This critique of re-industrialization is not dissimilar to Dewey's critique of capitalist industrialism in *Individualism Old and New* where he states: "... the educative influences of economic and political institutions is, in the last analysis, even more important than their immediate economic consequences" (p. 129). And "We must wrest our general culture from an industrialized civilization; and this fact signifies that industry must itself become a primary educative and cultural force for those engaged in it" (p. 133). What this paper adds to Dewey's outlook is a more explicit claim as to those dynamics of our economic system that function as a barrier to "educative justice."

A CRITIQUE OF A CRITIQUE: A RESPONSE TO
RICHARD LABRECQUE ON RE-INDUSTRIALIZATION

David E. Engel
University of Pittsburgh

From my experience I have to say that this paper is vintage LaBrecque. And, I would add, 1980 is a good year. Whether it should remain in the bottle (or the OVPEP *Proceedings*) a few years to improve its bouquet and flavor, I cannot be entirely sure. But its immediate taste is better than some recent California stock (Chateau Reagan -- Ronald, not Jerry!). If we should keep this bottled up until 1984 (not seen by Futurist Orwell as a good year), we might look back on this time and wish we had pulled the cork sooner. And then, I think, we would realize it had not been fine wine at all, but Irish whiskey -- undiluted, a bit raw, yet honest and direct, and also a bit heady.

The mash of LaBrecque's brew is "strategic thinking," which is, he tells us, a "truncated form of rationality" geared to a notion of "re-industrialization." For LaBrecque it is a bitter mash indeed. He asserts that it "threatens not only the material well-being of millions of people but the existence and survival of much of mankind." For those of us who are cognitive types, it "spells doom for an educative process aimed at the development of persons committed to what has been called (by R.S. Peters, no less) a 'passion for reason.'" As the brilliant American philosopher, Jimmy Durante, once put it: "What a catastrophé!"

Does LaBrecque mean to say that "strategic thinking" which is the instrument for re-industrialization is a national, or even international, disaster? Is it just plain corporate and nationalistic selfishness? Or is it something else?

Trace his argument. It includes three elements. First, he presents a critique of the incapability of the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values to expose the moral problems connected with this phenomenon. Second, he analyzes the impact of re-industrialization on notions of entitlement. Third, he presents some recommendations for rational alternatives to so-called strategic thinking.

At the outset, LaBrecque considers the value structure of re-industrialization. The chief problem we face, strategic thinkers would assert, is economic. Our business enterprises are presently unable to compete in world markets. Therefore we must revitalize and reconstruct industry to that it can compete and win. This will require a new social contract, very largely an economic arrangement, to specify how and who must sacrifice for the common good of dominance and control in the international marketplace. Such a *Business Week* mentality is typically communicated in crass pragmatic terms -- if it works, it's good -- which never question underlying moral presuppositions.

Parenthetically I would suggest that we need to recognize the attraction of re-industrialization for many who are neither powerful nor affluent. Suppose you were an unemployed steel worker in Youngstown, Ohio or a potentially unemployed auto worker at the Chrysler Corporation. Wouldn't you object to government regulations which putatively drive up costs and threaten productivity? I'm not indicating whether that is correct or right, only that it is seductive. Wouldn't you question the direction of federal monies to unproductive persons who drain needed funds away from the means of production that need to be re-tooled and re-designed? Wouldn't you feel your area of the economy is entitled to more support in a time of trouble than the poor who are always with us? Wouldn't you suspect that "big government" has sapped the strength of "big industry" and that now is the time to let business men rescue us from the halting leadership and economic failure of the liberals? Wouldn't you be more interested in a chance to work at union scale than subsist on welfare? After all, it's your neck that's being strangled. Therein, I think, lies a great deal of the apparent attraction of

the President-elect for significant numbers of workers who have not previously voted for a conservative Republican.

That is why I raised the question earlier about whether this is a matter of selfishness. You and I can understand that mentality because we in higher education are also threatened. It could be our necks too. So let's keep enrollments up (that's a productivity move) and let's become multinational (keep those OPEC students coming).

LaBrecque is troubled with the morality of this. Well he can be. He claims that to analyze the values imbedded in the ideology of re-industrialization in terms of the intrinsic-instrumental distinction leads to infinite regress. Here I disagree somewhat. While LaBrecque does show how various instrumental values can imply other instrumental values and so on, he could also have shown how certain underlying normative considerations (my neck as opposed to yours, for instance) conflict. But let me return to the question in a moment as a recommendation for strengthening LaBrecque's argument.

Instead of looking at the values of re-industrialization ideology in either instrumental or intrinsic terms, LaBrecque suggests that the core value is the imperative that the economic system or enterprise make a profit. This in turn leads to the operational principles of, for example, squandering resources, neglect of others' survival needs, environmental pollution, planned obsolescence and, perhaps most important, exempting the core value from criticism. Presumably strategic thinking which leads to re-industrialization assumes that the imperative to be profitable is self-justifying. Here I am in agreement with LaBrecque when he states: "a focus on the imperative values of our economic system would seem to make greater sense for social and philosophical purposes than employing the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values." I agree with one caveat; and that has to do with my earlier point of a conflict among intrinsic values. Even though both the corporate head and the displaced or potentially displaced worker may subscribe to re-industrialization in an instrumental sense, they do so in all probability with different intrinsic values in mind, possibly even conflicting ones. The worker will support the ideology and vote for Reagan because he or she believes it is a better bet for survival. Re-industrialization is seen as the instrument for the intrinsic value of survival.

For the industrialist the issue is not survival in the same sense, at least not survival in the basic sense of the worker, but it is control and status. Lee Iaccoca will not go on welfare if Chrysler goes under. But he will find it difficult to retain his pride.

Or, to bring it home, you or your junior colleagues may not go on welfare if your tenure unit is terminated or your institution declares bonafide financial exigency; but our circumstance is more like the steel or auto worker's than Lee Iaccoca's. When it gets down to questions of our respective necks, that is, to basic survival, we justify our interests and tactics in necessarily selfish terms and fail to pay attention to the imperative values which have created the situation which has exacerbated our conflict in the first place.

Can you remember the public criticism not that long ago -- about a year and a half -- when there were long lines at gas stations? A few selfish individuals were seen to be guilty culprits because they were topping off their tanks when others had a greater need. So those at the pump were put in conflict with one another, partly because they held different values (values of different consumers, values of marketers, values of distributors).

Meanwhile the oil companies, driven by what LaBrecque calls imperative values, cranked out unprecedented profits. By keeping the consumers in conflict, the producers and managers avoided culpability.

I know there is more to it than that. The unprecedented profits were re-invested, in large measure, in activities for future oil production and energy resource development (e.g., buying coal lands for future exploitation). But all

that just follows the imperative value of increased profits.

Some years ago in the South there was a phenomenon known as the "battle royal." Men of means, landowners, for recreation in the saloon would entice two poor men to fight, with the winner given a modest reward, usually enough whiskey to make him drunk. It was a cheap pastime. Typically one was the descendent of a slave and the other a poor white. In economic terms, they were competitors of sorts and that added to the intensity of the entertainment. Frequently they fought to the bitter end with the loser injured in both body and pride. For the combatants in the battle royal, their survival was at stake. But for the managers of the fight, it was a matter of entertainment and the reinforcement of their established positions.

Re-industrialization can be construed as a battle royal in which society's established managers will suffer no blows as they think (and act) strategically; but others will. They, the managers, will use the labor and money of others to enhance their own position and power. Others may benefit from their profits as they trickles down through the classes. But that is only incidental to the process and not a necessary outgrowth of the imperative value.

According to LaBrecque, the problem is to debunk the imperative value of profit and its rational instrument, strategic thinking, which is uncritical of the imperative value and to promote "reason as a form of thinking (which) requires a new form of life." He suggests "Instead of re-industrialization. . . we need a re-humanization of America." And that "would call for a reasoned discourse as to the ends which productive capabilities . . . should be geared."

Would that it were that simple! What LaBrecque does not reckon with, as Rousseau did not before him, is the truculence of human beings in giving up self-interest. I do not dispute the need for re-humanization generally, although I would prefer to talk of further humanization. There is a born-again ring to the term "re-humanization" that could become a kind of secular fundamentalism.

Surely it is apparent that a notion like re-humanization would be variously agreed to and with different instrumentalities for its achievement in mind. Jimmy Carter, grant him the benefit of the doubt in his last few days as President, asserted the priority of human rights (his version of re-humanization). But Carter, as his former associates in the Trilateral Commission, could not stomach an Andrew Young's critique of human rights violations among nations with whom we were supposedly friendly. Or our new-found Chinese friends are attempting to re-humanize their society for a majority who knew only economic servitude in the past. And they are doing it by re-industrializing their society as they drink Coca-Cola and smoke Marlboro cigarettes.

I said this was vintage LaBrecque. But it is also stock grafted from Herbert Marcuse. For LaBrecque, following Marcuse, believes that reason is sufficient to conquer self-interest. I simply disagree. We are neither that good nor that reasonable. We are, I fear, corrupted by self-interest and we bend reason into strategies to preserve what we have or to devise instruments for what we want.

The problem is not one of developing disinterested reason, but recognizing the perversion of reason by interests, including our own, and challenging the pretenses of such interested reason. "Promoting reason as a form of thinking requires a new form of life," LaBrecque says. I am a skeptic about new forms of life. The task is for reason to spell out the problem of self-interest imbedded in our rational behavior. Re-industrialization and its handmaiden, strategic thinking, are not disinterested. They are interested in maximizing profits for those who control our economy (let the chips fall where they may, or trickle down for the rest of us). That part of LaBrecque's analysis needs to be heard. But to presume that a new entitlement through education will insure or promote fairness is an apocalypse, not to be taken literally.

My earnest wish is that LaBrecque never becomes cynical, even after putting up with the cynical likes of me, that his vision of re-humanization and

entitlement remain a constant challenge to all of our imperfect strivings. His is, in my estimation, (as is Rawls' theory) an impossible ethical ideal. But the impossible ethical ideal can be very relevant, because it tells us what we cannot accept, much less be comfortable about, in the morality of the present.

PART II

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL SESSIONS

ASPECTS OF THE REPRODUCTION THESIS

Walter Feinberg
University of Illinois

Recently scholars have begun to analyze the role that schools play in reproducing aspects of contemporary, capitalist society. Yet many issues still remain to be addressed among those who share the general view that schools tend to reproduce the social order. One key issue is the way in which the reproduction process is to be explained and understood. The purpose of this paper is to look at two kinds of explanations that have been given of the reproduction process, to highlight a few of the important differences between them, and to sketch briefly grounds for a reconciliation. For purposes of identification, I call one view the critical-functional paradigm, and the other the critical-interpretive paradigm. Both are called critical because, whether explicitly or implicitly stated, the observation that schools tend to reproduce the social order, or more precisely, the social realizations of capitalism, is placed within a descriptive apparatus which has negative normative implications. The two forms of explanation will be represented by Bowles and Gintis' on the one hand and by Willis' on the other.

Before looking at these two paradigms, it would be useful to begin by distinguishing the notion of reproduction from the related concept of socialization. While each of these concepts refers to some aspect of generational continuity, they differ in terms of the object of reference. In other words, individuals are socialized and they are socialized into different groups or societies. Societies or certain relationships which constitute particular societies, are reproduced. I have argued elsewhere¹ that the concept of social reproduction is prior to and a natural extension of the concept of socialization, and I have attempted to outline some of the major features that educational research must seek to understand when examining the process and patterns of reproduction. For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to think of social reproduction in terms of those patterns of relations and understanding through which a society maintains its identity across generations and within which social change is constrained. Thus, to contrast the two concepts, when we are studying socialization we are studying the *transaction* that occurs between mature and novice members of a group in order to create the patterns of behavior and thought required to make the novice a functioning member of the group. In studying social reproduction we are studying those *patterns* of behavior and thought which constitute functional membership for a particular group or society. It should be mentioned that this notion of social reproduction is not drawn from any of the works under consideration here, but it is not inconsistent with the more intuitive use suggested by the literature, and will help to focus the discussion towards a resolution later in this paper.

The functional paradigm partly expressed in Bowles' and Gintis' analysis is familiar to many educators, but a few words are needed to justify characterizing their work in this way. It is obvious that Bowles' and Gintis' analysis does not meet some of the ordinary sense of "functionalism." Indeed, underlying what is a functional analysis of schooling is a conflict view of society, where there is a latent, if largely unrecognized, conflict between different classes. It is important to recognize the fact that their functionalism is imbedded in this deeper conflict view so as not to confuse their position with more orthodox statements of structural functionalism. Nevertheless, the functional paradigm does come into play in Bowles' and Gintis' explanation of the patterns of schooling. It also comes into play in their explanations of the behavior of the agents and clients of schools. It is this aspect of their theory that we are most interested in. The point that needs to be emphasized here is that, in their eyes, schooling is largely viewed in epiphenomenal terms, generally follows the requirements of work and is to be understood in terms of the needs that it meets for servicing the work requirements of the society. In distinction from orthodox functionalism, for Bowles and Gintis such work requirements are not viewed as meeting the needs of all members of the society in the best or only possible way. Rather what is satisfied is largely the needs of the dominant capitalist class. However, through its influence on schools and other socializing agencies, this class is able to

circumscribe what is to count as a personally felt need by other members of the society, and thereby to contain choice within structures that it is able to profit from. The analysis suggests that when we are trying to understand some key element of schooling, such as why a particular reform failed, we need a theory which will tell us what particular kinds of reforms are allowable in this particular kind of society. In general, those reforms are allowable which can be syncretized with the needs of the dominant class. Those which cannot be so syncretized are generally not allowable. The latter will either fail completely, be molded in such a way that they may indeed fit into the requirement of the dominant class or not be tried at all. Thus, in order to explain the activity of schooling, Bowles and Gintis turn to an analysis of the function that schools serve in terms of the needs of the dominant class in capitalist society. It is on this level that their explanation (although not their analysis) may be construed in functional terms. It should be mentioned that Bourdieu and Passeron,⁴ in their analysis of schooling, use a very similar explanatory device although with a significantly different focus.

Bowles' and Gintis' analysis of the failure of liberal educational reform can therefore be understood in terms of their basic explanatory scheme. The correspondence principle, which highlights the role of schooling in modern capitalist society, serves for them as an explanation of the failure of some liberal reform movements in the sense that it provides a summary of the manpower needs of contemporary capitalist society and shows how these needs serve as constraints on the educational process. The account is similar in some respects to the kind of explanation that one finds in Darwinian theory, where an account consists of providing an elaboration of the filtering process whereby some mutations survive and others do not. Bowles' and Gintis' account also as a strong, although perverse, teleological component, where those reforms that do survive do so because they meet certain external and relatively stable needs -- in this case, the needs of the dominant, capitalist class.⁵ Thus the correspondence principle, which has come under heavy criticism, works as an account of the limited success of liberal reforms in terms of the school's interaction with larger political, economic and social forces. It is a limited explanation to be sure. Yet it does provide us with a rule-of-thumb understanding of why certain forms of schooling take hold and why others do not. It allows us to see, for example, why certain cognitive skills are not often emphasized in working class schools, why the schools have not been able effectively to equalize economic status and opportunity, and why schools often exhibit more intense hierarchical structures than many learning theories might see as desirable. In other words, Bowles' and Gintis' analysis directs us to look towards the constraints that are generated by the patterns of work in capitalist society. The schools, in reflecting these constraints, come thereby directly or indirectly to serve the needs of capitalist society. Thus they seek to explain certain aspects of schooling by understanding the function that such practices serve in the context of the needs of maintaining the capitalist relations of production. The critical force of their analysis is generated by their view, supported by Braverman and others, that the work requirements of capitalism as developed under modern conditions of technology are antagonistic to the developmental needs of human beings.

If the functional paradigm focuses attention on the structural constraints of schooling, the critical interpretive paradigm focuses it upon the meaning systems that enable certain rules and activities of school life to be accepted as constraints. Apple objects to the explanation offered by Bowles and Gintis on the ground that it overlooks the way in which the actual practices, consistent with capitalist domination, are translated into the fundamental categories that form the foundation of classroom knowledge and interaction.⁶ Thus, what Bowles and Gintis offer as an explanation of the practices of schooling fails to take into account, according to Apple, the specific practices of schooling that complete the correspondence. Without focusing upon the specific transactions that occur in the school such as the crucial transactions that mark off the boundaries between such fundamental categories as play and work or which define the proper ordering of time and space, the causal mechanisms of the correspondence will remain a mystery. Thus, Apple along with Nancy King, focuses attention on the transaction between teacher and students and upon the portion of the school message which gives shape and form to the fundamental activities of school and social life.

Apple also objects to the largely epiphenomenal view of schooling that is found in Bowles' and Gintis' work, and to what he sees as one of the important yet incorrect implications of it -- that teachers and students are but passive transmitters and receivers of the messages and norms developed outside of the school. Willis expresses this concern more pointedly: "The difficult thing to explain about how working class kids get working class jobs," he writes, "is why they let themselves." Thus what Bowles and Gintis cast in a passive mode is transformed by Willis and Apple into an active one. Schools and their clients do not just follow the dictates of capitalist society. In some very important sense they *choose* to follow them, or rather they choose not to oppose them. The problem, therefore, is to uncover the interpretive framework that enables this choice to take place.

The working class students that Willis studies, called the Lads, do not simply passively reflect the messages sent by the agents of the school. Rather they are able, in Willis' view, to penetrate the ideological nature of the message and to perceive intuitively just where it fails accurately to reflect the social world. With this perception the Lads provide a stark contrast to the passive conformity that Bowles and Gintis ascribe to working class youngsters. The Lads' unwillingness to conform is reflected by their rebellious behavior in school. Yet even with their ability to penetrate the ideological nature of schooling and their unwillingness to conform to the norms of the school, the Lads eventually wind up serving the work requirements of capitalist society. It is this movement which Willis sets out to describe and explain. Unlike the filtering mechanism underlying the critical functional paradigm, Willis' treatment suggests a slightly different mechanism. Here a more or less invisible hand functions independently of, and sometimes in opposition to, the wishes or intentions of the parties involved.

The central conflict in Willis' ethnographic study occurs between the formal culture of the school and the informal counter-culture of the Lads. Within the formal culture there is to be found a set of reciprocal expectations which define rights and responsibilities, establish the norms within which legitimate activity is contained and set up the interpretive structure through which acts are classified by the agents of the school. In short, in exchange for appropriate qualifications and credentials which the teachers are responsible for providing to the students, the students are expected to display respect and to conform to the established norms of good behavior. The smooth working of the school depends upon the acceptance of this exchange by each and every member of it. Where the value of the exchange is not shared, order breaks down, the agents of the system must resort to more direct means of control, and the coercive features of the school become apparent. Yet the shared value of the exchange depends upon a network of meaning that may easily be broken at a number of points. If, for example, one is to understand a credential as a reward, then one must also be able to project himself or herself into a job to which the credential provides access. If one is to project himself or herself into such a job, then there is also a need to see real work possibilities as hierarchically structured -- that is one kind of work must be seen as better than another. Furthermore, one must be willing to define one's own worth in terms of that hierarchy. Moreover, if students are to accept the exchange as a reciprocal one, then they must also be able to project a continuity between the habits, behavior, attitudes, and skills demanded by the school and those required by the realm of possible work opportunities that the students perceive as real possibilities for them.

For middle class students who have little difficulty projecting themselves into a professional job requiring additional schooling, it is often easy to accept the various links in this chain. Here even the value that the schools place on theoretical knowledge, knowledge which the Lads find difficult to accept as worthwhile, can be placed in the context of real future life chances.⁸ Many working class youngsters may be mystified by the relevance of theoretical knowledge to their life prospects but yet be willing to accept many of the behavioral requirements of school because they see these requirements as a prerequisite for some form of economic mobility. In doing so, as Bourdieu and Passeron suggest, they are also accommodating to the value placed upon them by the dominant

culture.

The interesting thing about the counter-culture of the Lads is that this network of meaning breaks down at virtually every possible point. The jobs that they perceive as constituting real possibilities for them are not hierarchically arranged. Each is simply another job, a means to the end which is free expression within the counter-cultural group. The kind of jobs which make a difference—lawyers, doctors and so forth—are not perceived as real possibilities for them, which in fact they are not, and thus are not seriously considered. Because a job is just a job, these students do not perceive their eventual worth in terms of a position on an occupational hierarchy, and thereby they reject the value of certification. And again, because all jobs are perceived to be the same, requiring a minimum of school knowledge, they also reject both the need for school-defined qualifications, and the value of theoretical knowledge. Thus the formal interpretive network of the school is interrupted at every moment, and the reciprocity which is supposed to lie behind the exchange between student and teacher is seen quite differently from the point of view of the members of the Lads' counter-culture. Indeed, it is not seen as reciprocity at all, but as a subtle attempt to dominate and to provoke deference to an authority structure whose legitimacy is denied. Thus school life becomes a contest, a way of pushing authority to its limits, of wresting momentary control away from the formal structure and of creating free time for "having a laugh" or mixing it up while hopefully deflecting the full force of the school's counterattack.

The creative element which Willis perceives in the Lads' response is not just to be found in the fact that they transform the school message and interpret it in their own terms. More importantly, it is to be found in the fact that in doing so the Lads reveal a sharp, although limited, ability to penetrate the mystifications provided by the school and to understand something important about how the system works. Thus, for example, they understand more fully than the career educator who comes to lecture them about the importance of qualifications the structure of work in contemporary society. As one of them puts it in response to the rhetorical question whether you want to be a painter or a decorator: "Got to be someone in society who slops on walls."⁹ And they understand quite clearly the limited possibilities that society provides for most youngsters like themselves.

The irony of all this is that in the larger scheme of things it really matters very little. Expecting nothing from society, nothing is demanded, and when their last year of school is complete the Lads find support in the counter-culture of the workplace. Unlike those who were receptive to the message of mobility and equal opportunity, they do not experience feelings of depreciation and resentment when opportunities are not forthcoming. Just as they contested with their teachers for the space and time needed to "have a laugh," so too do they contest with the shop foreman. Penetration there is, but resentment and potential resistance are deflected away from capitalism itself and channeled into a racism and sexism that allow the relations of production to persist unrelentingly. Without intending it to happen, indeed without giving it much thought, the Lads have been guided, as if by an invisible hand, to take up their positions in the capitalist state. Moreover, their own ideological apparatus, one which places high value on the practical over the theoretical, which measures worth in terms of gender, race, and traits of masculinity, allows them to do so without perceiving the "steady diminution of their own capacities" which their work situation brings about.

If we look at the two kinds of explanations, the one offered by Bowles and Gintis, the other by Willis, we can begin to approach a reconciliation. Bowles and Gintis have been heavily criticized by otherwise sympathetic readers like Apple for offering a black box theory of education. In other words, according to these critics, the correspondence principle leaves little room for understanding the interpretive processes that occur within the school itself and gives the general impression that teachers and students simply conform passively to the work requirements of the larger capitalist society. The correspondence principle directs us to look at inputs and outcomes without much concern with the happenings

in between. This criticism is important, and it points beyond Bowles and Gintis to something about filtering-type explanations. With such explanations the concern is not usually with the nature of the filter, or with the mechanisms that produce a given outcome, but rather with the outcome itself and with the range of its possible competitors. Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that while filtering metaphors suggest where to look for explanations, what they yield are descriptive generalizations of the type: "schools tend to reproduce the social order." One important implication of this is indeed that, because they are concerned largely with outcomes, they are unlikely to penetrate deeply into the interpretive structures and the way in which these both influence and are influenced by social interactional patterns. Given the critical nature of their study, this neglect is important and could be used to understand the let-down that some have felt over Bowles' and Gintis' specific proposals for change. If the interpretive network forms apart of a kind of "causal" chain, then strategies that fail to probe its nature are likely to fall short of their goal.

While Willis' study looks more closely at the actual interpretive mechanisms, it too falls short, but in a way different from Bowles and Gintis. Willis' analysis falters because he rests content with showing only a parallel relationship between the network through which the Lads interpret the school interactions and the requirements of the shop floor. We see that capitalism is served by the invisible hand, but we do not see just how it serves to guide the hand at the same time. What he fails to see is that the interpretive network of the Lads has been itself framed by a structural picture of capitalism. To put the point in a different way, Willis ultimately fails to perceive an important aspect of his question: Why do working class kids let themselves get working class jobs? The fact is that the Lads do not perceive that they have any choice in the matter. It is true that they understand the structure of work in capitalist society, and it is also true that they have made a fairly realistic assessment of their own opportunities within this structure. Given this appraisal, what they allow, as a matter of choice, is not their job -- that falls upon them. What they do choose is to maintain their counter-cultural identity in light of a set of alternatives that they largely accept as pre-structured for them. The point is that it is not clear that the Lads see the arrangement of occupational possibilities as a choice that is available to them, and that what we need to understand is the way their interpretive network functions so as to negate the perception of choice.

We can begin to understand this by looking at the nature of the Lads' penetration into the structure of work in capitalist society, and the features of that penetration which deflect its political impact away from a practical critique of capitalism. Willis describes the features of this deflection. The value of intellectual activity is denied. This denial, however, is not just of theoretical activity as defined by the school, but of theoretical activity in general. Therefore, the penetration which occurs on an intuitive level is not extended to a systematic critique of work under capitalism. Given this failure, hostility is directed not towards capitalism but towards others whose race places them in a pariah group. Individual superiority is affirmed through masculinity and the domination of women. The Lads are not a very attractive group. Yet to describe this deflection does not tell us why it takes place. The answer to this question cannot be given in strictly causal terms, but we can begin to see what is entailed in this issue by focusing our attention on another side of it -- the framework through which the interpretive network is expressed.

To begin with, return to the conception of reproduction as the patterns of behavior and consciousness which constitute functional membership for a particular group or society. One of the factors that allows a particular pattern to persist is the mode in which it is understood. For example, in Willis' study the teachers along with the majority of working class children who, in fact, do not belong to the Lads find the pattern of relations reasonable. Moreover, the rules by which individuals are allotted roles within the pattern are accepted as fair. The moral sensibilities of these youngsters are upset when they perceive a Lad breaking the rules with impunity and, as is the case when a classroom exercise is disrupted, denying them their fair share of the exchange. These students are thus willing to play by the rules, believing that by so doing

they will be entitled to the allocation of rewards that the system has to offer. For both these students and their teachers, the existing pattern is framed within a moral mode which sanctions it and provides its legitimacy. For the Lads the framework is quite different. The existing pattern of interrelationships is not framed by a moral mode, but rather by a deterministic causal one in which the existing patterns must be what they are and where the allocation of positions within it is arbitrary from a moral point of view. Their penetrations are deflected precisely because the framework in which their interpretations is generated allows no room for altering the existing causal nexus. They can penetrate the mystification that the idea of equal opportunity provides because they can see that the pattern of work requires someone to "slop on the walls." However, they are unable to join this insight to any kind of effective praxis because the existing pattern is not seen as a matter over which individuals can exercise collective choice.

In contrast to both of these frameworks stands the critical analysis provided by both Bowles and Gintis on the one hand and by Willis on the other. It is precisely the patterns of relationships which the critical nature of both of these studies implicitly places into question, and the critical impact of their analysis is provided by the implicit denial that this pattern is to be understood in either deterministic causal or positive moral terms. In other words, what each of these studies is searching for is a way to break into the perceived causal chain in order to provide an effective lever for change. To do this requires that any explanation, even those that account for educational change in terms of filtering mechanisms or invisible hands, be taken only as descriptive of a given state of affairs, and not as some inevitable law of social change. Implicitly, the critical force of the analysis offered by both Bowles and Gintis and by Willis recognizes this simple fact, but it is often lost in the presentation. To capitalize on the framework which generates their analysis would require Bowles and Gintis to treat the correspondence principle not as an explanation, but as a descriptive generalization, which it is. It would require that Willis perceive the deterministic nature of the framework that is generating the Lads' interpretations, and it would require that some way be found to bring this framework to the Lads' attention and have them engage it. It would also require a structural analysis of the way in which skills are clustered into occupational roles in contemporary society, and the possibilities that are available for re-clustering these skills in productive ways.

NOTES

1. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life* (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1976).
2. Paul Willis, *Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs* (England: Saxon House, 1978).
3. Walter Feinberg, "Educational Studies and The Disciplines of Educational Understanding," *Educational Studies*, Vol. II, (Winter, 1980), no. 4, pp. 375-390.
4. Pierre Boudieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, R. Nice, tr., (London: Sage, 1977).
5. See Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 18-22.
6. Michael W. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
7. Willis, p. 1.
8. See Arthur I. Stinchcombe, *Rebellion in a High School* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964).
9. Willis, p. 93.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO EDUCATION AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

Eric Brede
University of Illinois

This paper represents an attempt to understand better the relations among three prominent theories of the effects of education on social inequality. The three theories, which I am terming *socialization* theory, *interactional* theory, and *critical* theory, have each been considered elsewhere in far greater detail than will be possible here. My object in this paper is not to give a definitive review of any one of these theories, but rather to highlight the relationships among them. I hope to bring out something of the way in which they stand with respect to one another logically, meaningfully, and practically. Along the way I will also say something about the principal empirical problems raised by each approach and what some of the empirical findings suggest. Needless to say, this part of the discussion should also not be taken as a comprehensive review, but only as a brief examination of a few exemplary studies.

To set the stage for the discussion, these three theories may be taken as close relatives of the three major macro-sociological paradigms. Socialization theory may be seen as intimately related to structural functionalism; interactional theory finds its closest macro-theoretical relative in Weberian status competition theory; and critical theory is, of course, most closely aligned with Marxist class conflict theory. This is not to say that there are no differences between the members of these related families of theories, but there are strong resemblances. The three theories of concern here all deal with socially significant learning. They deal, respectively, with socialization, enculturation, and indoctrination. However, there appears to be no overarching term for the types of learnings with which each is concerned that does not implicitly side with one of the theories against the other two. These terms are different, or certainly carry different connotations, and no one of them can be reduced to an instance of another without violence to their meanings.

Another way to orient the discussion is to point out the assumptions that each theory makes about culture. Socialization theory assumes that schools are in the business of transmitting a common culture. As far as socialization is concerned, this is the culture, the one that is constitutive of society. It is the values of this culture that define the society, so if one is interested in studying the society, one must do so from the standpoint of this culture. Accordingly, all schooling outcomes are ultimately of social significance only to the extent that they are valued in terms of these cultural values.

In contrast to this, interactional theory focuses on the patterns of interaction and learning that result when two different cultures meet, where both are treated as equally important in the analysis. When the culture of the school and that of the child differ, how are the messages of the school refracted at their point of difference? Here the significant unit is the community, with the society taken as made up of a number of communities.

Finally, in critical theory attention is paid not only to differences between cultures, but also to the degree to which each of two or more cultures is consistent with the dominant, institutionally sanctioned culture. Cultures differ in the degree to which their principles are written into law and supported by the coercive power of the state, a fact that has highly significant consequences for learning. It also has consequences for the meeting of human needs. In the end, the constitutive unit for critical theory is the human being, whose membership in one class or another affects his chances of having his needs met.

Each of these starting points yields a different theory and a different epistemology. As a result, each is also likely to yield a different set of valid observations and conclusions, where validity is determined by the presuppositions of the approach.

The bulk of this paper is concerned with examining each of these three theories, with particular emphasis on the implications that each has for educational and social inequality. Thus, the focus is on accounts of differences in outcomes or consequences, not on accounts of similar or common outcomes or consequences, even though such a focus would be equally valid. (See Meyer, 1977, for an analysis to which I am much indebted which takes the latter approach.)

Socialization Theory

Socialization theory suggests that educational institutions affect social structure by developing in individuals the "commitments and capacities which are essential prerequisites of their future role performance," and by selecting among them in terms of the degree to which they have learned these socially valued commitments and capacities (Parsons, 1961:435). By socializing and selecting among individuals on this basis, schools produce the new cohorts of role occupants needed by society. In effect, schools contribute to social maintenance by producing new parts for the social machine.

Schools produce these outcomes in three ways or at three levels. First, they teach through explicit didaction and the reinforcement of desired responses. They teach intellectual content and social manners and reinforce the learning of each. This is the explicit pedagogy of the school, the pedagogy which produces its cognitive outcomes. Much, if not most, of the literature on the sociology of the classroom focuses on learning at this level and attempts to find ways to enable schools effectively to bring about such learning of desired skills or content.

Second, recurring evaluations of student performance on general types of problems teach them about their own abilities to perform on different types of tasks. By being evaluated in comparison with those to whom they are formally equal (such as other first graders, or other members of the class) on tasks that are formally equal (such as "math," or "social studies") they learn how they compare to others, with differences being officially attributed primarily to differences in ability. As a result, students learn different aspirations for their own performances.

Third, the formal structure of the school may itself be seen as teaching lessons. The generalized, abstract principles embedded in this structure teach how to relate general approaches to particular situations. As Dreeben (1968) puts it:

The social experiences available to pupils in schools, by virtue of the nature and sequence of their structural arrangements, provide opportunities for children to learn norms characteristic of several facets of adult public life Pupils infer principles of conduct on the basis of their experiences in school . . . they learn principles underlying the alternative ways of coping with a social situation having a particular set of properties. Over a period of years, they discover which patterns of conduct permit them to cope with the school's constraints and opportunities; and, to the extent that they find that certain patterns of action lead to successful accomplishment of tasks and bring gratifications, they adopt those patterns as the right ways to act--that is, they value them.

This "hidden curriculum," a curriculum embedded in the school's structure, is primarily responsible for teaching values. How learning occurs at this level is less well known, though Dreeben suggests that the inferential learning required is brought about and reinforced primarily through manipulation of the student's self-esteem rather than by material rewards.

are controlled; however, the effect is not as strong as the effect of family factors, such as family SES and parental ambitions (Duncan, Haller, and Purtes, 1974). Furthermore, this is all on the assumption that friends do not choose each other, even in part, on the basis of their aspirations. Granting this assumption, at least for the present, the conclusion to draw is that school effects are again weaker than family effects.

Research on school effects on values is less clearcut. Inkeles and Smith (1974) found schooling to be a better predictor of modernity than participation in other institutions, such as modern occupations, or contact with communicational media in a variety of countries. They also suggest that schools have stronger effects on values than do families, though they admit that their measurement of familial values was weak. Given the weakness of the evidence regarding the relative strength of school versus family effects on values, a cautious conclusion to draw is that the conventional wisdom that values are primarily learned at home may well be correct. If so, then familial influences may be stronger than school influences are in all three outcome dimensions.

A final point concerns the interrelation between these three levels of school-related outcomes. The three outcomes are intercorrelated. Moreover, we know that all three -- achievement, aspirations, and values -- are positively related to social class origins. However, the correlations between them are not so strong as to preclude a significant proportion of people from being inconsistent on these dimensions. Many people are cross-pressured in inconsistent ways at these various levels and presumably internalize such inconsistencies (Parsons, 1961:445), a point I will return to later.

The obvious moral conclusion to draw, given this theoretical orientation and the evidence it generates, is that schools are relatively blameless for educational inequities and relatively powerless to change them. The foundations for both cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes are laid in the family and it is there that one must turn to intervene. Coleman (1968), for instance, took this reasoning to its logical conclusion by suggesting that if one wanted to equalize outcomes, one might have to take lower SES children out of their families and put them into high-pressure boarding schools which would give them the background to compete on a truly equal basis. Given the theory and methods used to arrive at it, the conclusion that the schools cannot create equality of outcomes except, perhaps, with impossibly disruptive measures, seems inevitable. It is a conclusion whose practical message to the less advantaged -- "change thyself" -- is fully consistent with the ideological implications of the theory. It is also a valid conclusion to reach, given the theoretical and methodological premises of the research on which it is based. Any questioning of these conclusions should at least be able to account for the evidence from a wide range of studies on which the conclusions are based.

Interactional Theory

In contrast to socialization theory, which sees education as affecting social structure by changing the properties of individuals, interactional theory suggests that educational institutions affect social structure primarily through the fact that they place people in different social statuses, regardless of any socializing effect on them. Education has its effect, not by changing individuals, but by changing the statuses to which they belong (Meyer, 1977). Education helps recreate social structure by recreating the social status order among groups in the educational status orders of attainments, thus helping to certify admission to the same social statuses. In the process such allocation is likely to bring about secondary socialization effects (Meyer, 1977; Rist, 1977). However, in this discussion I will concentrate on status allocation itself, since I believe it is most central to this theoretical tradition.

In the view of the interactional theorist, social structure is continually created and recreated through a process of situated interaction in which interactants interpret, anticipate, and respond to one another's actions by "placing" or categorizing the other. By knowing who the other is in relation to themselves,

The structural features that are thought to teach "modern" values are essentially the bureaucratic features of schools, with students considered to be in the role of workers. For instance, Parsons (1964:134) mentions four features of the elementary school classroom that are responsible for the main axis of differentiation being an achievement dimension. These are: (1) initial formal equality of the students in a class; (2) a common, undifferentiated set of tasks for all those who are formally equal; (3) a single adult evaluating many status-equal pupils; and (4) systematic standardized evaluations on the basis of individual performance. Other related analyses have similarly emphasized the bureaucratic features of schools as constituting the principal features teaching values (Jackson, 1968; Dreeben, 1968; Silberman, 1970).

Given this approach to the socially significant outcomes of schooling, educational inequities can be conceptualized in terms of quantitative difference in the learning of socially valued capacities and commitments. The main indicator of cognitive differences across groups or classes is their achievement in school-defined tasks -- with a lesser emphasis on manners or deportment. The principal indicator of attitudinal inequality could be the amount of difference in educational aspirations. Finally, the indicator of value differences in socialization outcomes can be thought of in terms of differences in "modernity" (Inkeles and Smith, 1974) or related concepts. The extent of educational inequality is then the extent to which groups or classes of individuals differ, on the average, in terms of their scores on these dimensions of valued outcomes. We might, for instance, compare upper and lower class students, or Blacks and Whites, in terms of their scores, and ask about the extent of inequality in terms of points on some scale. This is essentially what was done in the Coleman report, where inequality was primarily defined in terms of units of achievement difference. Metrics, of course, have also been developed for such outcomes as aspirations for "achievement instruction" and for "modernity" (Inkeles and Smith, 1974); one could similarly measure the degree of inequality on these dimensions.

The central problem on which research in the socialization tradition has focused is on the nature and extent of "school effects." A question continually asked is whether schools have strong or significant effects relative to those of the family. If so, then inequities in socialization outcomes would be amenable to educational solutions.

Most of the research has focused on cognitive outcomes and has found with remarkable consistency that family origin accounts for much more of the variance in achievement than do school factors (Campbell and Coleman, 1966; Jencks, 1972). Every effort has been made to find school effects that would be strong enough to have a potentially remediating effect in the face of family-based inequities. Recently, for instance, interest has focused on more and more disaggregated or lower level influences, hoping that the closer one gets to the child's immediate environment, the stronger will be the effects. While more achievement variance can probably be explained by micro-contexts, the conclusion to be drawn, at least thus far, is still that family background can best account for the observed differences (Centra and Potter, 1980). Of course, this is not evidence that schools have no effects, enduring or no, but rather that they have remarkably uniform effects relative to family-related differences (Campbell and Coleman, 1966; Hurn, 1978).

An extensive body of research on educational aspirations and their determinants has had a rather similar history. Earlier research that examined the relation of race, social class, or aspirations of all the peers in the school with the aspirations of the focal student found weak relationships. The same trend towards disaggregation continued until later research focused on the effect of a best friend's aspirations on the focal student's aspirations. Some relation has been found between friends' degrees of ambition, when various background factors

they know what to make of the other's actions, what to expect of them, and how to respond to them given social norms and the demands of the situated activity. Where socialization theory takes such placement as unproblematically based on the "objective" properties of the person, here the processes, norms, and cultural presuppositions by which individuals are placed are among the principal objects of scrutiny.

Research in this tradition can again be usefully simplified and interrelated by considering three types of learning that may take place. First, the interactants must define the situation. They must find out their own situated identities and those of the others with whom they are interacting, as well as the nature of the activity in which they are participating. By knowing the socially significant categories to which they and others belong in the situation, and the nature of the activity, they know what to expect of each other and thus how to respond, given the goals of the activity and the norms governing their relationship. Much of the research on the self-fulfilling prophecy has focused on this level of learning, asking, for instance, about the ways in which individuals use different types of cues to "place" others relative to themselves, the expectations they hold of different types of others, and the effects of such expectations on social interaction.

Given routine interaction, the significance of the other's action is plain and one can respond to it unproblematically. However, when others behave unexpectedly, causing problems in interaction, an interpretation of their action must be found that relates it to social norms. Did the interactant violate a norm, and if so, why? Motives will be attributed to the actor that the actor may acknowledge or dispute, and, depending on the outcome of such a negotiation, the relationship may change. For instance, if it is concluded that the other was purposefully rude, and that this has been part of a pattern of action, then perhaps the other should no longer be considered a friend. Along these lines, a second body of research examines the negotiated meanings of action for the interactants, and the ways in which their relationships change over time as a result of crucial events and negotiated understandings.

Thirdly, in order correctly to align actions with norms, one needs to know the interpretative procedures or communicative conventions which define what counts as an instance of a particular type of action in a situation. As Cicourel (1974), in distinguishing between norms, or surface rules, and interpretative procedures, or deep rules, notes:

Normative or surface rules enable the actor to link his view of the world to that of others in concerted action, and to presume that consensus or shared agreement governs interaction The idea of interpretative procedures employed by actors is implicit in how the actor decides a general rule is implied or operative. The interpretative procedures provide a sense of social order that is fundamental for normative order (consensus or shared agreement) to exist or be negotiated and constructed. (Cicourel, 1974: 301-31).

In other words, it is the interpretative procedures that make accounts of action in terms of particular reasons or motives sensible. If interpretative procedures significantly differ for two interactants, then it may be difficult or impossible for them adequately to align their actions to norms. The difficulty is that what is a real expression for one will be an unreal, sham, or false expression for the other. As a result, they are often forced to conclude that the other is "mad" or "bad" (Watzlawick, et. al., 1967), or "stupid." A third body of research examines the implications of cultural differences of this sort, in which the implicit world views of the interactants differ.

Summarizing these three levels of the interpretative model using Charles Taylor's (1971) terminology, the first refers to proto- or pre-understandings which are implicit in interaction with others, the second to common meanings, meanings whose sharing is shared, and the third to intersubjective meanings which

are necessary for reaching either agreement or disagreement at the level of common meanings. As Cicourel (1974:31) puts it with respect to the last two, "The two orders are always in interaction, and it would be absurd to speak of one without the other." While this is true of all three orders, research has nonetheless tended to emphasize a single order. To illustrate, in interactional theory research focusing on the first level of meaning tends to see educational inequality as a result of overgeneralization based on cultural stereotypes. Inequality is perpetuated by continually mistaking the clothes for the man. Research focusing on the second, common, level of meaning acknowledges such stereotypes, but tends to see the problem as arising because of different norms. Conduct which is acceptable to one group is unacceptable to another, resulting in stigmatization of the less powerful group. Finally, research focusing on the third, intersubjective level, sees inequalities as resulting from systematic misinterpretation or misunderstanding, an inability to make sense of the other, and as a result an inability to get organized together. Some specialization in the understandings of inequality have thus developed, even though all three of these accounts should ideally work together.

The central problem for research in the interactionist tradition would seem to be not the relative effects of school versus family on individual outcomes, as in socialization theory, but the extent to which schools must recreate the differences in social status in differences in educational status. In other words, how independent can schools be from the meanings and understandings that regulate social interaction in the society at large? The measure of inequality in this case is presumably not some interval scale measure of differences in outcomes, but rather something like the probability that individuals who stand in a certain social status relation to one another will come to stand in a similar educational status relation. Most of the research in this tradition has been qualitative, and one should probably not expect a quantitative answer to this question. However, some sense of the conditions facilitating greater or lesser equality can be sought.

Research on the first of the levels just considered represents an exception to the qualitative tradition of research in this area. The focus here has been on teacher expectations for students of different backgrounds, the degree to which such expectations affect the favorableness of the treatment of students and the favorableness of the interpretations given their actions. The main issue is whether teachers base their expectations primarily on "diffuse" external status characteristics, such as social class characteristics or race, or whether they base them on context-specific information, such as their performance. Early studies demonstrating obvious stereotyping have been replaced with later studies emphasizing that expectations follow more from performance rather than vice versa.

Research utilizing status characteristic theory (Cohen and Roper, 1972; Berger, et. al., 1977; Webster, 1978) has addressed just this issue, although largely in experimental settings. This research, which utilized task-oriented groups, has reached three principal conclusions: (1) Diffuse characteristics -- those, such as sex or race, that are associated with assumed differences in competence in a wide range of tasks -- structure interaction even when there is no reason to believe that the associated attributes are relevant to the task at hand; (2) multiple diffuse characteristics tend to be averaged in terms of their effect upon interaction; and, (3) diffuse characteristics combined with specific ones that are directly task-relevant in rather complex ways. People do not throw out information relating to diffuse characteristics, nor do they follow it blindly. They combine information from both types of sources, varying the significance given to it depending on (among other things) its degree of redundancy and extent of contrast with other information (Webster, 1978:231). In short, status information does bias interaction, but the extent of reliance on diffuse versus specific characteristics is not easily determined.

While this work does not tell us how prevalent a particular pattern of expectation might be among, say, American teachers, it does give us some hints about how people in general use status-relevant information. A more serious limitation

is that work in this vein also tells us nothing about the normative judgments that teachers make of students and students of teachers. Status characteristic theory takes a purely cognitive orientation. It sees inequality as a product of overgeneralization, as suggested earlier. More than this may be involved, however; different standards as to what is good work or acceptable conduct may also be at issue. If this is the case, teacher judgments of those of differing social status background may be a result of their living up to the teacher's standards to differing degrees, rather than of mere hasty generalization.

This is roughly what Becker (1952) suggested some time ago with his concept of the "ideal pupil." As he noted, teachers' conceptions of the ideal pupil -- the pupil that would best enable them to be successful when teaching as they think they should -- apparently better fits the culture of higher status groups. Teachers tend to classify students in terms of this ideal and the way in which they vary from it. Those who do not fit the role requirements of the school -- who are less like the ideal student -- will be seen as creating problems for the teacher, and as forcing the teacher to adapt to their behavior in ways that violate the teacher's image of "good teaching." Similarly, teachers will create problems for students from different cultural backgrounds where the image of the good student or the good child is different, and students will see teachers as varying in the degree to which they fit an image of the "good teacher." As a result of the fact that often neither fits the images of the other, both teachers and students are forced to adapt to one another.

What research in this vein suggests, beyond descriptions of teacher beliefs about different categories of students and of the ways in which they adapt to these students, is that the relations between teachers and the different categories of students become self-reinforcing because of the attitudes each develops towards the other. "Good" students -- those who have gotten good grades or have been placed in better groups or tracks -- have more favorable attitudes towards teachers and think teachers think more highly of them (Hargreaves, 1967: 89-90). They are less stubborn or recalcitrant, and, as a result, teachers can treat them more gently. On the other hand, "poor" students present more problems and are more recalcitrant, with the result that teachers often adapt by attempting to dominate them. Undoubtedly, the more strongly different groups of students are differentiated, the greater will be this bifurcation. In other words, the creation of "successes" necessarily also creates "failures." What is unclear from this research is the degree to which school role expectations are biased towards the norms of certain groups or classes, or to what extent they crosscut them. The research has tended to emphasize class or status bias, but the extent to which this is the case remains unclear.

The third body of research in the interpretative tradition focuses on the interpretative procedures or communicative norms that define what counts as an instance of a particular action. As Hymes (1972:xxx) puts it:

If backgrounds differ, what is an unsettling fight to one may be an argument showing that one cares to the other. If we are to understand what children from a community are saying, and how they hear what we say to them, we must come to be able to recognize more than the language of what is said. We must recognize how the community norms of interpretations are embodied in speech. It is conflict and confusion as to norms of interpretation that (are) at the root of much of the difficulty in American classrooms today.

Similarly, in a discussion of Amish education, McDermott (1977) notes:

Amish community members use a specific code to achieve common sense and mutual trust. In this context, instructions are not blind commands but, rather, sensible suggestions about what to do next to further common goals. There is a warm relational fabric that underlies the instructions and transforms them from orders into sensible ways of organizing everyday life. What appears to many to be an authoritarian and oppressive system for organizing a classroom may in fact make great sense to the

children. Outsiders simply miss the cues which ground teacher-student activities in trust and accountability.

From this vantage point the distrustful negative relations that can develop between teachers and lower status students are not so much the result of intentionally complying with different general norms, but rather of failing to understand the other's intentions at all. Becker also made reference to this in his early case study, although he did not elaborate on it:

It is worth noting that the behavior of the "better" children, even when morally unacceptable, is less distressing to the teacher, who feels that, in this case, she can produce a reasonable explanation for the behavior.

Teachers who follow the interpretative procedures of the higher status culture may be unable to understand the motives or reasons for the actions of lower status students and will themselves have "good reasons" for judging such students as being deficient.

This suggests that another way to view the hidden curriculum of the school is not as a set of social values, but as implying a particular communicative code which makes activities sensible. The question then is what message are those with different, conflicting, codes getting from the school? The principal message is, presumably, that they do not make sense and that what they feel is not important and not reasonable.

All three of these levels of interactionist theory are clearly interrelated. When intersubjectivity is difficult to attain, trusting relations tend to break down, and interactants come to stereotype each other more rigidly. On the other hand, trusting relations can provide an incentive for learning more about the other's code, thereby enhancing intersubjectivity. And trusting relations allow one to give the other more rope, rather than causing one to jump too rapidly to conclusions about them. At the same time, lessened over-generalization on the basis of stereotyped knowledge can facilitate the development of trusting relations and, ultimately, of greater intersubjectivity.

Summarizing this discussion of interactional theory, this theory tends to see schools as firmly embedded in the culture of higher status groups. While the autonomy of the school from the standards and conventions of any one group is still an empirical matter that needs further investigation, most work in this tradition emphasizes the importance of group biases.

The normative conclusions to be drawn from the theory are presumably clear: schools should become closer to the cultures of their students. Teachers should be less prejudiced, know the different norms governing conduct for different groups of students, and be able to enter into the symbolic worlds of their students. Of course, the difficulty with this answer is that all cultures are not equally institutionalized or supported by existing power arrangements. This brings us to the last of the three perspectives on education and inequality.

Critical Theory

The previous two theoretical approaches have not really considered the possible effects of education in reproducing or changing social structure. Replacing the parts of the social machine does not amount to reproducing the structure itself, nor does allocating different groups to the same positions as their parents amount to reproducing the system of positions itself. What I am loosely terming "critical" theory is concerned with the very structure of inequitable positions and not just with individual or group mobility within it.

From a critical standpoint, education is viewed in terms of its relation to the system of class relations. Since these are relations of power and dependence, rather than functional or status relations, education tends to be viewed as a means of control, however subtle. From this perspective there are three ways in which schools may serve to reproduce the system of class relations. First, they may help to reproduce the forces of production, i.e., the human "inputs" used in

production. Secondly, they may help reproduce the social relations of production, i.e., the social identifications and normative agreements maintaining hierarchical patterns of social interaction at work. Thirdly, they may have an ideological effect in that they help legitimate the relation between the forces and relations of production and thereby legitimate existing authorities. The logical relation among these effects is clear: The first is an effect on individuals, the second an effect on groups, and the third an effect on society (See Meyer, 1977). Just how these effects bear on the reproduction of class relations will be discussed presently.

The first contribution of schooling to social reproduction, through the reproduction of the forces of production, is brought about by changing individuals and is thus very close to the concerns of socialization theorists. One important difference, however, is that while socialization theorists see schools as trying to bring about common results, though with differential success due to limits on ability or motivation, reproduction theorists see schools as actively creating differences. Schools reproduce the forces of production by producing a pattern of differences among individuals in terms of their mastery of the dominant culture, rather than by creating a one-to-one fit between individual skill levels and job requirements. In Bourdieu's (1977) terms, schools help produce differences in the "cultural capital" possessed by students.

The data on cognitive achievement differences over time fits this interpretation all too well, with such differences increasing the longer students of different social class are in school. Non-cognitive outcomes presumably also diverge over time but, I would suspect, much less so. That is, students whose achievement is considerably less than that of others may be cooled out gently or may maintain the illusion that they can get ahead in the system and so may maintain higher aspirations than their comparative achievements would merit (e.g., see Massey, Scott, and Dornbusch, 1975). Finally, despite research on the values of the different classes, even less divergence may occur in the realm of values. If correct, this would suggest that while schools create differences or accentuate differences in the key dimension of cultural capital, they also produce less inconsistency between the beliefs, attitudes, and values of upper class than of lower class students. The poor may end up with less cultural capital while being more internally contradicted.

By creating a set of human "inputs" that are differentiated in terms of their mastery of the principles of the dominant culture, schools are able to sort and so help buffer the production process from input variability. They thereby allow greater organizational autonomy from the input environment, as well as allowing the productive process to follow its own internal logic more completely. Thus, aggregate effects on individuals have at least weak effects on the productive system. However, mere perturbations in input do not, in themselves, change structures.

But how can the assertion of strong differential effects of education on individuals be squared with the socialization theorist's evidence of rather uniform effects? In other words, why blame the schools for what is the family's fault? Let me suggest part of the answer, drawing primarily on Bourdieu's work.

As far as Bourdieu is concerned, the culture of the school -- that is, of school tasks and relationships -- represents the culture of dominant groups or classes presented as the culture. In other words, high culture is taken as all culture. Students enter having had a certain "cultural capital" and a certain "ethos" transmitted to them by their parents, where cultural capital represents their degree of cognitive socialization and their ethos values or attitudes.

Those who are members of dominant groups are seen as having greater access in their primary socialization or cultural inculcation to the dominant culture, and hence as having a greater practical knowledge of it. Their family ethos is also seen as different because the ethos is a function of their position in the structure of objective life chances. As he puts it:

If members of the lower middle and working classes

take reality as being equivalent to their wishes, it is because, in this area as elsewhere, aspirations and demands are defined in both form and content by objective conditions which exclude the possibility of hoping for the unattainable. (Bourdieu, 1974:33)

Given these initial differences in cultural capital and ethos, the differential effects of schooling can begin to be explained. With respect to cultural capital, Bourdieu (1974:37-8) suggests that:

In fact, to penalize the underprivileged and favor the most privileged the school has only to neglect, in its teaching methods and techniques and its criteria when making academic judgments, to take into account the cultural inequalities between children of different social classes. In other words, by treating all pupils, however unequal they may be in reality, as equal in rights and duties, the educational system is led to give its *de facto* sanction to initial cultural inequalities. The formal equality which governs pedagogical practice is in fact a cloak for and a justification of indifference to the real inequalities with regard to the body of knowledge taught or rather demanded.

The "higher" the standards of the school, and the less it stoops to teach its own code, the more it allows the class of those who already have the code to learn and in fact get better at decoding itself, and the more it shuts out and frustrates those who do not already have it, leading them to direct their energies elsewhere and thus learning different (less well rewarded) decoding skills. And all the while this is done under the guise of equality of opportunity:

Ethos also enters in, serving to limit those whose chances are already limited to what they can realistically expect. In fact, the system of selection remains most invisible and most legitimate when students self-select themselves out of school. Bourdieu's view can be seen overall by imagining someone who is thinking about becoming an artist and who is told that the avant-garde work at a certain museum is the only art worthy of the name. On visiting the museum, he finds it utterly incomprehensible, and quickly takes away the messages that, first, this place is not for him; secondly, he is not likely to make it as an artist; and thirdly, that he is dumb. In short, schooling is unnatural selection posing as natural selection.

Of course socialization theorists do not see the differential effects that schools have because, when they control for social background and IQ, they are eliminating variation in *social* factors causing the different effects. Similarly, when they see more or better forms of the same type of schooling as making little difference, this is because exactly the same biases are built into that schooling, creating the same kinds of differences.

The second contribution of schools to social reproduction lies in its reproduction of the social relations of production. If we conceive of this as accomplished through the effects schools have on groups, then a parallel with the concerns of the interactional theorists is suggested. Following this line we can see it as an effect that is produced, at least in the first instance, by enculturation rather than by socialization. However, where the interactionists are concerned with the development of intersubjective understanding and of positive, trusting relations, here the issue is the way in which differences in the cultures of different status groups can serve to reproduce or undermine existing power-dependence relations. To the extent that different status groups compete among themselves, they are likely to fail to see the larger class structure in which their competition is embedded, and this will serve to fragment the power of class-based groups.

Hints of this point can also be seen in socialization theory. For instance, Parsons (1961) sees peer groups as basically an integrative force, rather than

as a threat to authority. The groups help fulfill needs, e.g., for approval, that cannot be satisfied by the formal and academic status system of the school. If Parsons approves of peer groups in this way, clearly critical theorists must be considerably more doubtful about them.

Paul Willis' (1977) study is one of the very few along this line, and fortunately it is an excellent one. In this study of a working class school gang, he seeks to analyze their forms of expression, particularly antagonistic behavioral, visual, and stylistic forms rather than verbal ones, to find their meaning in class terms. He argues, for instance, that:

The variety of forms and challenges at the surface of the culture bewilder a notion that they might have a concentric cause. This is why the ethnography of visible forms is limited. The external, more obviously creative, variety and sometimes random features must be read back to their heart This always concerns, at some level, a recognition of, and action upon, the particularity of its place within a determinate social structure (Willis, 1978:121).

At the visible, conscious, level, the culture of the "Lads," as he calls the boys he studied, glorifies manliness and muscle and the subversion of authority. The Lads are sexist in their relations with women, and racist in their relations with immigrants, in both cases finding distinctive qualities in themselves that elevate them above others. However, at the less visible level, Willis finds their culture and expressive behavior to have the same determinants of shop floor culture: ". . . the common impulse is to develop strategies for dealing with boredom, blocked opportunities, alienation and lack of control (Willis, 197:188)." Despite the fact that he obviously studied a fairly tough group, and one with definite class overtones in their rebelliousness, Willis concluded in the end that they too have made their bargain with the existing class system. As he puts it:

The reverse side of the 'them' and 'us' attitude of the 'Lads' is an acceptance by them of prior authority relations it accomplishes a recognition of, and an accommodation to, the facts of power and hierarchy. In the moment of the establishment of a cultural opposition is the yielding of a hope for direct, or quasi-political challenge (Willis, 1978:194).

Without going into this at greater length, it would appear that this line of argument could be expanded to show how the interaction between the dominant culture and the relation to that culture held by different classes serves to produce the whole system of peer group adaptations, the main effect of which is actually to reach an accommodation with authorities and to divide class-based opposition. In other words, what is being explained in this case is not the particular adaptation reached by some group, but the whole system of and basis for such adaptations.

Finally, schools may also help reproduce the class system by reproducing belief in a legitimizing ideology. In fact, this is necessary for the previous two types of effects to occur, or to occur with any strength. Schools can be thought of as an institutional embodiment of a dominant ideology which serves to legitimize the relation between the forces and relations of production. Schools embody in their formal structures an implicit theory about the nature of knowledge and of learning (Meyer, 1977). To the extent that these principles are accepted as defining "the way things are," and not merely as personal values or as cultural conventions, they then become "natural" constraints to which all must adapt. In this vein, Meyer (1977) argues that:

Modern extended and institutionalized systems of education build into society certain rules which actors take for granted, know others take for granted, and incorporate in their decisions and actions. For instance, institutionalized

educational systems create a situation in which social gatekeepers (e.g., personnel officers)--even if they read and believe Ivar Berg's book--nevertheless know that they must hire people on the basis of educational credentials.

Obviously we have hit upon the "hidden curriculum" concept one more time, but this time the principles embedded in the structure of the school are taken to represent the dominant ideology, rather than cultural values or high status conventions. For instance, what the formal structure of the school tells one, presumably, is that students in the higher grades know more than those in the lower grades; that those in the same grade or level are the "same"; that those who have taken a particular subject know more about that subject; that knowledge comes in discrete packages called "subjects" which can be added up to constitute greater knowledge, and so forth.

To the extent that educational distinctions are built into law and supported by the coercive and remunerative power of the state and other power institutions, they gain extra "reality." On the other hand, to the extent that the dominant ideology built into educational institutions adequately accounts for social practices, it legitimates them.

This brings me to a final point about critical theory, which concerns the central problem that it faces. This is the issue of the dependence versus autonomy of the educational system with respect to the system of class relations. This question is obviously the equivalent, for this theory, of the family versus school effects or status group culture versus school culture issues that arose in the other theoretical traditions. However, in the case of critical theory, this question can not be answered in any absolute way because education will serve to reproduce the class system effectively only as long as people accept the dominant ideology as "the way things are," thereby ensuring that that is indeed the way they will remain.

Conclusion

This paper has been primarily concerned with showing the relations between the principal explanations of the effects of education on social inequality, though somewhat more needs to be said about this. The relation that I have emphasized, in which socialization theory focuses on effects on individuals, interactional theory on effects on groups, and critical theory on effects on society, sums up part of the story, for it makes plain the "wheels within wheels," or, if one prefers a more dynamic metaphor, "moments around moments," way in which the theories are interrelated. At the same time, I have also tried to show some of the similarities that run through the three theories, in particular by highlighting hierarchical elements in each theory that have a certain parallelism. The table that follows outlines these relationships:

<u>Socialization</u>	<u>Interaction</u>	<u>Critique</u>
Knowledge, Beliefs Attitudes Values	Identities Norms Communicative Rules	Forces of Production Relations of Production Ideologies

Of course, the relations between these elements really fall into a multi-dimensional hierarchy rather than the parallel hierarchies shown here.

The paper has also briefly, and in some way inadequately, suggested what the principal empirical problem is that each orientation faces and what some of the findings are in this regard. The findings generated by each paradigm were taken pretty much at face value, as valid findings given the theoretical and epistemological presupposition that went along with the theory. What all of this leaves unanswered is the further question about the truth, validity, and completeness of these theories. And, as a related issue, whether they are competitors, complements, or something else again.

I think there are three ways to understand the relations between these theories in terms of such assessments of their adequacy. At the level of individual propositions they are clearly competitors. Either schools have uniform effects or they have differentiating effects; they cannot have both. Similarly, either schools serve to promote equality or they promote inequality, not both. This is the level at which much of the debate has proceeded in sociology of education.

At a second level, one can note that these propositions are not really talking about the same things. They use similar terms with different meanings, depending on the differing theoretical presuppositions informing them. Equality of opportunity for individuals is not the same thing as equality of placement for groups. Given this conclusion, the theories may be seen as different viewpoints, each of which may be more relevant to particular types of problems and less to others. A live-and-let-live pluralism of this type appears to be the increasingly prevailing mode in the field.

Finally, one may also regard each of the three theories as representing fundamentally different value commitments, different options on life, or as serving different human interests (e.g. Taylor, 1971/Habermas, 1971). From this standpoint the third theory, critical theory, may be regarded as more adequate because it allows one to understand the place of each of the other two theories, but can not be understood by them in turn. As Charles Taylor (1971) says:

The superiority of one position over another will thus consist in this, that from the more adequate position one can understand one's own stand and that of one's opponent, but not the other way around. It goes without saying that this argument can only have weight for those in the superior position.

Accepting this does not mean that one thereby rejects all of the other two theories, but rather accepts them only in their place. It makes perfect sense, for instance, to encourage individuals to work hard if they want to get ahead, but such advice is a crazy way to deal with social structural problems. Similarly, encouraging inter-cultural communication may help break down barriers to group acceptance and equality, but is also a crazy way to try to deal with class inequities. In short, the interests purposed through the first two theories need to be bracketed or bounded or seen within the larger whole portrayed by critical theory if literally irrational practices are not to be advocated.

Finally, the very fact that we can understand all three of these theories and their presuppositions and interrelationships suggests that there must be an implicit fourth position cutting across the hierarchy created by the other three from which we view them (Bateson, 1972:308), and this is a tantalizing if as yet unexplored thought.

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PART III

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS

DEWEY'S ESTHETICS AS EXPERIENCE IN EDUCATION

Charlotte Landvoigt and Christopher Eisele
West Virginia University

Introduction

The genesis of this paper is an experience that is probably familiar to many of you - a classroom discussion on Dewey followed by the inevitable question "how would Dewey teach a specific subject?" In this case, the question centered on teaching "art as experience" in a setting more restrictive than Dewey's Chicago Lab School with its university and urban resources. It seemed a good pedagogical question which has the interesting implication of a flawed theory/practice relationship in Dewey's ideas.

What follows, here, is a limited answer. Limits were set by the complexity of the subject, the time allotted for an answer and the sophistication of the answerers. Our method was simple - even if the answer we found was not. We tried to read everything Dewey wrote about art and then to see how what he said could be related to education.¹ As might be expected, we found all too little on specific pedagogy. We unexpectedly found that Dewey's esthetics is the centerpiece of his philosophy. To quote Dewey, "For all the intelligent activities of men, no matter whether expressed in science, fine arts, or social relationships, have for their task the conversion of casual bonds, relations of succession, into a connection of means-consequence, into meanings. When the task is achieved the result is art . . ."²

There can be no doubt of the importance of esthetic experience in Dewey's philosophy. He provided examples throughout his writing. On science and art he said in 1948, "And if it be a legitimate question to ask which one of the two, science or art, owes the most to the other, I should be inclined to award the palm to art . . ."³ Twenty-three years earlier in *Experience and Nature* Dewey found science to be "an instrumentality of and for art."⁴ Perhaps a surprising view from a philosopher who is occasionally vilified for exalting science. Dewey the Instrumentalist, tied 'thinking' and 'art.' "Thinking is pre-eminently an art; knowledge and propositions which are the products of thinking, are works of art, so much so as statuary and symphonies."⁵ And further, when discussing the problem of democratic thought and democracy during World War II, Dewey included the arts "as an important part of the social conditions that bear upon democratic institutions and personal freedom." Why? Because, "ideas are effective not as bare ideas but as they have imaginative content and emotional appeal."⁶ To Dewey, "the problem is that of effecting the union of ideas and knowledge with the non-rational factors in human make-up. Art is the name given to all the agencies by which this union is effected."⁷ Science and thinking are, of course, important concepts in Dewey's program, but experience is primary. Dewey is the Philosopher of Experience, and it is in his philosophy of experience that esthetics plays a central role, a continuous role for over sixty years.

Dewey made the point clearly in 1950, "every normally complete experience . . . is esthetic in its consummatory phase,"⁸ and in 1929, in the *Quest for Certainty*, "Every experience is esthetic in so far as it is final. . ."⁹ Although less clear in his formulation, Dewey's analysis is similar in his first text, *Psychology*, written in the late 1880s.¹⁰ Understanding Dewey's esthetics is crucial to explaining how Dewey would teach art, in any setting - our original question. Our reading showed that understanding Dewey's analysis of esthetic experience is central to understanding Dewey's philosophy.

Experience

The foundation of Dewey's esthetic and educational theory is his analysis of experience and the conditions under which experience takes place. It is

vitaly important to understand that Dewey's view of life centers on an organism interacting with an environment, "that life goes on in an environment; not merely in it but because of it, through action with it. . . . The career and destiny of living beings are bound up with its interchanges with its environment, not externally but in a most intimate way."¹¹ Experience, then, consists of the interactions between the organism and the environment in which it operates. Obviously, the school may be such an environment.

Dewey distinguished between experience in general, which runs continuously, and "an experience" which occurs when "the material experienced runs its course in fulfillment."¹² An experience is an experience. It is not an "intellectual" experience or an "esthetic" experience. As Dewey writes in *Art as Experience*, "It is not possible to divide in a vital experience the practical, emotional, and intellectual from one another and to set the property of one over against the characteristics of the others. The emotional phase binds parts together into a single whole; 'intellectual' simply names the fact that the experience has meaning; 'practical' indicates that the organism is interacting with events and objects which surround it."¹³ Meaningful experience has the characteristic of wholeness or unity. Characteristics related to so-called esthetic experience. However, in Dewey's words, "what we call an esthetic experience, if we only had it often enough and if it were only normal enough, we should leave off the adjective esthetic."¹⁴

An essential condition for an experience to occur is a need of the organism, a point often overlooked in the artificial school environment. "Impulsions," according to Dewey, "are the beginnings of complete experience because they proceed from need; from a hunger and demand that belongs to the organism as a whole and that can be supplied only by instituting definite relations (active relations, interactions) with the environment."¹⁵

The need of the organism is not the sole determinant of the experience which follows. In its interactions with the environment, the organism must respond and adapt to factors which may hinder or even cause changes in its original purposes. In Dewey's view, this function of the environment is necessary for a growing and deepening of experience. He states, "An environment that was always and everywhere congenial to the straightaway execution of our impulsions would set a term of growth as surely as one always hostile would irritate and destroy."¹⁶ Growth may not always be continuous, however. In fact, Dewey finds a continuing rhythm to be one of life's basic characteristics, "all interactions that effect stability and order in the whirling flux of change are rhythms."¹⁷ This lack of stability does not necessitate disorder because "experience is the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ . . . it contains the promise of that delightful perception which is esthetic experience."¹⁸

Esthetics

This brief, general introduction to aspects of Dewey's theory of experience has brought us naturally to a consideration of his esthetic theory. Two parts of that theory are of greatest concern to the question under discussion. Dewey's analysis of the creative process and the appreciative process, both of which can be "taught" in the schools, provide the best insight to our question.

An esthetic experience is not divisible into hierarchies of motor action or emotional or intellectual processes any more than any other complete experience, "as it is a fusion of all these things it is just the complete and total vital experience that it is. The only way to have it is by having it. In that sense the significance of esthetic experience is that the very idea of it is a sort of direction to us to make our experiences as complete, as full, as total in their vitality as we can."¹⁹ Nor do the organism and the environment operate separately. As any complete experience, "the experiences that

art intensifies and amplifies neither exist solely inside ourselves, nor do they consist of relations apart from matter. The moments when the creature is both most alive and most composed and concentrated are those of fullest intercourse with the environment, in which sensuous materials and relations are most completely merged."²⁰ Thus the separation of creative and appreciative processes which follows is for discussion purposes only.

Dewey's description of the creative process is an interactive one. The active mind of the organism makes up part of the interactions.²¹ The artist has a particular kind of mind to bring to the interaction. "Different kinds of minds are named from the different interests that actuate the gathering and assemblage of material from the encompassing world: the scientific, the executive, the artistic, the business mind. In each there is a preferential manner of selection, retention, and organization. The native constitution of the artist is marked by peculiar sensitiveness to some aspect of the multiform universe of nature and man and by urge to the remaking of it through expression in a preferred medium."²² The artist, by nature, then is compelled to find new materials of experience. "Because the artist is lover of unalloyed experience, he shuns objects that are already saturated, and he is therefore always on the growing edge of things. By the nature of the case, he is as unsatisfied with what is established as is a geographic explorer or a scientific inquirer."²³

The creative process is not a simple, straightforward application of the artist's idea of his medium. "Antecedent subject-matter is not instantaneously changed into the matter of a work of art in the mind of an artist. It is a developing process."²⁴ It is also an interactive process, taking into account the values of prior experience as well as the emotions of the artist and nature of the medium. According to Dewey, "While there is no expression unless there is urge from within outwards, the welling up must be clarified and ordered by taking into itself the values of prior experiences before it can be an act of expression. And these values are not called into play save through objects of the environment that offer resistance to the direct discharge of emotion and impulse."²⁵ The environment also exercises a role in the development of the artistic product. Nevertheless, Dewey felt that the environment of the artist's chosen media should be the *only* factor affecting the artist's impulses. Arbitrary standards of the human community should not impinge on the artist's vision (or the school child's) for, "whatever narrows the boundaries of the material fit to be used in art hems in also the artistic sincerity of the individual artist. It does not give fair play and outlet to his vital interest."²⁶

Esthetic appreciation is for Dewey as total an experience as the creative process. The participant in an esthetic experience is as important as the creator of the object of the experience. In Dewey's words, "Language exists only when it is listened to as well as spoken. The hearer is an indispensable partner. The work of art is complete only as it works in the experience of others than the one who created it."²⁷

The process of appreciation is not a passive one, but like the creative process, is interactive and totally involving. Perceiving the art object is an active process, incorporating the rhythms and elements of the work into the experience of the appreciator. The organism interacting with the art object interjects himself into the experience as well. For Dewey our conventional notions of how to appreciate art do not apply. "A crowd of visitors steered through a picture-gallery by a guide, with attention called here and there to some high point, does not perceive; only by accident is there even interest in seeing a picture for the sake of subject matter vividly realized. For to perceive, a beholder must *create* his own experience, and his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent."²⁸

Dewey does not mean that all selves will have the same experience in interacting with the work of art. However, the appreciator goes through a

process similar to the creator's, a process leading to esthetic experience. "The artist selected, simplified, clarified, abridged and condensed according to his interest. The beholder must go through these operations according to his point of view and interest. . . .that is, a gathering together of details and particulars physically scattered into an experienced whole."²⁹ This similarity in process of creation and appreciation, according to Dewey, explains how one culture or era can understand the art of another.

It is doubtless true that the total experience of the Greeks in presence of, say, Greek architecture, statuary, and painting is far from being identical with ours. Features of their culture were transient; they do not now exist, and these features were embodied in their experience of their works of art. But experience is a matter of the interaction of the artistic product with the self. It is not therefore twice alike for different persons even today. It changes with the same person at different times as he brings something different to a work. But there is no reason why, in order to be esthetic, these experiences should be identical. So far as in each case there is an ordered movement of the matter of the experience to a fulfillment, there is a dominant esthetic quality. *Au fond*, the esthetic quality is the same for Greek, Chinese and American.³⁰

The appreciative process itself can grow and develop as the creative process does. But clearly, this process of esthetic appreciation is not one of learning the commonly held standards of beauty and applying them to art objects. Dewey states that "with respect to what the work of art does to us and for us, I see but two alternatives. Either it operates because some transcendent essence (usually called "beauty") descends upon experience from without, or esthetic effect is due to art's unique transcript of the energy of the things of the world."³¹ Obviously, Dewey chooses the latter, reminding us that the separation between creative and appreciative process is mythical.

Education

The esthetic experiences of the creator or appreciator are fundamentally similar. In both cases the self and environment are combined in a unique way. In Dewey's view, the teacher must take advantage of that uniqueness and help enhance the individual's experience, by helping him interact in a fulfilling way with his environment. The job may be difficult and many teachers may not be willing to undertake it. Using Dewey's analogy, "it is not easy to detect and watch the gleams of light that flash from within. Education and social surroundings are in a conspiracy to dim these flashes and to attract our watching to other things."³²

In what is probably his strongest plea for the inclusion of art is education, in a 1926 *New Republic* article, Dewey described the practice of basing education on science and industry "disastrous" for a variety of reasons. He noted that, "Esthetic appreciation and art . . . are not additions to the real world, much less luxuries. They represent the only ways in which the individualized elements in the world of nature and man are grasped. . . . Without esthetic appreciation we miss the most characteristic as well as the most precious thing in the real world."³³

Since both Dewey's esthetic and educational theories are based on individual experience, specific instructional suggestions would be counter-productive. However, stating general guidelines consonant with Dewey's theories is possible. We do not believe and Dewey would not say that following these guidelines will produce little artists-to-be. But students taught following these guidelines should grow in both appreciative and creative power-be able to have more complete esthetic experiences and, therefore, more complete experiences. We concur with Dewey's belief, "In the end, the great majority of pupils are of course to become appreciators of art rather than its producers in any technical sense. But only by taking some part in creative production (and that not

for the sake consciously of producing beauty but simply of embodying vital and significant feelings) can a wholesome and natural attitude of appreciation finally be secured."³⁴

We stated above that "the foundation of Dewey's esthetic and education theory is his analysis of experience." Our first guideline is that the teacher must take into account the immature level of experience of the child. According to Dewey, "the interest, which the adult terms *aesthetic*, is only rudimentary in childhood. An attempt to secure clearly defined appreciation of beauty from a child oversteps the mark in so far as it places the matter outside of the limited range of his experience. That esthetic appreciation grows as the child grows may be illustrated by the common tendency of young children to pass through a stage of primitive satisfaction in crude color before they are able to enjoy the subtleties of harmoniously related hue. Appreciation cannot be taught directly, but rather from a continuous process of reevaluating experience. This is another way of saying that the growing child is constantly modifying his standards and developing esthetic discrimination."³⁵ Likewise, clearly defined creation of beauty is limited by a lack of experience. That is, in Dewey's view, objects are not seen as objects, since that "involves a certain separation and abstraction" by the child. Without "separation and abstraction" esthetic creation is difficult."³⁶

Experiences, as noted earlier, cannot be fully discussed without including "need of organism" and "environment" components, the sources of our second and third guidelines. The teacher should recognize that the "need of the organism" condition applies to the school child. A teacher should provide instruction in technique or traditions of esthetic practice only when it is needed and perceived to be needed by the child to continue his expressive growth within his life experience. In Dewey's words, "the beginning must always be with some imaginative free expression in which both the experience represented and the process of expression have their own adequate value to the child. The consciousness of technique must grow up out of and within this expression, having its own meaning within itself. Every gain in technique must be at once utilized for a further and richer imaginative expression."³⁷ And it will be if the child has felt the need to possess the technique. However, the learner must always "see on his own behalf and in his own way the relations between means and methods employed and results achieved. Nobody else can see for him, and he can't see just by being 'told'. . . ."³⁸

On this point, Dewey makes as clear a pedagogic suggestion as can be found in his writings on this subject:

Questions and suggestions will bring the child to realize the discrepancy between what he meant to do, and what he has actually done. This makes him turn around upon his image, reflect upon it, define it more accurately, and makes him alert for the differences between false and adequate expression. When the child comes to have the habit of looking at his own products, of comparing them with his original image and of criticizing one by reference to the other (without being unduly discouraged and thus paralyzed) the battle for technique is, in principle, won.³⁹

During childhood "the art impulse," to Dewey, "is connected mainly with the social instinct-the desire to tell, to represent." In other words, the art of life experience of the child will revolve around his activities, not those of an adult.⁴⁰

A third guideline results from Dewey's analysis of the role of the environment. To achieve a successful complete experience, the organism must be interacting as self with a free environment, unbounded by "arbitrary standards of the human community." The teacher must present works of art in terms of how

they interact with each individual, not in terms of one correct "message." In quoting the passage "poetry teaches as friends and life teach, by being, and not by express intent," Dewey makes the point that the best way to present a work of art is to present it - without preamble.⁴¹

The problem is apparent in "teaching" appreciation, which in Dewey's view is "a personal, a highly individual matter."

The teacher, like any skilled critic, may heighten another's appreciation of a work of art by indicating how he himself is affected, what memories and expectations are aroused in himself. But when he decides in advance that the moral truth of a given poem or literary transcript is just thus and so, and then enforces this upon a class as a whole, a class composed of individuals of different temperaments, experiences, and preferences, he tends to fix in the pupils' minds a conventional, superficial interpretation, and thus arbitrarily prevents the work of art accomplishing its own and perfect work. There is a certain impertinence in any case in forestalling the deeper and organic responses of other persons, whether children or adults; a certain presumptuous lack of sympathy in insisting upon one's own reaction as typical and essential.⁴²

It is essential that the teacher not put forth arbitrary rules of technique, make divisions of art objects into categories, and hold up "classic" art works of the past as the only acceptable forms. The teacher may discuss (as Dewey did in his esthetic theory) form in relation to matter, the meaning of medium in art, and the nature of the expressive object; however, only in terms of better understanding art, not as ironclad and inflexible ways of analyzing.

According to Dewey, if a teacher does not follow this guideline he is interfering with the process of appreciation in his students and with esthetic experience. "Perception is obstructed and cut short by memory of an influential rule, and by the substitution of precedent and prestige for direct experience."⁴³ In addition, "Instead of favoring surrender to the object, ready-made divisions lead one to approach an esthetic object with an intent to compare and thus to restrict the experience to a partial grasp of the unified whole."⁴⁴

Conclusion

To return to our original question, it is reasonably clear that the three educational guidelines just offered could be followed in most teaching situations, particularly if one further esthetic distinction is clarified. Dewey rejected the notion that the fine arts were the only repository of esthetic experience, especially when the distinction was used to demean "useful" art. According to Dewey, "the hostility to association of fine art with normal processes of living is a pathetic, even a tragic, commentary on life as it is ordinarily lived. Only because that life is usually so stunted, aborted, slack, or heavy laden is the idea entertained that there is some inherent antagonism between the process of normal living and creation and enjoyment of works of esthetic art."⁴⁵ In a speech celebrating the Fortieth Anniversary of the Cooper Union, Dewey congratulated the institution for helping to break down the theory that "art" is only "fine art." Dewey noted that art "can reach into the lives of the masses of the people only as it enters into the building of their homes; their furnishings and utensils; their walls, hangings, floor coverings, tables and chairs; the dishes from which they eat and those with which they cook. Every article of daily use has form and color and wherever form and color exist there is the opportunity for art."⁴⁶

Perhaps an "esthetic" paper deserves a poetic ending. We offer the following plea by Dewey to bring "esthetic experience" into wider use, especially in this assembly of philosophers.

We must, in the cold, reflective way of critical system, justify and organize the truth which poetry, with its quick, naive contacts, has already felt and reported. The same movement of the spirit, bringing man and man, man and nature, into wider and closer unity, which has found expression by anticipation in poetry, must find expression by retrospection in philosophy. Thus will be hastened the day in which our sons and our daughters shall prophesy, our young men shall see visions, and our old men dream dreams.⁴⁷

NOTES

1. We want to thank Dr. Jo Ann Boydston and the staff of the Center for Dewey Studies for their typically excellent help in finding sources and Ms. Sharon Smith for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. We hope that anyone who reads this paper will feel free to write us with comments. Dr. Chris Eisele, 602 Allen Hall, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26506.

2. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), p. 369.

3. John Dewey, "A Comment on the Foregoing Criticisms," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* vol. 6 (1948), p. 208.

4. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 367.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 378. A more complete treatment of the relationship between Dewey's *Aesthetics* and *Psychology* can be found in Dr. Eisele's paper, "Dewey's *Aesthetics* Education: A Framework for the Response Centered Curriculum," National Council of Teachers of English, Cincinnati, Ohio, November 22, 1980.

6. John Dewey, *Freedom and Culture* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 9. We are relying on context to clarify the ambiguity in the word "art" and "esthetic," an ambiguity of which Dewey was well aware. "We have no word in the English language that unambiguously includes what is signified by the two words 'artistic' and 'esthetic.' Since 'artistic' refers primarily to the act of production and 'esthetic' to that of perception and enjoyment, the absence of a term designating the two processes taken together is unfortunate. . . there is a certain verbal awkwardness in that we are compelled sometimes to use the term 'esthetic' to cover the entire field and sometimes to limit it to the receiving perceptual aspect of the whole operation." *Art as Experience*, p. 46. The problem is compounded by Dewey's use of "esthetic" with "non-art" related experiences. See also *Experience and Nature*, p. 374-375.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

8. John Dewey, "Aesthetic Experience as a Primary Phase and as an Artistic Development," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* vol. 9 (1950), p. 56.

9. John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1929), p. 235.

10. John Dewey, *Psychology* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1891), p. 267, for example. (See, too, Chapter 2 of *Art as Experience*.)

11. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Milton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 13.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
14. John Dewey, "The Philosophy of the Arts," lecture given to the Washington Dance Association, November 13, 1938, p. 17.
15. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 58.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
19. Dewey, "Philosophy of the Arts," p. 11.
20. *Art as Experience*, p. 103.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 54. Italics in the original. (See also "Philosophy of the Arts," pp. 12-13.)
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, p. 331.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.
32. John Dewey, *Construction and Criticism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), p. 20.
33. John Dewey, "Art in Education and Education in Art," *New Republic* vol. 46, February, 1926), p. 11.
34. John Dewey, "Art in Education," *Cyclopedia of Education* vol. 1, p. 224.
35. John Dewey, essay in K.C. Mayhew and A.C. Edwards, *The Dewey School* (New York: D. Appleton Century Co., 1936), p. 361.
36. John Dewey, "Imagination and Expression," in *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898* vol. 5 (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), p. 198. Italics in the original. (See also his "Psychology of Drawing," *Teachers College Bulletin*, vol. 10, no. 1, 1919, p. 3.)
37. *Ibid.*, p. 198. (See also "Psychology of Drawing," p. 5.)

38. John Dewey, *Art and Education* (Merion, Pennsylvania: Barnes Foundation, 1929), p. 34. To do the opposite, "To subordinate the child to type forms [or other techniques] is materialism," according to Dewey, "Psychology of Drawing," p. 5.

39. "Imagination and Expression," p. 199.

40. John Dewey, *The School and Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 47. Writing about technique and subject, teachers at the Dewey School summarized this way, "Opportunity was constantly given for expression in various mediums. By means of crayon, pencil, color and scissors, as well as through the spoken and written word, the children were encouraged to record the memories of a walk, the apples they had gathered, the story they had heard, or the process they had imagined or carried through." *The Dewey School*, p. 51.

41. *Art as Experience*, pp. 346-347.

42. John Dewey, "The Moral Significance of the Common School Studies," *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924* (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977) vol. 4, p. 208. *Italics in the original.*

43. *Art as Experience*, p. 229.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

46. John Dewey, "The Educational Function of a Museum of Decorative Arts," *Chronicle of the Museum for the Arts of Decoration of Cooper Union* vol. 1 (April, 1937), p. 95. One caveat is in order, the more barren the environment, the more difficult esthetic experience becomes. And clearly from the analysis of experience above, "environment exercises an educative or formative influence unconsciously and apart from any set purpose." (John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 16-17.

Neither we nor Dewey, "see how any very high popular artistic standard can exist where a great many of the people are living in slums. Such persons cannot get artistic culture . . . as long as their immediate surroundings, or what they come into direct contact with, unconsciously habituates them to ugly, sordid things." (John Dewey, "Politics and Culture," *Modern Thinker* vol. 1 (May, 1932), p. 173.

47. John Dewey, "Poetry and Philosophy," in *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898* vol. 3 (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), pp. 123-124.

THE AESTHETIC-MORAL CONNECTION: MORE CLAIMS, MORE PROBLEMS

Marilyn G. Stewart
The Ohio State University

I. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between moral education and aesthetic education has received considerable attention in the literature of aesthetic education.¹ Many claims have been made for a role of aesthetic education in moral education, ranging from the rather weak claim that the subject matter of aesthetic education lends itself to the raising of moral questions to the stronger claim that aesthetic education, properly understood, necessarily includes moral content. Recently a still stronger claim has been made: if the most mature level of moral development is to be brought about, rational analysis needs to be supplemented by curricula which promote aesthetic sensitivity. This seems to be a fair summary of the thesis put forth by Arthur Newman in his article, "Aesthetic Sensitizing and Moral Education."² To accept Newman's thesis would lead not just to the conclusion that some moral education might occur in the context of aesthetic education, but that any adequate program of moral education would include some aesthetic education. Whether Newman's arguments warrant acceptance of his thesis is the question with which this paper deals.

II. THE NEWMAN ARGUMENT

The Newman position rests on an acceptance of Kohlberg's framework for moral education. Given this, the "morally mature" is viewed by Newman as an individual who has attained a Kohlberg Stage 6. The author's position rests further on his acceptance of the Oliver and Bane criticism of Kohlberg's approach.³ According to Newman, Oliver and Bane hold that a rational, analytic, discursive treatment of moral dilemmas is insufficient for promoting the highest level of moral development and should be supplemented by "nonrational and sometimes nondiscursive cognitive exploration."⁴ Newman maintains that curricula aimed at promoting aesthetic sensitivity might well be the supplement called for by Oliver and Bane. Why this is so is summarized in Newman's concluding remarks:

This inquiry has suggested that the logical relationship between moral maturity (in Kohlberg's sense) and heightened aesthetic sensitivity is one which approximates identity along some dimensions and a significant similarity along others. The theoretical consideration of the relationship has been supported by the citation of several scholarly personality correlation studies which indicate a marked affinity between aesthetically inclined personality configurations and those which would characterize the morally mature.⁵

The "logical relationship" of which Newman speaks as "approximating identity" is based upon his examination of the relationship between the personality characteristics of the aesthetically sensitive and those of the morally mature. The relationship to which he refers as being one of "significant similarity" is based upon his examination of *empathy* as it occurs in aesthetic sensitivity and moral maturity. I will take each connection separately, summarize Newman's arguments for it, then examine these arguments.

III. THE FIRST CONNECTION: AESTHETIC AND MORAL SENSITIVITY

Newman argues that if there is a logical relationship between the personality attributes of individuals who have reached Kohlberg's Stage 6 in moral development and those attributes of individuals who are aesthetically sensitive, then "curriculum designers engaged in planning learning experiences for

moral development might do well to infuse the curriculum with opportunities for student involvement in aesthetic experiencing.⁶

The author argues that there does indeed "appear to be a compelling logical relationship between the two configurations."⁷ In order to support this claim he presents what he takes to be, first, the personality attributes corollary to Stage 6 reasoning, and second, the personality attributes of aesthetically sensitive individuals. According to Newman, the attributes of a Stage 6 individual are "openness, independence of judgment, flexibility, and a finely-honed sense of empathy."⁸ The personality attributes of the aesthetically sensitive which are seen as logically related to those of the morally mature are "nonstereotyping, genuineness, and the ability to embrace varying perspectives."⁹ I shall argue that Newman is unwarranted in setting forth both these sets of corollary attributes. We look first to his claims regarding the attributes of individuals at Kohlberg's Stage 6.

The Kohlberg theory of moral development includes an attempt to explain differences in the *form or structure* of moral judgments offered by individuals over a period of time.¹⁰ Kohlberg holds that individuals pass through stages of moral development. These stages can be distinguished by analysis of the reasons given in support of moral judgments. As the individual passes from stage to stage his judgments indicate a particular form of logical reasoning, a particular view of self in relation to others, and a particular conception of justice.

A Stage 6 judgment indicates that an individual is able to reason abstractly, to view the moral situation as one standing outside it, and to employ universal principles of equality and reciprocity in offering reasons for a particular judgment.¹¹

The Kohlberg theory offers a description of the cognitive status of moral judgments. The theory does *not* attempt to account for moral behavior, as such. A description of Stage 6 will not give any indication of what action an individual who reasons at that stage will take in any given moral situation. Nor will the theory account for what Newman calls "personality attributes" of a Stage 6 reasoner.

According to Kohlberg, moral development is a "logically tight" system, a structural whole.¹² In order to view the broad structure of personality, or what is technically referred to as "ego-development," it is useful to take account of the individual's moral stage. Ego-development, according to Kohlberg, does not have the logical restrictions crucial to moral development, nor does it have the clear criteria of increased adequacy in levels evidenced in moral development. Kohlberg denies that moral development is simply an aspect of ego-development; he says that there are moral structures distinct from ego structures. While certain ego-developmental features are necessary (for example, an individual's particular social perspective), they are not sufficient for moral development. He states further that, "The higher the moral stage, the more distinct it is from the parallel ego stage."¹³ Thus, an indication of an individual's moral stage will not provide a clear indication of development in other areas *particularly* in the case of the higher moral stages. Given the Kohlberg theory, it is no short jump from the cognitive status of moral judgments to the personality attributes of those individuals who consistently make such judgments. Yet Newman apparently completes the jump with ease. His assertion that the personality attributes of "openness, independence of judgment, flexibility, and a sharply-honed sense of empathy" are corollary to Stage 6 judgments is unsupported both in the context of his paper, and to my knowledge, in the cognitive-developmental literature.

However, even if we were to assume that personality attributes could be asserted on the basis of stage description, we could not accept Newman's corollaries. A case can be made for these very same attributes being corollary to other Kohlberg stages. To see how this is so, let us examine the Stage 2

"instrumental relativist orientation."¹⁴ A Stage 2 judgment evidences an understanding that everyone has his own interests to pursue. For the Stage 2 reasoner, what is right is relative to the interests of the individual. Rules are to be followed only if they serve the individual's immediate interest. What is right for one may not be right for another. When interests conflict, agreements or exchanges can be made.

Now, with the same precision (or lack thereof) employed to provide corollaries to Stage 6, I believe that these same corollaries can be posited for Stage 2. We could say that standing corollary to Stage 2 are openness (to others' needs and interests), flexibility (in seeing right as relative), empathy (in perceiving the interests and needs of others), and independence of judgment (in not being coerced by authority or by the views of others to act in a way contrary to self-interest).

Thus, on the basis of the nature of Kohlberg's theory of moral development and the potentially broad application of the attributes supposed to be corollary only to Stage 6, we cannot accept Newman's claim regarding the Stage 6 attributes.

Let us now turn to his claim that the personality attributes of the aesthetically sensitive are "nonstereotyping," "genuineness," and the propensity to "embrace varying perspectives." Newman appeals to the views of John Dewey and Louis Arnaud Reid in order to theorize about these attributes. He interprets both Dewey and Reid as suggesting that aesthetic perceivers are characterized by non-stereotypic behavior. He asserts that a corollary to this type of behavior is the attribute of genuineness. "Genuineness," or "authenticity," implies the ability of the aesthetic perceiver to "embrace varying perspectives." These attributes are seen by Newman as logically related to those of the morally mature.

As support for his claim that the aesthetic perceiver is characterized by non-stereotypic behavior, Newman cites the following Dewey statement:

The moral function of art itself is to remove prejudice, do away with the scales that keep the eye from seeing, tear away the veils due to wont or custom, perfect the power to perceive.¹⁵

I believe I can show that Dewey's statement, in the context of the chapter in *Art as Experience*, takes on a different meaning than that attributed to it by Newman, thus limiting the kind of claims which can be made about aesthetic perceivers.

According to Dewey, art is the expression of the artist's interaction with the world, an expression of his experience.¹⁶ Because the kinds of experiences had by individuals change over time, new art forms appear in time. In this chapter on criticism, Dewey argues against the "judicial" form, the type of criticism which involved the evaluative application of traditional paradigms in art.¹⁷ Criteria for evaluation should emerge from a survey of the work. The role of the critic, according to Dewey, is to view art without preconceptions and, in turn, to help others view art in this manner--that is, Dewey can be seen here as issuing a plea to critics to judge art *a posteriori* rather than with *a priori* criteria. It would seem that if the moral function of art is to remove prejudices, it can only be such if the critic or ordinary viewer is prepared, in advance, to approach art without prejudice. On Dewey's view, increased perception of works of art does not necessarily entail removal of prejudices.

Further, we need to consider Dewey's statement in light of his view of the moral life of man.¹⁸ Briefly, this view is that man, faced with alternatives in a given conflict situation, entertains these alternatives and

their consequences and makes choices accordingly. Rational deliberation is distorted when decisions are based on past prejudices or on ignorance of the particularities of the immediate situation. According to Dewey, the moral life of man is encumbered whenever a decision is based on prejudice of any sort. It is in this sense that nonprejudicial aesthetic decisions are seen as having a moral function. Newman, however, suggests that because man can view art nonprejudicially, he will tend to be nonprejudicial in making decisions in areas other than those which are aesthetic. Given Dewey's view of criticism and moral deliberation, in addition to the fallacious reasoning employed in a move from "can" to "will," we cannot accept Newman's claim.

Additional alleged support for the view that the function of art is to remove prejudices is intended through Newman's appeal to the following statement by Louis Arnaud Reid:

... aesthetic education, which is concerned with the acute exciting perception of individuals, not generalities -- this flower, this painting, this pot -- should offset our tendencies to be slaves to stereotypes and clichés.¹⁹

The problem in Newman's appeal to Reid is similar to that in his appeal to Dewey: he takes Reid's claim concerning what *should* occur as a result of aesthetic experiencing as an indication of what *does* occur. As a result of his appeals to both Dewey and Reid, Newman claims that aesthetically sensitive individuals are characterized by "nonstereotypic behavior," and that, "An attribute implied by the nonstereotypic behavior which characterizes the aesthetic perceiver is that of genuineness."²⁰ He further states that corollary to these characteristics is the "inclination to embrace varying perspectives."²¹

Support for this latter claim rests with Arthur Koestler's study of creative behavior²² and with Dewey's remarks about the artist opening "new fields of experience" and disclosing "new aspects and qualities in familiar scenes and objects."²³ An assumption in offering this support is that there is no distinction among the creative individual, the artist, and the aesthetic perceiver.

While we might agree that it would be peculiar to have an artist who is not characterized by creative behavior, or who is not aesthetically sensitive, we would not say that what we can discover about the creative individual or the artist would necessarily apply to all those who are aesthetically sensitive. It would not be at all peculiar, for example, for a creative scientist to be neither an artist nor aesthetically sensitive. Alternatively, it would not be unlikely for one who is aesthetically sensitive, say, a connoisseur, to be neither an artist nor one who exhibits creative behavior.

A distinction among these three "types" limits what can be said about aesthetic sensitivity on the basis of an analysis of creative behavior or the artistic process and disallows the claim that aesthetically sensitive individuals embrace varying perspectives.

Newman has attempted to show that there is a logical connection between the personality attributes of morally mature and aesthetically sensitive individuals in order to conclude that moral education curriculum ought to include some aesthetic education. I have shown that Newman's claims regarding both sets of corollary attributes are unwarranted. Thus, we cannot accept, on theoretical grounds, the first of the supposed aesthetic-moral connections discussed by Newman.

IV. THE SECOND CONNECTION EMPATHY, AESTHETICS, AND MORALITY.

The second moral-aesthetic connection involves the condition of empathy. Newman states:

Perhaps the most significant consideration supportive of the aesthetic-moral relationship relates to the condition of empathy -- the prime characteristic, as it were, of Kohlberg's stage six personality.²⁴

Newman presents what he takes to be the aesthetic theory of empathy. He holds that with non-human objects of aesthetic perception, the viewer loses his sense of self and becomes one with the object. With human objects of aesthetic perception, the viewer identifies with feelings of the human performer. With all objects of aesthetic perception, empathy involves an "unfettered engagement of the imagination" so as to become "interfused" with the object.²⁵ Newman says:

Although the empathy interpretation of aesthetic experiencing insists upon an effective involvement of the imagination, it does not necessarily yield the conclusion that conscious, rational analytic inquiry is an alien process.²⁶

Again failing to recognize the distinction between the aesthetically sensitive and artists, Newman appeals to the views of several authors who maintain that successful artists "alternate between the largely unconscious-nonrational plane and the largely conscious-rational one" while engaged in artistic production.²⁷ He concludes the section on empathy by stating:

The aesthetic theory of empathy encourages the conjecture that the ability to engage in a successful 'shifting of psychic level' -- a prerequisite for creative production and appreciation per se -- may also be integral to an effective process of moral development.²⁸

He notes that while a rational, analytic perspective is necessary for the Stage 6 ability to "take the role of the generalized other," it is "clearly insufficient." What is required is a nonrational element. It is Newman's view that, "Aesthetic perceiving may provide this necessary complement."²⁹

Newman's reasoning seems to be as follows: Because empathy is a significant aspect of both moral maturity and aesthetic sensitivity, if we can understand how empathy is involved in aesthetic experiencing then we will be able to see how it ought to be involved in moral development. In the artistic experience, which he equates with the aesthetic experience, the individual shifts between rational and nonrational cognizing. Therefore, if we wish to promote empathy in moral development, we need to insist upon nonrational as well as rational cognizing. Aesthetic experiencing can provide the nonrational component of empathy which is overlooked by the Kohlberg method.

There are two problems with Newman's argument which make his conclusion unacceptable. First, he is not correct in assuming that empathy is the prime characteristic of Stage 6 reasoning. Second, it is not clear that the use of "empathy" in the aesthetic sense is equivalent to its use in the moral sense. It is these problems to which we now turn.

While it is generally understood that the notion of role-taking is integral to Kohlberg's theory of moral development and his corresponding approach to moral education, some distinctions need to be made with respect to how it relates to empathy and how each functions within his theory.

Newman apparently supposes that "role-taking" and "empathy" are equivalent terms, yet Kohlberg makes a distinction between them. "Empathy" is used by Kohlberg to refer to a feeling or emotion similar to that of "sympathy." "Role-taking" is used to refer to the cognitive structuring of the relationship between self and others. At any given moral stage, an individual will have a particular conception of this relationship--a particular social perspective. Kohlberg notes that in role-taking, there is an "understanding and relating to all the roles in society of which one is a part" and that it "goes on in all social interactions and communication situations, not merely in ones that arouse emotions of sympathy and empathy."³⁰ Thus, the feeling of empathy may or may not be present in role-taking. Moreover, neither role-taking nor empathy is unique to Stage 6. Every stage evidences a specific social perspective; every stage may or may not evidence the presence of the feeling of empathy. The Stage 6 social perspective, far from being the "interfusion" of self and object of which Newman speaks, is an *objective* perspective.³¹ The individual perceives society, as it were, prior to society, stepping outside and viewing the networks of relationships evident in the societal system. This objective perspective is the perspective of one in the Rawlsian "original position," wherein the individual bases his moral judgment upon principles of justice as they would apply to any society, not simply to an interpersonal relationship of which he is a part. Thus, since empathy is not the significant factor in Kohlberg's view of moral reasoning which Newman supposes it to be, information as to the workings of empathy in aesthetic experiencing will not afford significant insights with respect to Stage 6 or any other stage of moral development discussed by Kohlberg.

Yet there is still another reason why such insights cannot be viewed as morally significant. It is simply that "empathy" in the aesthetic sense as discussed by Newman is not equivalent to "empathy" in the moral sense.

The aesthetic theory of empathy, according to Newman, offers an explanation of the aesthetic apprehension of not only human but non-human objects of perception. With human objects of aesthetic perception, there is an "interactive process" which involves "projection (of one's feelings) and/or identification." With nonhuman phenomena, there is an obliteration of a self-object distinction wherein "a unitary, inviolable whole is experienced."³² Newman refers to Susanne Langer in an attempt to show how empathy can even account for the apprehension of music in that the musician identifies with "the condition of humankind *per se* and then reflects his or her perception in a given genre of notation." Further, Newman holds that the appreciation of music also involves a similar process for the listener.³³

While we often speak of having empathy with human beings and sometimes even dogs and cats, we do not ordinarily speak of having empathy with rocks, trees, tables or chairs. It is readily apparent that "empathy" in the aesthetic sense covers too much ground in its inclusion of inanimate objects of perception. As such, it is far removed from its ordinary usage, which is dominantly the moral use. Thus, attempts to glean insights regarding empathy in moral experience by taking note of its use in the aesthetic context seem wrong-headed.

The second aesthetic-moral connection discussed by Newman is one through which "empathy" involved in aesthetic perception can serve to show what is required by empathy at Stage 6. In an attempt to indicate why this cannot be so, it has been shown that the notion of empathy is not a crucial factor in Stage 6 reasoning and that "empathy" in the aesthetic sense is not equivalent to "empathy" in the ordinary or moral sense. Newman's conclusion that a non-rational component is necessary for moral education and that aesthetic experiencing might provide this component is unwarranted on the basis of these distinctions.

V. OTHER PROBLEMS

Newman presents empirical evidence as support for his theoretical position. While he does not claim that the evidence is conclusive, he notes that results from some personality correlation studies add "an aura of hopefulness" to his position. Briefly, these studies indicate that: 1. "the aesthetically inclined are significantly less ethnocentric than their less sensitive counterparts," 2. aesthetic types are social nonconformists, and 3. there is a "strong positive relationship between successful aesthetic judging ability and several of the personality characteristics which presumably distinguish the morally mature."³⁴ But the major obstacle to the acceptability of this research is the same problem noted earlier, namely, that the personality characteristics of Stage 6 individuals proposed by Newman are not theoretically or empirically grounded. Another reason why this empirical data is irrelevant rests with the definitional confusion regarding "aesthetic types" or the aesthetically inclined." Many of these studies cited by Newman focus on the behavior of artists, as such. It has been noted that there may well be a difference among those generally referred to as aesthetically sensitive individuals, creative individuals, and artists.

VI. CONCLUSION

A careful attempt to further the dialogue regarding a relationship between aesthetic sensitivity and moral awareness would be welcome. However, the attempt analyzed here has been shown to be in one sense, trivial, and in another sense, quite wrong. It may be true that morally sensitive and aesthetically sensitive individuals share many of the same characteristics. It may also be true that emphasis on aesthetic experiencing will increase the likelihood of individuals becoming morally mature. Yet, Newman's arguments do not warrant these conclusions.

NOTES

1. The July, 1968, issue of the *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, the authoritative source for those interested in aesthetic education, was entirely devoted to this question. Since then, numerous articles on this topic have appeared in this journal and elsewhere.
2. Arthur J. Newman, "Aesthetic Sensitizing and Moral Education," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, vol. 14 (1980).
3. Donald W. Oliver and Mary Jo Bane, "Moral Education: Is Reasoning Enough?" in *Moral Education*, ed., C.M. Beck, B.S. Crittenden, and E.J. Sullivan (New York: Newman Press, 1971), esp. pp. 258-60.
4. Newman, "Aesthetic Sensitizing," p. 94.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

10. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," in *Moral Development and Behavior*, ed., Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1976), p. 32.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
14. Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development," in *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*, ed. T. Mischel (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1971), p. 165.
15. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), p. 325.
16. *Ibid.*, Chapter 2.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
18. See Herbert Schneider and Darnell Rucker, "Dewey's Ethics," in *Guide to the Works of John Dewey*, ed., JoAnn Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), Chapter 4, pp. 99-130.
19. Louis Arnaud Reid, "The Philosophical Implications of Art in Education Today," in *Art in a Rapidly Changing World*, ed., Mary Hobbs (Report of the XXth INSEA World Congress, 1970), p. 13, cited by Newman, p. 95.
20. Newman, p. 95.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Arthur Koestler, *The Act of Creation* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), esp. Chapters 8 and 9.
23. Newman, p. 95.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization," p. 49.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
32. Newman, p. 96.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-100.

RESPONSE TO STEWART, EISELE, AND LANDVOIGHT

Walden Crabtree
The University of Akron

Professor Eisele and Ms. Landvoight have provided us with a paper in which, among other things, they share with us their discovery that to Dewey aesthetics was very important and even the centerpiece of his philosophy. By emphasizing the centrality of the role of aesthetics in Dewey's writings, Eisele and Landvoight bring into operation a kind of halo effect, whereby the words of the Master are endowed with a mystical quality of meaningfulness and truth that are not always so obvious. It might, as a matter of fact, have been better to start their inquiry with the conviction that *vagueness* plays a central role in Dewey's philosophy, and that throughout his writings this pervasive quality can be found. Starting with this latter conviction about Dewey's sayings, Professor Eisele and Ms. Landvoight might have been more inclined to clarify and interpret Dewey's dicta. In assuming that the selected pronouncements of Dewey are true and clear, the authors neglect to ask important questions like: What is the meaning of what Dewey is saying here? Does it make sense to view x in such a manner? Is this claim consistent with other dicta, and what are the reasons for believing these claims to be true? In this vein it is pertinent to note that C.M. Smith, in an article that did explore the ramifications for education in the arts of the vagueness and inconsistency in some of the writings of Dewey on aesthetics, noted that "an unwise emphasis on certain unclear aspects of Dewey's aesthetics, . . . can easily lead down the path of least cognitive strain to . . . anti-intellectualism and educational irresponsibility . . ."¹

I should like to point out some places in the paper where the meaning might have been inquired into, for a more useful paper. On page one, I read a Dewey quote and conclude that art is achievement. This characterization is too global and does not differentiate, for instance, between such things as the playing of Dvorak's *Cello Concerto in B Minor* by the Chicago Symphony Orchestra and my playing "O Susannah" on the harmonica. As such it is not of much use. One might object, of course, that by "achievement," Dewey means artistic achievement, but then his claim becomes trivial -- artistic achievement is art. This tells us nothing. Moreover, and importantly, achievement can be immoral. But, can artistic work or a work of art or aesthetic perception, or an aesthetic experience be immoral? I do not know, but *prima facie* the two concepts seem to me to be antithetical. Morality and aesthetics would appear to have some close connections which need further exploration, but Broudy has maintained that moral education in schools in the U.S. has been deficient in not including training in aesthetic perception² and both Broudy and Jenkins³ take the view that art and education in art function, among other things, to teach the ideals and standards of a community, so that these will operate in our lives to enable us and influence us to act more fully in accord with these ideals. To assert that art is achievement without attending to criteria of achievement and to those of morality is unsuitably vague.

On page one one reads that every completed experience is aesthetic in its consummatory phase. This description likewise is vague, specifies little, and is included as presumably clear. Recently, I was at home early in the morning. I had sent the kids off to school, and it was time for me to eat breakfast. I had a problem: what should I eat? It turned out that for my breakfast I ate oatmeal that was quite cold. This was an experience (in Dewey's terms); it had an inception, a progression, a consummatory phase, and even a pervasive quality; there was need (disequilibrium), search, consideration of means and consequences, restoration of equilibrium, but there was no art, so far as I could see. There was no satisfying, immediate, perceiving of a valued quality, nor was there an intensifying or prolonging or discriminating of valued feeling. To call this experience artistic is not helpful. I share this example with you, following Dewey's advice to "go back to experience of the common or mill run of things to discover the aesthetic quality such experience possesses."⁴

It is also said on this same page that experience is aesthetic if final. This claim is misleading: we all know of an attempted genocide in this century, which was referred to as the "final solution." I am very reluctant to apply the term "artistic" in this context.

Eisele and Landvoight refer on page four to "arbitrary standards" of the human community, saying that these should not be imposed upon the artist's vision or that of the school child. I am confused here; of course "arbitrary" standards ought not be applied. "Arbitrary" means capricious, random, without reason, or despotic. Not only may this injunction be construed as tautologous, but the claim may obfuscate by suggesting that any standard is arbitrary, and that no standard is to be applied. We know that some standards will be operative, because selection of materials is taking place, and we know that inappropriate standards, which may well be counter-productive, should not be applied. Perhaps, instead of a summary dismissal of all standards as arbitrary, which this claim may be construed to suggest, attention to the kinds of appropriate criteria when the young student attempts artistically to express his/her experience would be more useful.

Later, Eisele and Landvoight say that the "separation of creative and appreciative process is for discussion purposes only." Dewey's unusually strong dislike of dualisms is acquiesced in by the authors, and the claim is made that in reality the appreciator and the creator do very nearly the same things. This claim does not seem to me to be true. Artists who participated in the production of a great film did not do the same things as the patrons who watch and enjoy the film. I am not sure how to describe language that fails to distinguish these disparate modes of action, but it seems counterproductive. "The separation between the creative and appreciative process is mythical," Eisele and Landvoight explain. Not to separate them appropriately is unclear, and there is no need to pay allegiance in sloganizing fashion to Dewey's antidualism. Stewart argues convincingly in her paper that it is a mistake to equate the work of the artist and that of the aesthetic perceiver. She says, "We would not say that what we can discover about the creative individual or the artist would necessarily apply to those who are aesthetically sensitive."⁵ Also, with regard to this point, Smith wrote that this notion of Dewey's is not clear and further that this view "imposes a task which some aestheticians [have] thought to be as impractical as it is irrelevant to the apprehension of aesthetic value."⁶

It does make sense to say in some contexts that appreciation involves in some sense recreating experience similar to that of the creator. This seems to apply in some situations; when I listen to music or when I view buildings I think I go through some of this, i.e., appreciating the work more because I go through what the artist has to go through to achieve his/her product, but in some other contexts it does not seem to apply. For instance, when I look at a beautiful woman, other thoughts go through my mind than those recreating how she or nature produced the artistic product, or when I view a beautiful sunset, I seem just to enjoy, observe the patterns and the colors, and experience satisfaction as well as some awe and wonderment, but I am not conscious of going through a process of recreation. This idea is perhaps a useful one but needs exploration.

To conclude my comments on this first paper, I would not go so far as to agree with Smith who, after examining for consistency and meaning some of the views of Dewey on art, said that his analysis should "... discourage attempts at constructing a theoretical base for teaching in the arts based on Dewey's thought," but I would suggest that, in further inquiry apropos of the materials in this paper, clarification and testing of Dewey's sayings are a very important addendum to the selection of them. Although I have been critical of Dewey's vagueness in this paper, the main reaction I have after reading it is that it is a good paper: it is clear (although Dewey's words are often in need of clarification); it brings to our minds some of the very good ideas of Dewey in an important area, and it helps one think more clearly and, I think, more productively about the place of art and art education in the world today.

Stewart's paper evaluates some claims made by Arthur Newman, who, by referring to authorities and to some possibly related correlational studies, argues

that to reach stage six of moral development, persons need not only acquire skill in rational analysis, but also in some other component, referred to as "moral sensitivity."⁸ This may presumably be developed by participation in "nonrational" and "nondiscursive cognitive exploration."⁹ Stage six personalities and aesthetic personalities, according to Newman, have some common traits, and therefore, inclusion of aesthetic sensitizing in moral education "might be fruitful,"¹⁰ but only longitudinal empirical research can provide the answer. Newman's argument is appealing and persuasive enough to lead one to think about possible connections between moral and aesthetic education, that is, until one reads Stewart's paper.

Stewart has here, I believe, an outstanding essay; it is lucid, excellently arranged, thoroughly logical, and substantively accurate and informative. She shows that Newman's arguments are based on the following errors: Newman takes to be Kohlberg's theory that which is not; he confuses the concepts of creator, artist, and aesthetic perceiver, or equates them, then draws conclusions based on those erroneous equations; he confuses the meaning of empathy in different contexts, and cites as evidence correlational studies which are useless in this context because, Stewart maintains, the personality traits of stage six types are not grounded empirically. I know of no way the paper could be improved; I should like to say only that it is so well done and so compelling that Professor Stewart's arguments undercut not only Newman's strong claim, but also his weak claim, which claims little or nothing. Newman's strong claim is that "Both the incorporation of an aesthetic dimension" and the "rational, analytic interpretation are necessary";¹¹ his weak claim is that "it might be fruitful to infuse the curriculum with learning experiences designed to enhance aesthetic sensitivity."¹²

Professor Stewart shows among other things that if one is going to demonstrate some connection between aesthetic and moral education, it is going to have to be done in different ways from those Newman has utilized in the paper referred to here.

NOTES

1. C.M. Smith, "The Aesthetics of John Dewey and Aesthetic Education," *Educational Theory*, vol. 21, no. 2 (Spring, 1971), p. 141.

2. Harry S. Broudy, *Enlightened Cherishing: An Essay on Aesthetic Education* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1972), p. 7.

3. Iredell Jenkins, "Aesthetic Education and Moral Refinement," in Ralph A. Smith, ed., *Aesthetics and Problems of Education* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 180.

4. John Dewey, *Art As Experience* (New York: Capricorn Books, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1958; first published 1934), p. 11, as quoted in Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

5. Marilyn G. Stewart, "The Aesthetic-Moral Connection: More Claims, More Problems," Paper delivered at the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Conference, Lexington, Kentucky, November 21, 1980, p. 51.

6. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

8. Arthur J. Newman, "Aesthetic Sensitizing and Moral Education," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, vol. 14, no. 2 (April, 1980), p. 94.

9. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

EVALUATING INTRINSIC VALUES:
SOME REMARKS ON PHILIP G. SMITH'S "FORMS OF EXTRINSIC VALUE"

Dennis M. Senchuk
Indiana University

Last year at these meetings Philip Smith gave us a progress report on his work on value theory, with special emphasis on the varieties of evaluational structures. That work is, of course, a significant contribution to our understanding of these matters; and, even where we may disagree on certain points, we can scarcely deny the value of his having raised these points clearly, concisely and cogently. In this paper I shall explore some points of disagreement which I have with Smith's views. In doing so I also hope to make some positive points of my own. I do not pretend to say the final word on any of these matters but merely to continue the dialogue so ably begun by Smith.

Since Smith's paper is focussed on the forms of extrinsic value and their evaluation, it may seem strange that my own starting point and, in fact, the principal focus of the present paper is a discussion of what Smith has to say about intrinsic values and the possibility of evaluating them. But while Smith is convinced that intrinsic values do not admit of evaluations, I am at least not wholly persuaded by him that this is the case. And, of course, since he does not acknowledge their possibility, it is not surprising that Smith doesn't spend much time talking about them. Since I am not so skeptical as he is about them, I shall try to say something more extensive, if not more incisive, on the subject.

In keeping with Dewey's view that "value" is basically a verb rather than a noun, Smith prefers to speak of *valuing* instead of *values*. He says that "to value intrinsically is to value something just for its own sake, in its own terms, and without regard for its actual or potential relations (including comparison) to anything else." (p. 44) This characterization seems, upon analysis, to be largely negative -- that is, it explains valuing *intrinsically* by way of opposition to valuing *extrinsically* which Smith explains in turn as valuing "something *because of its actual or potential relations to other valued things*." (*Ibid.*) And I take it that the force of denying that valuing something intrinsically involves a regard for that something's relations to other things is to contrast intrinsic valuing with extrinsic valuing. So, according to Smith, intrinsic valuing is valuing which isn't extrinsic. He also speaks of intrinsic valuing as valuing something *for its own sake*, but this adds little that is substantive to the characterization. Indeed, this language tends to reinforce my suggestion that the characterization is negative; for, once we eliminate other possible interpretations of the word "sake" in this context as implausible, we are left with an interpretation of that characterization which amounts to a tacit contrast with the characterization of extrinsic valuing. Thus, when Smith speaks of valuing something for its own sake, he does not mean anything like valuing it for its own benefit, well-being, interest, advantage, purpose or end; and this pretty well exhausts the available counterpart paraphrases for the word "sake." What he doubtless does mean is that valuing something intrinsically is *not* a matter of valuing it for the sake of something else -- that is to say, is not a matter of valuing it extrinsically.

To conclude that Smith's characterization is negative is not, of course, an actual objection to it. It might even be the case that intrinsic valuing cannot be characterized independently of extrinsic valuing, that a more or less negative characterization is all we can hope for. And this would be an interesting philosophical finding. It would suggest, among other things, that intrinsic values are not thinkable to us, could not be conceived to exist, apart from extrinsic values. This has a Deweyan flavor to it; and, although it doesn't make the same point, it certainly seems in the spirit of his views about the futility of, the lack of value in, ends which don't also serve as means beyond themselves.

In any case, the reason I am dwelling on Smith's characterization of intrinsic valuing is to discover whether it contains any basis for his conclusion that such

valuing cannot be evaluated. The importance of evaluation cannot be exaggerated. Indeed, Smith himself seems close to suggesting that unless our valuing is amenable to evaluation, our valuation claims cannot be sustained. He says:

When I value [something] just for its own sake, I claim that it has intrinsic value; when I value something because of its relations to other values, I claim that it has extrinsic value. Such evaluational claims cry out for evaluation -- i.e., for an assessment of value that will support or refute the claim, and thus warrant the use of *evaluational terms* such as valuable (disvaluable), good (bad), right (wrong). (p. 44)

Since Smith denies the possibility of evaluation in the case of claims to intrinsic values, it would seem to follow from his remarks in this passage that our use of the evaluational term "intrinsically valuable" is never really warranted. But is it really illegitimate to use such a term? A casual perusal of the dictionary might lend some credence to such a view: the term "valuable" means "of considerable use, service, worth, or importance," and all these terms seem to suggest assessments based on *relations* between the valuable things and other things. But, given Smith's characterization of it, valuing intrinsically cannot involve such relations; so, on the face of it, perhaps there is some reason to be cautious of the phrase "intrinsically valuable." In cases where something "has a very high intrinsic value or is very dear for its own sake . . ." the dictionary recommends we use the term "precious" instead of "valuable." And even those philosophers who are not inclined to rely on considerations of language use in their arguments may find it reassuring when lexicography and philosophy are not at odds with each other. It does, after all, seem more natural, less philosophically stilted (if not downright tendentious), to say that life is precious instead of saying that life is intrinsically valuable.

So, following Smith's lead, perhaps we should reform value theory, not ordinary language, and use the term "precious" wherever we are tempted to use the term "intrinsically valuable."

Still, none of this actually *proves* that there are no evaluations possible in the case of intrinsic valuing. According to Smith, however, the use of evaluational terms in relation to intrinsic value is a *category mistake*. In support of this contention, he says:

. . . to evaluate means to *assess* merit, worth, or value while a claim that something has intrinsic value is a claim based upon the object as a unique particular. As such, it is incomparable, incommensurable, and invaluable -- its value is beyond assessment. (p. 44)

Now 'invaluability' is a rather striking notion, one which seems to possess its own, built-in hyperbole: we say that something is *so* valuable that its value cannot be estimated. But what does this really mean? In what sense may something be *beyond* assessment? Are we to suppose at least that invaluable things are still in the same dimension as valuable things, that they are, say, infinitely valuable and, so, are not finitely measurable? This latter understanding does seem a plausible one, but then doesn't the claim that something is infinitely valuable demand some sort of substantiation? If so, then the assessment of something's value (as infinite) is, almost paradoxically, a precondition for the possibility of judging this something to be invaluable. But another, less paradoxical approach to the understanding of this expression is to see it on the model of the expression "priceless," which carries with it a suggestion of something's being irreplaceable. Just as money is no replacement for the loss of a priceless Grecian urn, so too other 'good and valuable considerations' will not make up for the loss of an invaluable friendship.

Now one good reason for claiming that something is irreplaceable is that that something is unique, so there is true merit in Smith's suggestion that the uniqueness of a valued object makes it invaluable. However, I am not fully

convinced that this demonstrates the impossibility of intrinsic evaluation. For one thing, invaluableity is not limited to the intrinsically valuable: many extrinsically valued things may also be invaluable. Thus, we might say that Bach's work made an invaluable contribution to the development of music, that a particular teacher's wise counsel was invaluable, and so on. Indeed, the word "invaluable" seems more at home in cases where extrinsic as well as, rather than merely, intrinsic value is concerned. Thus, friendship, which does have extrinsic value, seems more aptly characterized as invaluable than does human life, when valued intrinsically. Life, as observed earlier, seems better spoken of as *precious* than as *intrinsically valuable*; and, by the same token, it's better to call life *precious* than to call it *invaluable*. We might conclude from this that yet another category of invaluable values has been discovered, or we could consider the possibility that invaluableity is not incompatible with evaluation. But just what is the connection between intrinsic value and uniqueness? To complicate the question, consider the case of art prints -- lithographs, engravings, etc.: each individual print in a series may have intrinsic value, yet we would need to have a rather exaggerated notion of uniqueness to insist that each print in the series is unique. So, if we insist that only unique things can be invaluable, we are forced to conclude that not all intrinsically valued things are invaluable, since not all of them are unique.

This conclusion does not strike me as all that implausible, but we may be well-advised to try to reach it from a slightly different direction. To wit, there are surely some differences in the intrinsic value accorded different things; and it doesn't follow from the fact that something has intrinsic value that that something is invaluable: some things are only moderately or slightly imbued with intrinsic value. Thus, the initial efforts of the sculptor may have some intrinsic value, but this doesn't make them invaluable -- otherwise the sculptor might feel overly constrained in sculpting, all too fearful of destroying his or her invaluable productions to get on with the task of sculpting.

This is not to deny, however, that some intrinsically valuable (or, precious) things are unique and, for that very reason, invaluable. And Smith is quite right to observe that value comparisons among invaluable (or, precious) things cannot meaningfully be made. But these points, important though they are, do not serve to demonstrate, as Smith hopes to do, that intrinsic evaluation is impossible in all cases.

But perhaps Smith does have another reason for his denial of intrinsic evaluation, a reason based on the very definition of intrinsic valuing. Smith's definition, it will be recalled, states that in valuing something intrinsically we do so "without regard for its actual or potential relations (including comparison) to anything else." And since comparison does *seem* requisite to the process of evaluation, one might plausibly conclude that this process is inapplicable to intrinsic valuing. Of course the phrase "including comparison" in Smith's definition might be objected to as an *ad hoc* device for ruling out the possibility of intrinsic evaluation, for trying to define intrinsic evaluation out of existence. But Smith probably supposes that the addition of this phrase is justified by the rest of the definition and, though in principle superfluous, does serve to emphasize certain implications of the fact that the intrinsic valuing of something does not involve any regard for the relations which that something may have. And if a regard for relations is not involved in intrinsic valuing, then comparisons are also not involved -- this much is surely true.

But is Smith right to think that a regard for relations isn't involved? Earlier I suggested that this *is* a way to contrast intrinsic valuing with extrinsic valuing, which clearly does involve a regard for relations. But let's explore the matter a bit further. We have to be sure not only that these contrasting modes of valuing are contrasted in their characterizations, but also that these modes are contrasted in the appropriate manner. It might be argued that there is something wrong with the characterization of intrinsic valuing because, after all, certain relations -- e.g., personal relations -- are themselves valued

intrinsically. How, then, can we say that intrinsic valuing does not involve any regard for relations? The fact is that the use of this example demands a willful misinterpretation of Smith's characterization. Smith could easily respond to the argument against him by pointing out that he nowhere denies that relations can be intrinsically valued; he only suggests that, if they are, then there won't be any regard for the actual or potential relations between those *valued relations* and anything else. So, for example, friendship can be valued intrinsically but not by valuing the relation between friendship and something else; for that would amount to valuing extrinsically rather than intrinsically.

But consider the following use of the term "intrinsic value," taken from an article in a popular magazine:

The custom knife, Devlet explained, is a natural collectible. Unlike some other items that are being feverishly collected these days, it has *intrinsic* value. A good knife will do what it was built to do, whether that is skinning a deer or carving up a man. (*Esquire*, August, 1980, p. 46)

Now I don't believe we can dismiss this occurrence of the phrase as a misuse of the phrase "intrinsic value" -- it sounds right. And here we seem to have a case of something's being intrinsically valued on the basis of its *potential* relations to other things -- deer, men, etc. But there is still an implicit contrast being made between the intrinsic value of this knife and the purely extrinsic value of certain other collectibles, say, a misprinted stamp whose oddity and rarity appeal to the philatelist, despite the intrinsic worthlessness and uselessness of the imperfect scrap of paper. (One is tempted to say that such a stamp is valuable only in the sense that people will give you a lot of money for it but that it is totally devoid of intrinsic value -- a governmental factory reject.) Accordingly, it would seem that Smith's own characterization of intrinsic valuing stands in need of a modest revision: a regard for something's potential relations *can* be involved in valuing it intrinsically. This still allows for the appropriate contrast with extrinsic valuing, and it isn't at odds with the ordinary use of the term "intrinsic value."

But now we come to the crucial last step of the argument against the possibility of intrinsic evaluation. Given the fact that no regard for something's *actual* relations is involved in valuing it intrinsically, does it follow, as Smith seems to think it does, that intrinsic evaluation is impossible? Logically speaking, quite apart from any question about the truth of this conclusion, I do not think that it does follow. Even if, for the sake of argument, we accept Smith's supposition that all evaluation does involve the relation of comparison, and even if we accept his original, unrevised characterization of intrinsic valuing as involving no regard for any relations, it still doesn't follow that there can be no evaluations of intrinsic valuing (or, as I have been calling them for short, intrinsic evaluations). To see that this doesn't follow, it is necessary only to insist on the very distinction which Smith defends, the distinction between valuing and evaluating. Given this distinction, it is clear that even if intrinsic valuing cannot, by definition, involve a regard for any relations, it doesn't mean that the *evaluating* is similarly constrained. Thus, even if a comparison is not, could not, be involved in our coming to value something intrinsically, it does not follow that a comparison is not, could not, be involved in our evaluating the intrinsic value we place on that something. Since valuing and evaluating belong to different logical categories, since *evaluating* is a second-order process directed upon the first-order process of *valuing*, it is by no means obvious that what can be predicated of the one process, can also be predicated of the other.

But let's suppose nevertheless that such cross-categorical predication is possible, that any constraints on valuing are also constraints on evaluating. In that case it is time to reconsider the modified version of Smith's characterization of intrinsic valuing. We were forced, it seemed, in light of the example about the knife, to omit any restriction against a regard for potential relations. Accordingly, Smith's characterization would have to run as follows: to value

intrinsically is to value something just for its own sake, in its own terms, and without regard for its actual relations to anything else. Hence, even if we make no comparisons in *valuing* something intrinsically, we are not proscribed by this characterization from making comparisons in order to *evaluate* our valuing.

But is there any reason to suppose that comparisons are inappropriate in this connection? Smith rightly observes that "if in a moral context I value someone as a distinct individual person, then all comparisons are odious." (p. 44) But this may just be a special feature of the particular kind of valuing involved: such comparisons may be *morally* odious but they are not logically precluded, not *logically* odious as well. And notice that even if one values someone as a distinct individual, provided the context is more romantic than moral, comparisons are sometimes far from odious: "Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?" Shakespeare did not shrink from such comparisons.

Now my major disagreement with Smith's views is not merely that he denies the possibility of intrinsic evaluation, but that, in consequence, he tends to minimize the complexity of intrinsic valuing generally. So, for example, while he admits the existence of "two kinds of more or less critical activities that can be engaged in while valuing intrinsically" (p. 44), he still denies that they amount to evaluation. The first is called "phenomenological description or analysis," and is said to consist in describing the intrinsically valued "object and its internal structure and form, noting what features make it attractive, interesting, and why it is that it arouses prizing or cherishing." (pp. 44-45) But descriptions are often explicit comparisons, and it might even be argued that all descriptions are at least implicit comparisons with other objects which share the various characteristics mentioned in those descriptions. And why should it be denied that such comparative descriptions are evaluative? Is the art critic's labor *merely* for his or her "own elucidation or to help someone else join in appreciation of the object"? (p. 45) Granted that these effects do result, it is nevertheless likely that they result *because* the descriptions are properly evaluative. Thus, we may come to appreciate a given artist's command of a difficult *new* medium when we compare his or her accomplishment to the clumsy efforts of certain other artists. And we may describe, convincingly, the development of a particular artist's artistry, by comparing earlier uses of form, color, etc. to later uses of them -- thereby elucidating the works for ourselves as well as others. Evaluation of intrinsically valued objects is not only possible but actual, and that process of evaluation may, in turn, serve to inform our subsequent intrinsic valuing of other objects, too. It is even possible, it even does happen, that some not explicitly comparative descriptions of (say) the unique structure of a literary work, the way its various elements fit together, etc., serve to assess the value of a literary masterwork. Something may be shown to be superb in its own terms, an excellent realization of its own novel form; and it seems useless to profess that the descriptions which show this are not, properly speaking, aesthetic evaluations of something valued intrinsically.

Another "critical activity in relation to valuing (either intrinsically or extrinsically) is," as Smith calls it, "introspection." (p. 45) He has in mind such things as a preference rating, the "comparison of one's reaction to the object with one's reaction to other valued objects." (*Ibid.*) Smith supplies a persuasive example, the so-called "student evaluation of teaching," which shows that such ratings are not necessarily truly evaluative. However, even in the case of preference ratings among intrinsically valued objects, it is by no means obvious that there is no possibility of assessment based on such ratings: an effort to explain one's preferences, to say *why* one prefers one item to another, may sometimes result in the makings of an objective evaluation. Still, Smith is right to insist that the preference ratings themselves are not evaluative, and I suspect that an analysis of good reasons for preferences would usually show those reasons to be descriptions of the objects rated. My only quarrel with Smith about this second kind of 'activity in relation to valuing' is that I don't see why he chooses to call it "critical."

Smith does mention one "true form of evaluation that is appropriate in

relation to one's intrinsic valuing," but he denies that it is "directed toward an assessment of the *intrinsic* value of an object." (p. 45) He has in mind here the assessment of "the value of having or engaging in such a valuing experience." Thus, we may assess "the contributory value of the experience to the realization of one's conception of the good life." Now I agree that this assessment is not a direct evaluation of intrinsic valuing, but such an assessment may, nevertheless, demand a prior assessment of intrinsic valuing. How, after all, can we assess something's contributory value to the good life unless we know its intrinsic value? I am assuming, of course, that the greater something's intrinsic value is, the greater the contributory value of (experiencing) it will be.

Another mode of assessing intrinsic value -- in addition to the above-mentioned descriptive mode -- is that evidenced in the example about the collectible knife. This mode might plausibly be dubbed the "functional mode," provided we never forget that the assessment of functional adequacy is based only on *potential* relations to other things: the prized collector's knife is intrinsically valuable because it could be used superbly well to skin a deer, not because it has been used to do so. Indeed, if one were using the knife for such purposes, one would then speak more plausibly of its being *extrinsically* valuable. And using the knife that way could well diminish its intrinsic value, by marring its finish, dulling its blade, and so on.

Now it might be questioned whether the functional mode of evaluating intrinsic value isn't at least implicitly comparative. In favor of an affirmative response, it might be said that determinations of how well something *would* fulfill a particular function depend on comparisons with other things that *do* fulfill those functions. Thus, our knife might be sharper, stronger and more flexible than other knives which do a fairly good job of skinning deer. But what about cases of things which are known to do particular jobs extremely well even though no other things are known to be able to do those jobs at all? The wheel comes to mind as a case in point. Do we really want to say that our estimation of the excellence of the wheel is based upon some sort of tacit comparison between it and a square block, which just doesn't roll as well? Perhaps not, but it must be acknowledged that the example does not clearly indicate a case of functional evaluation based on purely potential relations to other things, either. The wheel is known to do what it does very well because it *has done and continues to do* what it does. And so it might be concluded that comparisons are involved in assessing the intrinsic value of wheels as well as anything else, comparisons between the possible future use of the wheel and its past and present uses.

At this point, however, we might begin to worry that the distinction between actual and potential relations to other things is not able to sustain a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic functional value. Suppose, for example, that our prize winning knife has been used to skin a deer but remains unmarred by the experience and sharp as ever. Would we have to say then that this knife is no longer intrinsically but now extrinsically valuable? I think not. The appropriate comment would be that the knife, so long as it retains the properties which would enable it to do its job well, is intrinsically valuable; and, while it is actually being used to do its job, the knife is also extrinsically valuable.

In conclusion, let me say that unless we are willing to deny the very existence of intrinsic value, as opposed to merely intrinsic valuing, we ought to acknowledge the possibility of evaluating intrinsic valuing; for without evaluations there is no real possibility of substantiating our valuation claims about intrinsic values. Moreover, such evaluations do take place, on the basis of both critical descriptions and assessments of functional adequacy. And not all genuine evaluations are based, in any philosophically interesting sense, on comparisons. These are my chief conclusions, drawn from a critical examination of, but in partial opposition to, Philip Smith's remarks in "Forms of Extrinsic Value: A Report of Work in Progress." As Smith observes, "one of the problems connected with valuational decisions in education has been that philosophers have operated with too small a catalogue of forms or types of value." (p. 44)

By helping to enlarge that catalogue, Smith has usefully addressed this problem. My own remarks cannot lay much claim to the same achievement. Nevertheless, I should point out, finally, one implication which my suggestions may have for a topic more squarely located in the philosophy of education. Dewey, in defending his well-known educative principle of interaction, which demands a proper fit between objective, curricular conditions and internal conditions of students, remarks: "It is no reflection on the nutritive value of beefsteak that it is not fed to infants."¹ This is his way of emphasizing the point that nothing in the curriculum is intrinsically valuable: its value always depends on the relation between it and the wants, needs, capacities, etc. of the student. But once we acknowledge the existence of intrinsic value based on potential functional adequacy, as in the case of the collector's knife, we realize that Dewey's point over-simplifies the truth. Insofar as a particular item in the curriculum is especially well-suited to a student and could be used exceedingly well to serve a particular educational aim, that item may well be said to be intrinsically valuable, if not precious.

NOTES

1. John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 46.

REPLY TO SENCHUK

Clinton Collins
University of Kentucky

Those of us who are familiar with the workings of O.V.P.E.S. will, I hope, rejoice in this somewhat unusual, but not unprecedented, occasion. Dennis has chosen to comment critically on what Phil Smith presented to the society last year under the title of "a report on work in progress." At that meeting Phil's report received a formal response from Jerry Popp. And here come I at third remove, to try, as Puck would say, to sweep the dust behind the door. I am thankful for the chance because I believe that Phil's work merits serious consideration by philosophers of education, particularly those, like myself, who are interested in value theory. I also believe that Dennis's critique, with the aid of a little illumination I hope to provide, can be of definite benefit to Phil's ongoing work, and that it points up some things also identified in Jerry's critique last year.

Let me sketch what I see as the significance of Phil's project. Philosophy of education as a field of study has long stood in the shadow of John Dewey. Perhaps the saddest aspect of Dewey's influence is the impetus it gave to educational research efforts which have progressively diminished the role of philosophy of education in large-scale efforts at educational reform. I am thinking specifically of the search for a science of instruction.

In my judgment Dewey's greatest philosophical contribution is his theory of the continuity between ends and means -- his realization that human goals are continuously reconstructed as means are selected for their implementation. It is a realization which makes educational evaluation, for example, far more complex than it would be if ends could be presumed constant while various means are evaluated for their efficiency in reaching those ends. There is, however, one serious difficulty in Dewey's theory, and Smith, following the lead of C.I. Lewis and others, has shown what it is.

By focusing almost exclusively on the relation between ends and means, Dewey tended to turn every problem of evaluation into a need for *instrumental* evaluation. Smith pictures the impact of this orientation on subsequent educational research in his 1976 article in *Educational Theory*. Permit me to quote at some length:

Much of the difficulty with this form of evaluation in education probably stems from Kaplan's, "The Law of the Hammer." The training of many researchers in education is focused, almost exclusively, upon the use of certain statistical procedures designed to produce reliable estimates of how much of the observed variance can be attributed to various factors Since this kind of research is easily confused with studies of so-called "cause-effect," and since cause-effect sounds very much like means-ends, and since one way to compare means is to compare their utility, educational researchers are inclined to hammer all evaluation problems into at least the appearance of something that could be studied by the methods and techniques that they understand Actually, however, assessment of instrumental value is either inappropriate, or else of only supplemental importance, in connection with most problems in the field of education. (p. 33)

Having recognized this difficulty, Smith went looking for a wider array of methods of evaluation, some of which may be more appropriate to problems in the field of education. He began the search by attempting to construct a taxonomy of types of valuing, in the hope that this would suggest alternative methods of evaluation. In this regard, he has retained Dewey's functional

distinction between valuing and evaluating, e.g., if I desire something I value it; but in order to evaluate it I must determine if the desired thing is desirable.

Smith's first move was to replace Dewey's emphasis on ends-means relationships with a functional distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic valuing. By doing so, Smith is able to identify a variety of modes of extrinsic evaluation, only one of which is instrumental, i.e., concerned with choosing the most effective means to ends sought. The other two major categories of extrinsic evaluation Smith has identified are what he calls "exemplified value," and "contributory value." In his report, last year, Phil sketched this taxonomy for us, and asked us to join with him in searching for other possible modes of extrinsic evaluation. Specifically, Smith suggested the possibility that symbolic value might provide a distinct mode of evaluation, which, to date, he had been unable to identify.

I want to applaud this effort of Phil's. I think it is important work. As is usually the case, however, so ambitious a project is fraught with difficulties at the point of communicating its conclusion to others in the field. I see the major contribution of Dennis's paper as pointing up some of these difficulties. His difficulties with Phil's report, indeed, seem to me to echo some of the difficulties which Jerry Popp identified in his response last year.

The major difficulty seems to be Phil's somewhat cavalier treatment of intrinsic valuing, and in particular, his contention that when people are engaged in intrinsic valuing of something, that valuing does not involve evaluating, and that intrinsic valuing is therefore incommensurable, incomparable, invaluable, and unique to particular experiences. To anyone in philosophy, such a description is likely to suggest, as Jerry Popp noted, that intrinsic valuing is irrational and unreflective, leans in the direction of fanaticism, and is of a lesser status as a cognitive activity than extrinsic evaluation. I think Phil could have avoided some criticism by making a greater effort to dispel such a suggestion. Dennis has attempted to provide him with some reasons for doing so. And in the process he has provided Phil with an example which I believe he would do well to incorporate in his own analysis.

Let me quote again the example:

The custom knife . . . is a natural collectible. Unlike some other items that are being feverishly collected these days, it has *intrinsic* value. A good knife will do what it was built to do, whether that is skinning a deer or carving up a man. (See reference in Senchuk, above.)

Admittedly this is an off-beat use of the term "intrinsic value," but it does seem to communicate, although it apparently communicates something different to Dennis than to me. For he writes that in the passage there is, "an implicit contrast being made between the intrinsic value of this knife and the purely extrinsic value of certain other collectibles." As I see it, however, the contrast being made is between the extrinsic value of the knife as a collectible which also has intrinsic value, and the extrinsic value of those collectibles which do not have intrinsic value (say, for example, stocks and bonds). The passage seems to me to indicate that the intrinsic value of the knife resides in its having value *apart* from being a collectible. The passage then shifts perspective and considers what other extrinsic value the knife may have (it can be used for cutting).

What this seems to me to suggest is that intrinsic value can be used to refer to *any* value that something has apart from the extrinsic value being attended to in a given context. That is what I meant by calling the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction functional. Dennis is, therefore, correct, I think, in his contention that "not all intrinsically valued things are invaluable." Indeed I suspect that virtually nothing that is valued intrinsically is, in principle, invaluable; but I agree with what I take to be Smith's point in this regard; viz., that evaluation of these intrinsically valued things is apart from their being intrinsically valued and necessarily introduces extrinsic considerations.

Dennis states well the functional relationship between intrinsic valuing and extrinsic evaluation, I think, when he writes that "evaluating is a second-order process directed upon the first-order process of valuing." But I have further problems with the way in which he uses this functional relationship in interpreting the example of the collectible knife. He writes that:

The knife, so long as it retains the properties which would enable it to do its job well is intrinsically valuable; and, while it is actually being used to do its job, the knife is also extrinsically valuable.

I have two problems with this passage: first, it seems clear to me that even an old, beat-up knife that doesn't cut very well is still capable of being valued intrinsically; perhaps aesthetically or as is sometimes called "sentimentally." Secondly, it makes no sense to me to say that the knife is extrinsically valuable when it is being used to cut, unless someone in the situation is conscious of how well the knife is doing its job.

What I am suggesting is the possibility that the only place it makes sense to say that something is being valued extrinsically is one where some implicit or explicit evaluation of it is being made. In cases in which something like a knife is simply being used uncritically we, as observers, might say that it is being used extrinsically. But I see no sense in claiming that it is therefore being extrinsically valued.

Therefore, I wish to call into question Smith's contention that a thing can be extrinsically valued apart from being extrinsically evaluated. It seems to me that extrinsic valuing is exhausted in the act of evaluation. If I am right then the functional distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic is directly tied to the distinction between valuing and evaluating, i.e., we intrinsically value; we extrinsically evaluate. Without the other process, neither process would have meaning. (This would bear out some of Senchuk's opening suspicions.)

A further ramification of what I am suggesting is that Smith has merely succeeded in confusing many of his readers by his exploration of the gray areas between intrinsic valuing and extrinsic evaluations. That such gray areas exist, I have no doubt. One does not simply stop valuing something and begin to evaluate it. One can, for example, begin to describe phenomenologically the things he values intrinsically. It is difficult to say at what point such descriptions begin to become evaluations.

Senchuk's comments on this seem to me very much to the point. He notes, for example, that if the art critic labors, in Smith's words, "to help someone else join in the appreciation of the [art] object" it is likely, according to Senchuk, that those effects result "because the descriptions are properly evaluative." I would add that much art criticism is extrinsic evaluation in the mode Smith calls exemplified value, i.e., art objects are frequently evaluated as good or poor examples of their genre. This is an important form of extrinsic evaluation often overlooked in educational evaluation. I would maintain, however, that when one begins to consider the extrinsic value of anything he is engaging in evaluation.

With regard to another of Senchuk's examples, if I value an art print intrinsically, why should I care whether there are others like it or not? For me, the intrinsic valuing is a unique experience. If I decide to buy a copy of the print then, of course, I will engage in an extrinsic evaluation of its status as a print, and I will want to know how many other copies there are, etc., in order to arrive at a fair price. On the other hand, if I want to estimate the value of my neighbor's art collection I may ask, "That's a print, isn't it?" Again, I have switched to an extrinsic mode of evaluation. In the latter case, however, the evaluation is done regardless of my intrinsic valuing of the print; whereas in the former case it was my intrinsic valuing of the print which led to my extrinsic evaluation.

In summary, I think Phil's work and Dennis's response have led us to a better understanding of the functional relationship between intrinsic valuing and extrinsic evaluation. Their analyses suggest that intrinsic value is any value that something has apart from the extrinsic evaluations being attended to in a particular situation. Furthermore, anything intrinsically valued can be extrinsically evaluated. Indeed, much of the effort of philosophers is aimed at getting people to evaluate on extrinsic grounds the things which they implicitly value intrinsically.

For example, as a teacher I may intrinsically value teaching children to read. The value is intrinsic since I don't evaluate the extrinsic consequences of my valuing. The philosopher of education comes along and questions whether the consequences of my intrinsic valuing of teaching children to read are good either for myself, my students, or society. I reply, "Get off my back; I'm too busy for such pointless philosophizing." But the philosopher insists that my intrinsic valuing does have consequences, and, as a responsible teacher, I ought to be aware of and evaluate my uncritically held values. I relent, and eventually become a philosopher of education myself, and let someone else worry about teaching children to read.

Since he is an outstanding philosopher, there is little reason to wonder that Phil Smith seems to prefer extrinsic evaluation as an activity to intrinsic valuing. But the choice is never either-or. If it were, teachers would have good grounds to reject philosophy in favor of holding on to their unevaluated values. Extrinsic evaluation is only meaningful in the service of intrinsic valuing that accompanies awareness of the largest possible whole and its contributory parts. If as a result of our extrinsic evaluations we gain as comprehensive an awareness as possible, we are in a better position to stop and smell the roses; that is, to value intrinsically the smallest detail of that vast but comprehensible whole.

I'm sure that Dennis joins me in the hope that Phil's work in progress continues apace. For my part I think that Phil's taxonomy is now sufficiently complete so that he may give attention to other aspects of the inquiry. Like Jerry, I find no anomalies in the case of symbolic values. Similar to many other areas of valuing, it seems to me to combine intrinsic valuing with extrinsic evaluation. And when I extrinsically evaluate a symbol -- say, when I decide to burn a frayed flag, or to throw out a seashell which I can no longer relate in memory to a particular vacation -- I believe I will be using one of the three modes of extrinsic evaluation Smith has identified.

The questions which I hope that Phil will explore in the future are ones such as why is it that extrinsic evaluation of educational method is generally conducted in an instrumental mode? And why is such evaluation presumed to take precedence over evaluations which stress either the "good exampleness" of teaching experiences or the contributions which various educational experiences make to the student's life viewed as a whole?

EDUCATION AND THE IMAGINATION

Karen Hanson
Indiana University

In her 1977 book on education, *Schools of Thought*, Mary Warnock avows and tries to justify her conviction that the most important question about education is "What should be taught?," that the most crucial issue in education is the determination of the curriculum. She also tries to answer this question, to speak to this issue, and her remarks on this topic are grounded on the supposition that an individual is improved and life enhanced by education. Education would be pointless, she reasons, if it did not lead to, or contribute to, a better life. Thus, problems of educational practice are tied to practical and theoretical questions about the nature of the good life.

Warnock's own conception of the good life requires the development in the child of imagination, virtue, and a capacity for work, and she would base all curricular decisions on the prospect of such development. She recognizes that there is controversy about two of her desiderata. How, whether, the schools should engage in moral education and to what extent, or in what ways, the schools should serve as, or be related to, vocational preparation are, she acknowledges, questions which excite dispute. But about the third of her goals there is, she claims, no argument:

Being more imaginative, is, I believe, like being more healthy. There is no need to raise the question 'Why do you want it?' or 'How does it benefit you?' If you know what 'being healthy' means, you know that it is desirable, and desirable both for its own sake and for its consequences . . . Analogously, while everyone exercises imagination in some degree, the desirability of exercising it more is not to be defended on the grounds that it leads to anything good, though it may well do so, but simply on the grounds that, if understood, it will be seen to be good. Thus it becomes clear that if a particular study can be shown to increase the imaginative powers of a child, then it is a strong candidate for inclusion in the educational curriculum, granted that the point of the curriculum is to offer to the child the possibility of a better life than he could have without it.¹

But Warnock's confidence that she has here at last isolated one educational goal which is beyond dispute is, it seems to me, unwarranted. It is not at all obvious that "being more imaginative is . . . like being more healthy"; indeed, if the analogy is as appropriate as Warnock believes it to be, then the idea of a "morbid imagination" should strike us as self-contradictory or, at least, we should recognize the phrase as an oxymoron. But the fact is that the phrase is not oxymoronic, not self-contradictory, and that fact should alert us to the possibility that being more imaginative is not in itself always and necessarily good or desirable. This possibility of morbidity may remind us that we can care about the *best* of a child's, an individual's, imagination and, perhaps, that we can worry about particular connections between an individual's imagination and his or her behavior.

Yet Warnock holds that, if imagination is properly understood, the exercise of it will always "simply . . . be seen to be good." The form of her insistence suggests that the depth of any disagreement we may feel on this point can only be measured by a direct examination of the notion of imagination. I should like to explore Warnock's remarks on this topic, to assess her understanding of imagination, and, then, to relate that assessment to the specific educational recommendations she proffers. In doing these things I hope also to be preparing a setting

for some of my own thoughts on the cultivation of imagination.

Warnock claims that:

Imagination . . . is involved in all perception of the world, in that it is that element in perception which makes what we see and hear meaningful to us. It is . . . the image-making capacity, [and so] also involved in memory of the past and the envisaging of the future, as well as in dreaming and day-dreaming, [in] fantasy.²

In taking the view she does, Warnock seems to be standing on the shoulders of giants. She says that her concept of imagination "is related to the concept as analysed by philosophers such as Hume and Kant and Wittgenstein" and is close to the sense of the word as it was employed by Shelley, Coleridge, and Wordsworth.³ But is there a philosophically defensible and an educationally useful concept of imagination which was held in common by all these great and diverse philosophers and poets, or is there such a concept to be distilled from their various writings? Warnock argues that there is, but the primary locus of her arguments is not *Schools of Thought* but her 1976 book, *Imagination*. We must attend to that earlier work, then, if we are to do justice to her remarks in the later.

And I think that there is one particular thesis set out in the earlier work, and reiterated in the later -- the assertion that imagination is involved in all perception -- which we should scrutinize most carefully; for it is from her conviction that imagination is involved in all perception that Warnock derives her sense of the profound importance of educating the child's imagination. Such education then: "may or may not lead to 'creativity'," she says, "but it will certainly lead to [the child's] inhabiting a world more interesting, better loved and understood, less boring, than if he [or she] had not been so educated."⁴ We might agree that if the role of imagination is so vast, its education will have the pervasive consequences Warnock envisions. But is its role so vast? Is imagination involved in all perception?

Warnock is certainly correct in enlisting Hume and Kant in defense of her position, although each of these philosophers supports the central claim for rather different reasons. Hume divides what he calls "All the perceptions of the human mind" into "two distinct kinds, . . . Impressions and Ideas."

Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may name *impressions*; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas* I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.⁵

We might be tempted to understand Hume's distinction in the following way: By "ideas" he means images, and images are used, are what we are aware of, in thought. He labels "impressions" whatever we are aware of in perception.

But there is an ambiguity in this reading of his distinction, and that ambiguity could lead us to misconceive his position. Most of us think that what we are aware of in perception is an external world, that we see and touch, for example, tables and chairs and trees and flowers, and that these objects have a continued existence independent of our perception of them. But Hume says that "all impressions are internal and perishing existences, and appear as such,"⁶ that what we are aware of in perception is not felt as external to us.⁷ That we think there is an external world, that we think some of our impressions are impressions of external objects, objects which have a continued existence independent of our perception of them, is, then, to Hume, a feature of our psychology which wants an account.

He offers such an account, and, in it, imagination is given a central role. It cannot be, Hume says, the *senses* which produce this belief in the continued

existence of external objects. Now, he asks, could the senses be responsible for our idea that objects continue to exist even when those objects do not appear to the senses? That, he says, would be "a contradiction in terms" and would involve the idea "that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas'd all manner of operation."⁸ And it cannot be *reason* which grounds our belief in the objects of the external world: "Whatever convincing arguments philosophers may fancy they can produce to establish the belief of objects independent of the mind, 'tis obvious these arguments are known to very few, and that 'tis not by them, that children, peasants, and the greatest part of mankind are induc'd to attribute objects to some impressions."⁹

It is, Hume concludes, the *imagination* which supports our notions of the objects of the external world. Our impressions are discontinuous and ever-changing, yet we can make coherent or roughly uniform collections of some of them, and, when we do, the imagination helps us posit the notion that there are independent objects which, in having these coherent impressions, we are perceiving.

[T]he imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse.¹⁰

Although the objects of our sense impressions do sometimes have a certain coherence and uniformity, this coherence would be much greater if only we posited the idea of the continued existence of these objects. So the imagination does this, continuing on its own "till it renders the uniformity as compleat as possible."¹¹ And, what is more, imagination supports the supposition of each external object by supplying to the mind, from memory, an appropriate image, so there will seem to be no gaps or discontinuities in the sense impressions.

When the . . . resemblance of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we may remove the seeming interruption by feigning a continu'd being which may fill those intervals, and preserve a perfect and entire identity to our perceptions.¹²

Thus it is, in Hume's view, imagination which is primarily responsible for our conviction that there is an external world, a world of objects having continued existence independent of our perception of them. And, as we *do* take ourselves to inhabit a world of tables and chairs, trees and flowers, a world of independent objects, if Hume's account is correct, then imagination *does* indeed play a huge role in our lives. If Hume's view is right, then Warnock is right: imagination *is* involved in all perception of the world.

There are, of course, good reasons to reject Hume's account. The components out of which it is constructed are questionable: What counts as a single impression? How are impressions differentiated and enumerated and how do we judge the similarities and differences between them? How do we tell the difference between an impression and an idea? (Hume says that the only experiential difference between the two is their relative "force and vivacity."¹³ But if we overlook the vagueness of this measure, we shall either feel this claim to be untrue to our experience or we shall find ourselves facing further theoretical problems as we try to understand Hume's accounts of memory and thinking.) But we need not here pursue a detailed criticism of Hume's theory of perception. It is Warnock's use of Hume's theory -- in particular, her use of his conclusion to buttress her educational recommendations -- which here concerns us.

Warnock argues from the importance of the imagination to the idea of the importance of a curriculum which develops this faculty. She seems confident that once we grant that imagination plays a pervasive role in perception, once we see that it is the faculty which makes what we see and hear meaningful to us, we will admit the propriety of making the development of imagination one of our fundamental educational goals. But it seems to me that Warnock's enlistment of Hume's account severely weakens the connection she is trying to make between

theory, or analysis, and recommended practice. She pledges some allegiance to Hume because she wants her concept of imagination to be recognized as fitting within the boundaries of the Western philosophic tradition's understanding of that notion. But this tradition seems hostile to the conclusion that the imagination needs education and development. For Hume, the role that imagination plays in perception is that of a magician: it makes us believe we see (etc.) what we do not. And while it is true that Hume's account might warrant the claim that imagination makes our experience meaningful, or significant, this significance is literally mundane and distinctly banal: we really have a series of fleeting, ephemeral impressions, but imagination lets us take those impressions to signify one continuously existing independent object -- a tree, for example, a table, a chair. Do we need education to thus "enrich" our lives, to help us to this sort of meaningfulness in our experience? Not even Hume would think so. Indeed, we should remember that his theory assigns this task of going beyond mere impressions to imagination, and not to reason, just because of his recognition that "children, peasants, and the greatest part of mankind" -- in short, for Hume, the uneducated -- automatically see a world full of external, independent objects. We must conclude that Warnock's alliance with Hume, though firmly grounded on some claims about the nature of imagination, cannot be of any help to her in the matter of curriculum planning.

A similar judgment would, I think, be the consequence of a study of the connection between Warnock's claims -- and aims -- and Kant's analyses. Again, Kant certainly does hold that imagination is involved in all perception, so Warnock is certainly correct to cite him as an authoritative antecedent, on that issue like-minded. Kant explicitly says that "imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself."

What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness, it is called perception. (Save through its relation to a consciousness . . . , appearance could never be for us an object of knowledge, and so would be nothing to us; and since it has in itself no objective reality, but exists only in being known, it would be nothing at all.) Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination.¹⁴

But again, the way in which Kant describes the role of imagination, his insistence that there would be no perception at all without the proper functioning of this faculty of the mind, suggests that there is no need to develop imagination through education. Kant in fact goes beyond Hume at this point; Hume implies that, were we as circumspect as we ought to be, if we did not "disguise" our experience, we would be aware of sense impressions in their purity. But Kant claims that, without imagination, there would be no human experience; not even appearances would exist. So Hume's account might, after all, be taken to suggest the idea that education should deal with imagination--but the suggestion seems to be that education can and should eliminate the mediation of imagination in perception, in order to bring us closer to metaphysical truth. But since Kant's account holds that the faculty of imagination is a precondition of all experience, it is hard to sustain, in conjunction with his account, the idea that there is specific educative experience necessary to develop this faculty.

In sum, it is not clear that Warnock's citation of these great historical sources, and of this portion of the tradition of discussion on imagination, can provide a firm foundation for the educational recommendation she proffers. It even seems there might be something peculiarly unhelpful to the educational project in the specific assertion that all perception involves imagination. There is a variant of that assertion -- namely, the claim that perception involves interpretation -- which might be all that Warnock really wants or needs to argue,

for this latter claim would not so easily vitiate the idea that education should be directed toward the imagination. William James presents elegant expositions of the thesis that we interpret reality in perceiving it, and a version of this claim is most strongly advanced today by Nelson Goodman, one of the inheritors of pragmatism's legacy. I shall not argue here either for or against this thesis. I will only note that interpretations can be novel or standard, fresh or familiar; and we might think that a particular educational curriculum could foster the ability to perceive the world in fresh and original ways. We might say that such a curriculum would help develop the imagination. But it is thus clear that, even if all perception does involve interpretation, we should not conclude that all perception involves imagination. The standard or familiar interpretation should hardly be called "imaginative."

I would take historical support for this position from section xi of Part II of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. I would, in fact, want to draw heavily on those remarks of Wittgenstein's in order to suggest what I would take to be an adequate account of imagination. But, oddly enough, so would Warnock; and she implies, in *Schools of Thought*, that her contrary view of imagination would be endorsed by, or, at least, that it is derived from, Wittgenstein. I think she is here clearly wrong, and if I can show that she is, I shall also be preparing the ground for my own claims about education and imagination.

In the relevant section of the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein comments on perception and interpretation and speaks about seeing an object as we interpret it, seeing according to an interpretation, seeing an aspect of an object. We can use the famous duck-rabbit example to make plain what it is to "see . . . as" That figure can be seen, by most of us, as either a duck's head (i.e., a pictured duck's head) or a rabbit's head. Most of us can shift at will from seeing one aspect of the picture to seeing the other. We can also think here of the well-known Necker cube. If we focus on one of its squares, the square can be seen either as an outer surface or as an inner surface of a transparent box. This picture can seem spontaneously to reverse in depth. Wittgenstein says that "the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought."¹⁵

It is because of such comments that Warnock takes Wittgenstein to support her contention that imagination is involved in all perception. Wittgenstein does say that:

The concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image. In other words: the concept 'I am now seeing it as' is akin to 'I am now having this image.'

Doesn't it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one is perceiving something in so hearing it.¹⁶

But all that Wittgenstein here remarks is a *kinship* between aspects and images, and he implies only that imagination *can* be involved in perception. In fact, he explicitly claims:

'Seeing as' is not part of perception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like.¹⁷

And he explicitly denies that the concept of "seeing . . . as" is appropriately applied to all perception. One can't say, at the sight of the knife and fork beside one's dinner plate, "Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork."

One doesn't 'take' what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery; any more than one ordinarily tries to move one's mouth as one eats, or aims at moving it.¹⁸

But, of course, one knows these objects to be cutlery only because one has had a certain upbringing, because one lives in a certain social setting. We might note that in a world without rabbits, or pictures or descriptions of rabbits, none

of us would see the rabbit-aspect of the duck-rabbit. The possibility of particular interpretations is bound, in various ways, by the social circumstances and the physical environment. And, thus, the possibility of that subset of interpretations which we might properly call "imaginative" is likewise constrained. Again, we shouldn't call the common, the conventional, "imaginative."

Now what counts as going beyond the obvious or conventional, what may require the engagement of imagination, will vary. Picture a duck rancher, a man who lives isolated in a marsh devoid of rabbits. For him, seeing the rabbit in the duck-rabbit may be quite a task. His seeing of the rabbit might be thought to require imagination. It is worth remarking, too, that this person could be helped to the achievement of this sight, guided in his use of imagination. If we enrich his experience in appropriate ways, if we give him, say, a copy of Dürer's picture of a rabbit or, perhaps, a volume of Beatrix Potter, we might be providing the springboard for his leap beyond the perception which is a product of his everyday existence. He can now see more in the picture than the familiar duck.

I am thus approaching a point of agreement with Warnock. She recommends exposure to art and literature in the schooling of imagination, and I would certainly concur. The fact of this particular agreement should not, however, obscure the differences in the groundings and the implications of our respective views. I have rejected Warnock's contention that imagination is involved in all perception, and I have tried to show that her reliance on some historically important accounts of imagination is either inappropriate or misguided. Finally, though I am ready to endorse some of her specific recommendations for the curriculum, I remain rather dubious about her ultimate test of whether or not a course of studies enhances the imagination. "The test, she says, is whether or not the educational curriculum is boring."¹⁹

Warnock offers interesting speculations on the topic of boredom and on the kinds and arrangement of studies which might keep the pupil interested. The connection she tries to draw between the engagement of imagination and *absorption* -- this absorption being incompatible with boredom -- is initially plausible; and, if there is this connection, she has that as a good reason for proposing the curricular criterion she does.

But, of course, the claimed connection deserves further scrutiny. We have seen reason to doubt Warnock's insistence on the omnipresence of imaginative functioning and so might well suppose that some activities can be absorbing without thereby necessarily engaging the imagination. (Think of a child practicing adding by working his or her way through a page of exercises. The child might be absorbed in this work, though trying for standard, not imaginative, answers.) Moreover, it may be that the imagination can be engaged and the individual yet remain bored. (Think of the plausibility of some of Anton Chekov's characters, individuals absorbed in fantasy and daydreams who yet remain excruciatingly, overarchingly bored.)

Beyond these theoretical uncertainties about the relation between imagination and boredom there is also the larger question of whether or not it is in fact important to avoid all boredom in school. Against Warnock's contention we might find ourselves siding with William James, who brusquely asserts that "[i]t is nonsense to suppose that every step in education *can* be interesting."²⁰ If we think again of a child learning addition, or practicing the tables of multiplication, or mastering some rules of grammar, we must realize that, though the child might be absorbed in this work, he or she might also not be; nonetheless, we might feel, this material should be learned. We want the child not just to be imaginative, but also to be, in some sense, conventional, to learn and to some extent participate in our shared thoughts, our shared form of life. This shared social foundation may be, in fact, what supports the vault of imagination.

I indicated that I am prepared to accept some of Warnock's specific curricular recommendations, though on the grounds of my own conflicting view of imagination. I mentioned, in particular, the claim that great art and literature

exercise or fuel the imagination and so should be studied. I should like to conclude by spelling out the terms of my agreement with Warnock on this point and then indicating what I take to be the justification for any appropriate reference, in educational planning, to the cultivation of imagination. We might all grant that exposure to art and literature allows us a broader range of experience and can provide us with actual access to others' imaginative conceptions. Why this is so crucial, what finally constitutes the importance, for education, of a concern with imagination, remains to be described.

The first feature of imagination which is relevant to this issue is one also cited by Warnock, though if proprietary rights to this insight are being sustained, the work of Jean-Paul Sartre must be acknowledged. In *Being and Nothingness*, as well as in his two small books focussed on the topic of imagination, *L'Imagination* and *L'Imaginaire*, the claim is there: Imagination is a key to freedom. I have tried to emphasize the way in which the exercise of imagination moves us away from the conventional, the common and familiar. Imagination is what allows us to envision possibilities in or beyond the actualities in which we are immersed. We do not thus merely escape in thought the bounds of reality; we know that something other than this immediate temporary reality is possible -- and we may then be excited to effect changes in the world. Imagination may be a form of escape, but insofar as that escape is to the sight of possibilities beyond the immediate, it can be a path to personal and social freedom.

There is at least one other fundamental reason why the cultivation of imagination should be the concern of education. It is imagination which gives us whatever power we have to move toward better, more harmonious and more finely tuned relations with others. I have stressed the link between the imaginative view and the uncommon view. Now there is at least one object in this world which none of us can ever behold from exactly the same real perspective as any other's. That object is oneself. If we are to match others' perceptions of us, of ourselves and our behavior, we must reach out imaginatively and identify with those others and try -- in and through imagination -- to take their perspectives. If we can do this, if we can imaginatively identify with others, we can at once achieve both a better sense of ourselves and of those others. And when we do this -- for as long as we sustain this sympathetic imagination -- we live with those others on truly common ground. We move from isolation to a kind of communion, and this, to me, sounds like a better life. And, as Warnock insists, education should always be directed toward the establishment of better lives.

NOTES

1. Mary Warnock, *Schools of Thought* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 153.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
5. David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888), p. 1.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
14. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A120, Norman Kemp Smith trs. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 144.
15. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, G.E.M. Anscombe trs. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), p. 197.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
19. Warnock, *Schools of Thought*, p. 153.
20. William James, *Talks to Teachers* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1958), p. 51.

MARRIAGE OR DIVORCE:
PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN AND MORAL EDUCATION

Jo Ann Freiberg
The Ohio State University

I. Introduction

There is substantial philosophical criticism of what has gone on under the label, "moral education." Much of this criticism aims at showing that existing programs are philosophically naive.¹ Some philosophers firmly believe that, even if they ought not monopolize the enterprise, philosophy has much to offer those who would engage in moral education.

Philosophers Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp have gone even further. They have been more bold by claiming that philosophy plays a special role in moral education programs. Included in the comprehensive Philosophy for Children method is their approach to moral education. Their contention is that adequate moral education cannot be divorced from philosophical education. By "philosophical education" they mean Philosophy for Children. "How will philosophy for children accomplish this moral education? How is it different from other methodologies now available to teachers?"² These are the questions raised explicitly in response to the topic question which provides the title both of their article, "Can Moral Education Be Divorced From Philosophical Education,"³ and of a chapter in their book, *Philosophy in the Classroom*.⁴ Lipman and Sharp offer five reasons why this separation cannot take place. Apparently, Philosophy for Children is believed to be adequate moral education, and their justification rests upon accepting this premise.

II. Moral Education and Philosophical Education

Lipman and Sharp present the following five reasons why the marriage of moral education must not end.

In the first place, philosophy provides a regimen for thinking, so that the logical aspects of the moral situation can be dealt with by the child who has learned how to unravel the logical aspects of a situation and to see the need for objectivity, consistency, and comprehensiveness in his or her own approach to such situations. Second, philosophy involves a persistent search for both theoretical and practical alternatives, with the result that the encounter with philosophy generally leads the child to a more open and more flexible attitude toward the possibilities in a given situation. Third, philosophy insists on awareness of the complexity and multidimensionality of human existence and systematically tries to point out this multidimensionality to children so that they can begin to develop a sense of proportion about their own experience. It stresses that a problem situation is seldom merely a moral situation but has metaphysical, aesthetic, epistemological, and other such aspects . . . Fourth, philosophy for children involves not just reasoning about moral behavior but also devising opportunities to practice being moral. . . . Fifth, we said that a sufficient moral education program would have to develop in the child an awareness of the feelings of others. Philosophy can never be separated from dialogue because philosophy inherently involves questioning, and questioning is an aspect of dialogue.⁵

Without question, both 'moral education' and 'philosophical education' are less than clear concepts. And although these five reasons are clearly stated, they do not help to clarify either of these opaque notions. Nevertheless, two things are evident. First, Lipman and Sharp view Philosophy for Children as a

clear example of philosophical education. And, second, moral education is a necessary and major component of their total program. With this in mind, notice that their claim that moral education cannot be divorced from philosophical education is ambiguous. There are at least three distinct ways it could be interpreted. So, in the remainder of this paper I wish to outline these possible meanings and then to examine the Philosophy for children claims, with these interpretations in mind. My purpose is twofold: First, this kind of analysis should clarify what Lipman and Sharp are actually claiming. And, second, it should shed some light on the extent to which the claim is warranted.

III. The Claim as a Conceptual Truth

The claim that moral education cannot be divorced from philosophical education could be interpreted to mean that to engage in philosophical education is, by definition, to engage in moral education. On this view, moral education is necessarily wrapped up in both the substance and procedure of philosophical education. If this is true, is it because of philosophy or education or the combination of the two?

David Purpel and Kevin Ryan have argued at length that moral education is an inherent part of the schooling process. They claim:

There is in effect really no point in debating whether there should be moral education in the schools. What needs to be debated is what form this education should take since we believe that moral education, in fact, "comes with the territory."⁶

R.S. Peters also makes this same claim. He demonstrates that the concept 'education' "involves the transmission of what is worthwhile."⁷ Consequently, there are "moral requirements built into 'education.'"⁸ Although education and schooling are not synonyms, any analysis of schooling includes the view that goals determine what subject matter is relevant, and principles of procedure and restrictions on manner in turn limit how the subject matter will be taught. Since both the process and product goals are inherently normative, curricular decisions require justification, especially those which depart from generally accepted moral beliefs. For instance, in order to use indoctrinative procedures, one would have an obligation to justify why this methodology is morally permissible. Richard Pratte goes so far as to say that the

manner of teaching and schooling purpose calls attention to the idea that schooling that attempts to inculcate x without developing good thinking or judgment about the x cannot be educative schooling. Schooling that does not encourage such judgment cannot be educative, no matter how successfully, say, mathematics, science, history, and so forth are taught and learned.⁹

Thus, all noneducative schooling "has only one justification -- an instrumental one."¹⁰ Pratte's comments not only suggest that education is a moral enterprise, but that it is also an integral part of schooling. In fact, one could claim that the most important and general goal in the schooling enterprise is to educate. As has been suggested, education is a moral task.

It should be clear that, merely from a conceptual perspective, both education and philosophical education could be viewed as being moral activities. However, this is only one way the claim that moral education cannot be separated from philosophical education could be interpreted.

IV. The Claim as Referring to Effectiveness

Aside from some form of conceptual connection between moral and philosophical education, it is possible that Lipman and Sharp are asking whether or not there

is an effective way to engage in moral education apart from philosophical education.¹¹ Given the previous analysis, this question is asking whether or not *philosophy* is an effective, or the most effective, means to educate morally. Unlike the conceptual interpretation, a positive answer to this question would require empirical evidence showing that philosophical education is the most effective means to educate morally.¹²

V. The Claim as Ought

The third sense in which the claim that moral education cannot be divorced from philosophical education can be interpreted focuses not upon conceptual or empirical connections, but upon a question or connection of value or adequacy. Understood in this sense, the question could be translated to read, "Ought moral education be divorced from philosophical education?" An answer to this question does not depend upon empirical data or conceptual analysis. Instead, philosophical justification must be provided to illustrate why such a separation should or shouldn't be recognized. The question now is concerned with the extent to which philosophical education can be satisfactorily defended as adequate moral education.

Lipman and Sharp never explicitly state which of these particular interpretations or combinations of these interpretations they intend. Nor do they state whether they have chosen to use this question expressly because of the inherent ambiguities. The only observation which can be safely made is that whatever question they intend, their answer is NO. Moral education cannot be separated from philosophical education. I wish to return now to the five reasons, mentioned earlier, which provide the rationale for this answer.

VI. Answering the Question

Since Lipman and Sharp never make clear the nature of the question they are in fact asking, it is also unclear what will count as evidence to support their conclusion. In one place they imply that not only is *Philosophy for Children* an "opening wedge of the commitment"¹³ to teaching morality in the schools, but also that it is the best "wedge" presently available. Although they never state this stronger claim explicitly, their view seems to be that other competing approaches worthy of comment, (i.e. Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach, Values Clarification, and other 'character development' processes) are sorely lacking and fundamentally inadequate as viable approaches to moral education.

If I am correct in interpreting Lipman and Sharp to be making this strong claim, then support for their position would have to consist of positive evidence of two sorts. First, they would have to be able to provide empirical evidence showing that their approach educates students morally better than the other existing methodologies. It would not be enough to demonstrate the insufficiency of Kohlberg, Values Clarification or any other version of moral education and to follow by claiming that therefore *Philosophy for Children* is satisfactory. This would be to commit the fallacy of appeal to ignorance. The second kind of support would be a philosophical justification arguing that *Philosophy for Children* is the most rationally defensible candidate for adequate moral education. This latter form of support would not require any disconfirmation of other approaches per se. Rather, their reasons should be able to withstand general philosophical appraisal. Such an appraisal might be based upon a set of agreed-upon standards of evaluation.

No empirical evidence is presented by Lipman and Sharp to show that the *Philosophy for Children* version of moral education is more effective than other approaches. The empirical data which has been provided by other moral education theorists is inconclusive, if only because there is not enough of it to arrive at any definitive answer. Thus, at this point in time no useful answer can be proffered with regard to the "effectiveness" interpretation. Consequently, I wish to devote the remainder of my discussion to an analysis of the question viewed primarily from a philosophical perspective.

VII. Claim #1: Philosophy as a Regimen for Thinking

Aristotelean logic is the particular "regimen for thinking" preferred in both *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*¹⁴ and in *Lisa*.¹⁵ Lipman and Sharp claim that a "good reasons approach,"¹⁶ as given in the Kohlberg material, is not an adequate means to foster the ability in students to arrive at justified moral judgments. It is not clear why this approach is insufficient. Lipman and Sharp define morality as the planning of conduct. In keeping with this, they believe that the double goal of moral education is to "make passions more rational"¹⁷ and to initiate children into a life of "integrity." Their definition of a life of integrity is one "whose thoughts and actions are consistent with one another, will resist performing an action incompatible with the rest of that child's life."¹⁸ As a means to achieve these goals, Lipman and Sharp claim that "moral imagination" must be an existing trait in a child. According to their definition of it, moral imagination "consist(s) of two major varieties; first, those that involve consideration of different types of means-ends relations, and second, those that involve different types of part-whole relations."¹⁹

Aristotelean logic does seem to fit the bill when these definitions and goals are basic. Lipman and Sharp's implicit claim is that having moral imagination encourages the development of a life of integrity. Wrapped up in the definition of "integrity" is what they take to be "morality." This chain of definitions is internally consistent. However, this raises a number of questions of broader concern than internal consistency. First, is moral decision-making always logical decision-making? Second, must moral imagination be defined in such a restricted fashion? Even if the answers to these questions are Yes, why begin with Aristotle? There are many ways to gain a "regimen for thinking." Why not begin by teaching children conditional reasoning? Or using Deweyan problem-solving? Why not use the Piagetian-Kohlbergian scheme? No argument is given to show why the Aristotelean framework is any better than other philosophical alternatives, unless, of course, one accepts the entire Aristotelean philosophical belief that to know the moral is to do the moral. Lipman and Sharp never address this underlying philosophical position. However, at many points in their discussion they seem to endorse this belief.²⁰ They claim that a "child will be shocked and disgusted"²¹ when thoughts and actions are inconsistent with one another. "The unwarranted violation of that whole, of that consistency and that integrity, should seem to the individual himself as a self-destructive violation of his own integrity and therefore wrong."²² Thus Lipman and Sharp advocate continual and comprehensive moral practice so that the rules of reasoning and morality become second nature.²³ They fail to recognize the ever-present existence of such competing factors as weakness of will, lack of ego strength, conflicting moral judgments, expediency, and so on. Also, what kind of "practice" can Philosophy for Children offer to overcome these character flaws? Lipman and Sharp have no response except the passing claim that whatever moral practice *is* provided to students is created by the teacher, who has the responsibility of transforming the Philosophy for Children fictional page into classroom reality.

Third, Lipman and Sharp believe that being objective, consistent and comprehensive are fundamental necessities in a moral character. Will having the skill to do class reasoning yield the ability to evaluate moral problems in such a manner? The answer to this is highly debatable. The particular meaning given to "comprehensiveness" will determine whether or not class reasoning is at all useful. If one merely views "being comprehensive" as a matter of acquiring the relevant factual material to arrive at a justified moral judgment, then it would seem unlikely that the gathering of these facts could be significantly aided through the employment of Aristotelean logic. It is also unclear whether or not the lack of ability to engage in class reasoning means that one would be at a grave disadvantage in being objective, consistent or comprehensive. Obtaining positive answers to these questions seems to be dependent upon accepting Lipman and Sharp's underlying assumptions and definitions. Any justification beyond this point is non-existent.

Philosophy for Children provides a philosophical regimen for thinking. It qualifies as a clear example of philosophical education. Lipman and Sharp implicitly claim more than this. They imply, first, that their philosophical framework

is the most effective moral education model and, second, that since this model is the best "wedge" available for moral education that it is therefore the most philosophically adequate. This presumed connection between Philosophy for Children and a particular regimen for thinking is not demonstrated. Without sufficient justification, their wish to establish the warrant for the above two distinct claims is unsuccessful.

VIII. Claim #2: Philosophy Provides a Persistent Search

Like the first claim, this assertion is really no more than an uninformative analytic statement based upon Lipman and Sharp's definition of "philosophy." They state that "since it is inherently a process of dialogue it is not under any obligation to come to a particular conclusion at a particular time."²⁴ We can all recognize instances when it is inappropriate to continue to search for possibilities in a given situation. In such cases, whether or not all of the information is in, a decision must be made. Although the spirit behind this claim is praiseworthy, it must be said that by failing to recognize that philosophy is both procedure and substance, Lipman and Sharp fail to see the complexity of moral decision-making. It is not merely an unending search. The Philosophy for Children concern with the *process/skills* of thinking above any concern for the *substance* of moral decision-making raises some important questions. They have claimed that "Moral education worthy of the name necessarily involves acquainting children with what society expects of them."²⁵ How can Philosophy for Children further the values of society without even minimal awareness of normative concerns? It may be true that philosophy as an ideal is unending search for answers, solutions, or truth, but if Lipman and Sharp's aforementioned goal is taken in earnest, then at least in some cases, this philosophical search must result in realistic and justified practice.

IX. Claim #3: Philosophy and Multidimensionality

There is little question that the more knowledge one has at one's disposal the better one is able to make justified moral judgments. It is arguable, however, what kind of knowledge is appropriate for arriving at such judgments. Lipman and Sharp would have us believe that arriving at justified moral judgments requires knowledge of metaphysics, aesthetics, epistemology, and logic as well as ethics. All of this knowledge is every bit as, if not more, important than learning how to obtain relevant factual information. Accordingly, their implication is that philosophical knowledge is of substantial value and is the most effective way to arrive at justified moral judgments.

The "sense of proportion" of one's own experience alluded to refers directly to the notion of part-to-whole and means-to-ends relationships. All concerns of proportion falling outside of the definition of moral imagination would not be included. As with the previous two claims, Lipman and Sharp present no justification to indicate why their conception of proportion or multidimensionality ought to be accepted over other views. The position is merely stated. No explanation is provided which would demonstrate why these two notions of proportion present children with special insights into their own multidimensional lives. It is true that class reasoning provides exercises in these two proportional relationships. However, as suggested previously, since we have no justification for choosing Aristotelean philosophy as a beginning, dealing with this claim without that prior argument is premature.

Lipman and Sharp may wish the notion of multidimensionality to be taken merely as part of their concept of philosophical education. Even this minimal attachment of multidimensionality and moral education would only be helpful to maintain internal definitional consistency. Other programs of philosophical education as moral education might lack "multidimensionality" as necessary but still be considered adequate moral education by general standards.

X. Claim #4: Moral Practice

Lipman and Sharp assert that providing sufficient moral practice is necessary for two reasons. First, it helps children be able to lead lives of integrity and,

second, it is a criterion for what an adequate moral education program contains.²⁶ What they mean by "moral practice" is not clear. Some hint is provided by the following: "we urge that children be given practice in reading aright the individual character and significance of the individual situations in which they happen to find themselves."²⁷ This imperative is not sufficiently clear to serve as the basis for a guide for identifying or creating proper exercises leading to the desired goals. We do find a further hint in their discussion of "integrity":

Integrity of one's self is based upon an integrity of praxis--one's thoughts consistent with thoughts and actions, and one's individual acts in line with or compatible with the whole character of one's conduct. Unless such praxis has been built day by day, bit by bit, lesson by lesson, moment by moment into a tough closely-knit texture, the individual lacks a strong moral base.²⁸

Now the meaning of "moral practice" remains vague, but given the Lipman and Sharp view, it is reasonable to

begin by helping children to develop habits of logical and critical thinking, by encouraging them to engage in philosophical dialogue where they can discuss their opinions and feelings with others and at the same time learn about other people's values and points of view, and by giving them the opportunity to engage in individual and collaborative inquiry where they can appreciate the values of objectivity, impartiality, and comprehensiveness, values that are indigenous to the philosophical enterprise. When children are encouraged to engage in moral practices, allowed more and more responsibility in the classroom, on the playground, and in the schools as a whole, and exposed to all other aspects of philosophy, they gradually can begin to make sense of the moral dimensions of their world.²⁹

Implied in this explanation is the belief that engaging in philosophical dialogue is essentially moral practice. For Lipman and Sharp, moral practice requires being able to reason logically and consistently. Evidently, having this ability to reason will encourage children to act in line with their decisions. Is this what constitutes adequate moral practice? Even if the truth of this was clear, is the Philosophy for Children material adequate in providing such practice? Lipman and Sharp claim that the children's novels are "model communities" and that by reading and discussing them these stories are able to "convert fears into hope."³⁰ Further, through the models "constructive feelings and energies are liberated that can be converted into moral activity."³¹

Lipman and Sharp have identified but one way to interpret these "conversions." I propose an alternative interpretation: Because these models are only fictional, when children are faced by the real world and the disappointments experienced, might they not become disillusioned and discouraged instead of hopeful? Lipman and Sharp themselves suggest, without realizing it, that such an interpretation is just as reasonable, if not more so, than their "hopeful" view.

Some years ago, for example, we held a series of discussions with some high school students about the usefulness of philosophy, during which we presented a perhaps overly rosy view of the possible benefits of logical reasoning. As it happened, the students were at that moment engaged in a heated debate over the policy to be adopted toward drugs during the annual class encampment. To our surprise, there was an attempt to press the syllogism into service, as though it alone could demonstrate conclusively that certain policies were the right ones. When we tried to point

out that one could examine the logic of any argument but that logic *alone* wouldn't solve their problem, the students were rather miffed, as if they had first been oversold and then betrayed.³²

At best, these models provide *vicarious* moral practice, nothing more. The kind of praxis suggested as being adequate moral education would have to come from and end within the classroom environment itself. Thus, according to Lipman and Sharp, in order that a program be asserted as "adequate moral education" it would have to involve nothing less than complete recognition, commitment, and employment of the actual school community. By their own design, this is the source and vehicle for furthering moral growth. Accordingly, adequate moral education leaves Philosophy for Children as one method among many able to *help* the effort.

XI. Claim #5: Philosophy Develops Awareness for the Feelings of Others

There is little doubt that morally autonomous persons are able to recognize the feelings of others. How to encourage empathic sensibility is of central concern to every educational practitioner and theorist. Lipman and Sharp claim that the following series of activities leads to such awareness.

When philosophy for children enters the classroom, the classroom becomes an open forum for all sorts of ideas, but it is not just a brainstorming session where all ideas can be thrown out uncritically. Philosophical discussion leads to acquaintance with the wide diversity of points of views to be found in any group and with the equally broad set of differences among opinions and beliefs.³³

It certainly is not the case that whenever, under any circumstances, philosophy is placed in the classroom, an open forum results. And it is not the case, either, that such conditions will not obtain without philosophy. There are many reasons why students would not feel free to discuss and share their views, reasons such as peer pressure, fear of being wrong, apathy, day dreaming, and so on. However, Lipman and Sharp imply that philosophy in the classroom necessarily leads to an open forum and that the open forum will provide practice in becoming aware of others' feelings. They later recognize that this relationship is only contingent. They claim that it is the classroom teacher's responsibility to see that this situation actually results.

Lipman and Sharp go so far as to say that "a teacher must become a substitute parent."³⁴ They give the teacher total responsibility for making the Philosophy for Children program a classroom success. The manner in which the role and responsibilities of the teacher in their program are described suggest nothing less than a model of perfection. Not only must the teacher create the model environment and fill the model role, but s/he must also be a philosopher. The Philosophy for Children novels are meant as a point of departure for philosophical dialogue. Unless the teacher has the proper background knowledge and appreciation of metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, logic and ethics, how can the goals of Philosophy for children be adequately achieved? In other words, does this mean that if students in their program do not become philosophers, morally aware, or both, that this only indicates the teacher's inability to make Philosophy for Children successful? Lipman and Sharp describe the program goals and present classroom activities in a way that suggests that *prima facie* if the program fails it is not the fault of the approach. The blame lies with the teacher for inadequate implementation abilities. In essence, this addendum renders any empirical evidence suggesting program inadequacy irrelevant. Thus, Philosophy for Children will develop awareness of the feelings of others as it will do all of the other four claims as long as the teacher is successful.

XII. Conclusion

I applaud the Philosophy for Children program and its effort and advances in bringing philosophy, writ large, into the elementary, junior and senior high

school classrooms. The fictional literature has unquestionable utility in being able to acquaint students with subject matter usually considered too difficult or abstract for younger minds. Lipman and Sharp have shown that philosophy can be introduced to children in a systematic manner. What they have yet to demonstrate to my satisfaction is that Philosophy for Children as adequate moral education ought to *replace* its competitors as being the best "wedge" available. The Philosophy for Children novels can be gainfully employed in classrooms as yet another method of acquainting children with moral issues and their resolution. As indicated earlier, in order to claim superiority, empirical evidence would have to be provided to show that Philosophy for Children more effectively encourages moral growth than do other approaches. Lipman and Sharp have yet to argue philosophically that their chosen model is able to facilitate the achievement of their own goals more comprehensively and defensibly than other possible alternatives. In their own words, Lipman and Sharp correctly state:

There is an element of reasoning in moral education, as there is an element of character-building, and as there is an element of emotional liberation and sensitivity training. The problem is not to devise a program that would do any of these things but to do all of them.³⁵

Although it is not at all evident that Philosophy for Children fails according to these standards, it still remains to be shown how and why it apparently succeeds.

NOTES

1. For example, a wealth of criticisms of Kohlberg and Values Clarification provide obvious examples of philosophical naivete in program design.
2. Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, "Can Moral Education Be Divorced From Philosophical Education?" in *Growing Up With Philosophy* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 357.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 338-368.
4. Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and Frederick S. Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the Classroom* (Upper Montclair, NJ: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1977).
5. Lipman and Sharp, *Growing Up With Philosophy*, pp. 357-358.
6. David Purpel and Kevin Ryan, *Moral Education . . . It Comes With The Territory* (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1976), p. 44.
7. R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (Atlanta, GA: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1967), p. 10.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Richard Pratte, *Ideology and Education* (New York: David McKay Company, Incorporated, 1977), p. 162.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188.
11. I have chosen "effective" rather than "possible" in this section because the latter is not helpful in distinguishing the conceptual from the empirical questions. In other words, "possible" may mean conceptually feasible or it may refer to efficiency/effectiveness.

12. "As has been suggested earlier, although Philosophy for Children is supposedly a clear example of philosophical education, it may not be the only clear example of adequate philosophical education.

13. Lipman and Sharp, *Growing Up With Philosophy*, p. 363.

14. Matthew Lipman, *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (Upper Montclair, NJ: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1976).

15. Matthew Lipman, *Lisa* (Upper Montclair, NJ: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1976).

16. Lipman and Sharp, *Growing Up With Philosophy*, p. 362.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 352.

20. Even so, Aristotle would not have children learn morality except as positive habit formation. Thus, only portions of Aristotelean philosophy could be used as a model for moral education.

21. Lipman and Sharp, *Growing up With Philosophy*, p. 361.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*, p. 343.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 342.

26. These two following quotes from Lipman and Sharp's article illustrate this point clearly. "Moral education is not just helping children to know what to do; they have to be shown how to do, and be given practice in doing the things that they may choose to do in a moral situation. . . . We can hardly expect children to carry out their response effectively if they have not been able to prepare themselves through various forms of moral practice." (p. 345).

27. Lipman and Sharp, *Growing Up With Philosophy*, p. 348.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 356.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 355.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 363-364.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 358-359.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 338.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 344.

MORAL FORESIGHT:
A RESPONSE TO FREIBERG AND HANSON

Frederick S. Oscanyan
Berea College

Freiberg and Hanson have given us so many things to think about that I had better start by telling you what I *won't* address. I will not try to be a surrogate for Mat Lipman and Ann Sharp. They will have to defend their article from Freiberg's charges against it, if they can. Nor will I insist on speaking about the great dead philosophers Hanson discusses. I won't try to speak for Mary Warnock, either. All the masters, living and dead, will have to look out for themselves. Instead, I propose to speak about imagination in moral education by reacting to parts of Freiberg's article, and responding to some of Hanson's remarks.

According to Freiberg, Lipman and Sharp claim that a moral imagination is an existing trait in children, and that moral imagination considers only means-ends and part-whole relations. Freiberg asserts that such relationships are basic to Lipman and Sharp's definition of morality as the planning of conduct. Freiberg proceeds to raise three objections to this account of imagination in morality: (1) whether moral decision-making is always logical decision-making, (2) whether the moral imagination must be confined to means-ends and part-whole relationships, and (3) whether an emphasis on an Aristotelian logic of classes is appropriate to the development of a moral imagination. I will get at these objections eventually, but in a roundabout way.

Is there such a thing as a moral imagination? Is there such a thing as *imagination*? Now there's a large question, big enough to make me want to skirt it during this discussion. If we suppose that there are imaginations, what could we mean by talking about a *moral* imagination? We might be using the expression in contrast to an *immoral* imagination, one that revels in wicked images. But we might mean something else by a moral imagination, namely, a *use* of imagining that contributes to moral thought and action. This second meaning is, I think, closer to what Freiberg, Lipman, and Sharp have in mind when they talk about morality as the planning of conduct. Making plans suggests *using* one's imagination, since plans are like mental images of what might become reality.

Let's look more closely at this idea that imagining can have a special use in morality. Why suppose that imagining has *anything* to contribute to moral behavior? Why not just say that morality consists of a certain batch of rules and that moral education consists of teaching those rules? Although there is much to commend this view of morality, it does not give an adequate picture of *moral education*. As parents and teachers have learned to their despair, it is not enough for children to know rules, they also need to learn how to recognize situations where the rules apply, and learn as well when circumstances are leading toward situations forbidden by the rules. The first of these, being able to tell that a rule applies to a particular case, requires *judgment*; the second, being able to tell when a situation could arise that is excluded by the rules, requires *foresight*.

We have just heard Hanson argue at some length against Warnock's theory that applying concepts (rules, ideas) to perceived circumstances requires imagination. I see no point to going back over Hanson's arguments at this time, so I propose that we cheerfully -- if provisionally -- accept her conclusion that Warnock's theory of imagination in perception is faulty. As a consequence we suppose, at least for the purposes of this discussion, that imagining plays no special role in perceiving situations where *moral* rules apply, and that the imagination has no special function in exercising good judgment. That leaves us with the problem of foresight.

Foresight is the ability to tell when a bad situation may arise; it is being able to spot trouble coming before one gets into it. Foresight requires anticipating future events, but is not confined to that, as though one first saw

what was going to happen and then helplessly lived through it. Rather, foresight also involves the ability to discover new alternatives, to come up with a way out of, or around, anticipated trouble. I want to argue that the development of foresight, including both anticipation and discovering alternatives, is important in moral education. I also want to claim that foresight requires imagination.

A standard objection to claiming that foresight contributes to moral reflection is expressed as a fear that foresight is too self-centered for morality. Persons who are good at anticipating difficulties and finding imaginative ways to avoid them seem well-equipped to look out for themselves at the expense of others. However, I think that this fear is misplaced, and that moral foresight is quite different from a kind of sly selfishness. Foresight includes an imaginative ability to discover new perspectives on existing situations. A morally healthy way to do this is to identify imaginatively with other persons so as to take their desires into account and especially see oneself from their points of view. This is supported by Hanson's conclusion that development of a sympathetic imagination leads to a better life.

Hanson also says that the imagination "moves us away from the conventional, the common and familiar." She says that it involves "the sight of possibilities beyond the immediate," and as such is "a path to personal and social freedom." These descriptions of imagining are pleasantly close to what I have said about anticipation and discovery in foresight, and I take them to support my claim that foresight requires imagination.

Moral foresight requires using one's imagination to anticipate future consequences of present actions and to discover alternative responses to immediate problems. These abilities to form realistic anticipations and imaginatively discover new possibilities are not directly learned by experience, in the same way that, for example, I learn to connect your names with your faces. Foresight involves special capacities that come, so to speak, from within the learner, the ability to use one's imagination for picturing future events and to use it to throw new light on a present situation. If these uses of the imagination can be taught at all, they are skills that develop over time, and are drawn out of the learner rather than put in. To say this another way, I cannot teach you to imagine, but I can try to teach you to use your imagination for anticipating consequences and discovering alternatives, so as thereby to develop foresight. In order to do this successfully, I will need materials that provoke your imagination and encourage you to develop its uses along these lines.

One way to put together such material for developing moral forethought in children is to write philosophical novels about fictional children who are reflective and imaginative, and to find ways to combine these traits. In order to be effective, such novels should have characters that exhibit different thinking styles, and experience failure as well as success in using their imaginations for moral thinking. It matters less that the characters actually show signs of developing foresight than that their thoughts and experiences help elicit moral forethought in the readers.

In order to elicit and encourage a sympathetic imagination, these philosophical novels should show the characters forming communities of inquiry. By exhibiting how varieties of thinking styles can mesh in pursuit of common interests, the novels can help develop insights about how others think, and so encourage the readers to imaginatively identify with other persons. By building the novels around topics of perennial philosophic interest and writing them in dialogue form, one can repeatedly hint at sympathetic imaginings, and provide clues that can help the readers connect imagination and sympathy in moral foresight. Chances for success in this endeavor materially increase when the readers of the novels are encouraged to form communities of inquiry in their classrooms, pursuing topics of mutual interest found in the novels.

As you have probably guessed by now, in talking about these philosophical novels I am referring to materials that Lipman, Sharp and I have written for our

program in philosophy for children. I believe that I have said enough about these novels and their uses in moral education to be able now to respond to Freiberg's three objections to Lipman and Sharp's account of morality.

Freiberg's first objection is posed as a question: is moral decision-making always logical decision-making? Moral decision making, in philosophy for children, involves rules, good judgment, and foresight, with emphasis on these in reverse order. As moral decision-making primarily requires use of the imagination in foresight, it is not confined to logical decision-making. Conceivably, moral decision-making can result in actions inconsistent with the rules of logic (I don't mean anything existentially profound by that, just that situations can arise where being inconsistent is a virtue.).

Freiberg's second objection asks whether the moral imagination must be restricted to considering means-ends and part-whole relations. The point to saying that these are the two major varieties of exercises in moral imagination is that each addresses a specific problem in moral education. Emphasizing means-ends relations can encourage children to seek more realistic ways to achieve their goals. And imaginative exercises in part-whole relations can help them see their actions not as isolated events, but as parts of larger contexts of personal and social relationships. However, this is not to say that these are the only problems for learning moral uses of the imagination, and in that respect Freiberg's objection is very well taken.

Freiberg's final objection asks whether Aristotelian logic is appropriate to the development of a moral imagination. The answer to this, especially from the point of view of the program in philosophy for children, is that it is not. I do not know whether Freiberg was misled by Lipman and Sharp's article, or whether she has misunderstood it, but no such assumption is made in the program. Aristotelian logic is used to present certain styles of thinking, but by no means all. It is imaginatively violated by a main character in an early chapter of *Harry Stottlmeier's Discovery*. It is used to encourage certain patterns of reflective thinking in selected chapters of *Harry* and *Lisa*, but Aristotelian class reasoning makes no special contribution to moral uses of the imagination, in philosophy for children or anywhere else. Here I need only remark that the Aristotelian logic of classes does not adequately formalize means-ends or part-whole relationships.

In conclusion, I would like to apologize to Freiberg for seeming to side with Hanson against her. The appearance is generated by my concerns about understanding the moral uses of the imagination, and how they tie in with the philosophy-for-children program. Had we the time, I would gladly take on Hanson's critique of judgmental theories of perception. But I thought we would all be better served if I chose a topic common to both papers, and this is the result.

ARE DIFFICULT STUDENTS SICK? A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION

Joseph Watras
University of Dayton

Teachers often use the words and ideas of modern medicine to organize their resources and plan actions to overcome classroom difficulties. Unfortunately, this model of thought may increase classroom difficulties because it is used in a way that frustrates thought rather than expands it. When this happens, the medical model conveys a shallow notion of science and democracy. It makes drill and repetition appear to be the result of a carefully analyzed plan. And it seems, almost automatically, to lead to excessive pressure against an individual by disguising punishment as therapy.

The idea that children's troubles in school are brought on by a physical disability is widespread. Children who experience reading problems may be said to have dyslexia. Children who do not learn easily may be said to have a learning disability. And children who misbehave may be considered to suffer from minimal brain dysfunction. These terms imply that something is wrong with the mind of the child, even though they are used when such organic damage cannot be found. As a result, the words justify applying to normal children a model of therapy that is widely used to treat severely handicapped children.

The model is often called an interdisciplinary team approach. The idea is to bring together specialists from different areas to approach a baffling syndrome. The model is used in many child study clinics and training centers where experts like audiologists, physicians, and psychologists work with teachers to help mentally retarded children. When professionals apply the model to normal children, they do so in the hope that a united front of experts from previously competing disciplines will provide the answers to stubborn problems in learning. Instead the division of labor in this approach seems to encourage teachers and school administrators to believe that good plans for action come from properly managed meetings rather than from intelligent people using their wits and powers of observation.

Let me pause here to give two examples of the medical model. These examples will show how it seems to lead logically to dangerous ways of thinking. The first is the team approach in general as outlined in the public law that promoted what is called mainstreaming. The second example is the use of medication to control children who are called hyperactive.

Public Law 94-142 requires all school districts to follow a similar procedure to help handicapped children. Details may vary between states or districts. In general, it goes as follows: when a teacher or parent feels the child is suffering from an educational handicap, he may ask that the child be examined by a variety of experts. These may include ophthalmologists, audiologists, reading specialists or psychologists. These experts make what is called a multifactorial assessment. The experts do not make up the educational program for the child. This is drawn up in a meeting. The experts may attend the meeting or their reports may serve as the basis of the discussion. The teacher should be present as should the parent and sometimes even the child. The school psychologists and any other school official such as a curriculum supervisor or the principal may be present. During the meeting, they will decide on an individual education program for the child. They should do this in language the parent can understand. And the entire procedure is open to review by an impartial hearing officer.

The rationale behind this approach is that the best program for any child comes when all the people who might be involved work together to design it. The hope is that the program will be scientific, because the curriculum will be based on the individual differences of the child, differences identified

by prominent experts. The idea is popular. A surprising number of people feel that the model should be applied to all children. Unfortunately, the model is often neither democratic nor scientific.

It is not democratic because the information the experts use to make their diagnosis cannot be shared with the parents, at least not in the short time the meeting takes. In this regard, even if the meeting is conducted in language they understand, the parents may not play a part in designing the course of study. The parents cannot be expected to act as equals towards people who appear to have esoteric knowledge and status. Furthermore, the teachers, administrators, and experts may try to avoid engaging in theoretical discussions which could become lengthy, even though such discussions could help the parents recognize the implications behind various suggestions. In view of the likelihood that the experts will conceal information, it is not surprising that few parents or teachers appeal the decision of these experts to an impartial hearing officer.

Of more importance to school people is the fact that individual educational programs tend to discourage democracy in the classroom. As John Dewey pointed out, if a child is to participate in a democracy as an adult, he must learn early to set goals for himself. He must learn to use newly acquired information or skills to set further purposes or goals. In this way the child learns to integrate progressively his developing interests. If he does this with other children, he will learn to integrate his interests with those of other people. When the goals are set too far in advance of the learning act, the child cannot use what he learns to discover new and unexpected goals. Since the individual educational program is tailored to the child's needs, it seems to discourage cooperative work in a social setting.

An individual educational program usually consists of some form of basic skills remediation or drill and repetition. The danger here is that the learning will be separated from anything the child is interested in. When this happens, the child rarely learns the material easily. He may quickly forget the material. And he may be unable to apply the information or skills to a new and slightly different situation. It is ironic to say that an individual program can overlook the child's interest. But this occurs when the committee tries harder to decide if the child's preferred mode of learning is auditory or visual than it does to decide what the child's previous experiences have been, to find ways to make the material to be learned interact with that experience and to provide continuity for future experiences. The result is that, even though a great deal of attention is paid to the child, this approach can be as mechanical as one in which the teacher takes an authoritarian attitude.

Finally, drawing up an individual education program does not seem to be a scientific way to make a curriculum. It does not encourage a scientific spirit of inquiry. Instead, the teachers and administrators tend mechanically to follow the experts' findings. This may occur because the division of labor implicit in the model encourages a laziness of mind. Few people can master the theoretical conjectures that underlie the tests the specialists use. As a result, they give up trying. What comes out of this surrender is a view of science as a static body of tests that can tell the teacher what he should do. This is a most unscientific view of science. A more correct view would be to regard science as a collection of ideas that help one make sense of his situation and that change as the individual adapts them to his setting. While this latter view of science should be the basis of any method to construct a curriculum scientifically, this view is often not a part of an individual educational program.

The shallow form of cooperation that the medical model may lead to not only discourages individuals on an interdisciplinary team from having their own insights, but may also put excessive pressure on an individual student, by disguising punishment as therapy. This possibility is illustrated by efforts to help those children called hyperactive. Oppressiveness, though, does not come from malevolence in those who use the model. It seems to be the result

of a logical escalation of patterns within the ideas. As a result, school people may end up acting in ways they would rather not act.

The word "hyperactivity" is a misnomer. These children are often no more active than other children. Experts say these children are occasionally unable to focus their attention when they should. These children may not do class work or they may bother other children. Other names such as "minimal brain dysfunction" are also misnomers, since there is no evidence the children suffer from an abnormality of the brain. The names designate a syndrome of behaviors that is mysterious and troubling. Strangely, the behavior of these children changes after they reach puberty. Further, the consequences do not seem to follow the child into adulthood. Nonetheless, the child may receive some form of stimulant medication to help him focus his attention and act more purposefully.

Probably a relatively small percentage of children receives these medications. While some experts say that fifteen percent of the children under 12 may need this medication and other experts that only three percent need it, the percentage that actually receives it is probably under one percent. The number of children that receive the medication is high. And the number seems to be increasing rapidly. In Massachusetts, where certification by the Department of Public Health is required before a child can take such medication in public school, 1215 children were reported to be taking the medication during the 1976-77 session. In 1975-76, 843 received certification, and in 1974-75, the total number was 725.

The practice seems to move by itself. Although hyperactivity is not a disease, the language used to describe it implies that it is. Since physicians are involved, one cannot depend on any external device such as people's consent to control the practice. If a physician decides that medication might be appropriate, few parents can resist and assert their right to say no. Nor can one depend on the competence of experts to control the use of medication. There is no objective test for hyperactivity. Furthermore, the physician's trade is drugs. This does not mean they are pill-rollers. It means that when someone asks a physician what can be done to modify behavior, the question sets up the answer. Perhaps the clearest indication that, once the basic principles of the medical model are accepted, the treatment of these children is beyond anyone's reach comes from the fact that even criticism of the practice advances it.

In 1970, nationwide news shows announced that physicians in Omaha were prescribing medication to control children's behavior at any teacher's request. On September 29, 1980, then Representative Cornelius Gallagher chaired a congressional investigation of the practice. He found cause for concern. Most importantly, no one knew if the medication was helpful or harmful. He asked then Secretary of the Department of Health Education and Welfare Elliot Richardson to set up procedures to regulate the practice. Richardson said he would call a blue ribbon panel of experts to look at the conditions under which these drugs could be harmful or helpful.

The conference was held January 11-12, 1971. Their report essentially ended federal efforts to regulate the use of stimulant medication. While it acknowledged that little was definitely known about minimal brain dysfunction and said that medication was not a cure, the report said medication could make the child more accessible to good teaching. The report held that side effects could be controlled by careful attention on the part of the physician.

Studies to determine the benefits of the medication are mixed. It has not been clearly established that children profit from taking it. The side effects of the medication are probably not serious, although they might be. Possible side effects include later drug dependency, suppression of the child's growth, and problems with hypertension and increased heart beat. The important point here is the practice of using medication to control behavior was widespread before attention was directed to its safety. In fact, when the practice was attacked for causing harm, physicians prescribed more medication while studies were conducted to prove its safety. This seems to show that some motive

other than helping or caring is behind the practice.

Criticism of the practice publicized the idea that some behavior could be studied and treated. It was never clear that any physicians were abusing their right to administer medication. Probably few were. But as a result of the controversy, questions about children's behavior were raised in areas of the country where such behavior had been tolerated before. Child study clinics, composed of psychologists, special educators, neurologists, and physicians promised a comprehensive treatment of childhood disorders. Once clinics were set up in various communities, their very existence meant that children had to be treated.

Efforts to find alternative treatments increased the use of medication. For example, one group of experts said changes in diet could work miracles. Others said behavior modification was enough to help the children. These suggestions reinforced the idea that something was wrong with the child. When a diet or the system of consistent rewards and punishments failed, medication remained as a final solution. It continues to remain such, even though it is still not clear whether the medication is helpful or harmful.

The school's role in all this is peculiar. Teachers and school officials do not prescribe medication or force a child to see a physician. Teachers may complain to guidance counselors, who may in turn observe the child and later invite the parents in for a conference. During the course of such a conference, the counselor or even the teacher may suggest that the child visit a physician to see if there is a medical problem. Once such a suggestion comes up, the parents are likely to take the child to a physician for an examination, either because they take the suggestion as a command or because they want more information. Unfortunately, the doctor has no test he can give the child. He may depend so much of the teacher's anecdotal record that it becomes the basis of the diagnosis. As a result, although school people generally say that parents and physicians must decide about the use of behavior-modifying medication, they may inadvertently encourage it.

The conclusion that I draw from these illustrations is that when school people begin to think of difficult students as sick, the ideas can take them in directions which demean the professional and the student. We must be careful here though. This does not mean the ideas have a life of their own. More correctly, it means that, when school people do not have values that can control it, the medical model can expand and answer all educational questions in its own way. That is, if school people knew more clearly what they wanted students to learn in school, if they held a clear yet deeper notion of literacy than simply the skills of reading, they could control the apparent automatism of this way of thinking. They do not, so they cannot. Let me explain what I mean by referring to my work with prospective teachers.

In several of my classes I asked my students, undergraduate and graduates at a state teacher's college and a church-related university, to identify a translation I made of the Sermon on the Mount. I asked the students to tell me what type of person would say these things and what the world would be like if we followed the suggestions. In general, the students did not like the ideas of Jesus that my translation contained. In all of the classes about twenty percent of the students approved of the ideas. Most of the students who disliked the material objected to Jesus' call to not resist evil. This objection was so widespread that it had a special meaning. I think I know what that meaning is.

The bulk of my students are becoming specialists. To ensure that they are going to get a job, they are becoming reading specialists, special educators or health instructors. The students do not have any idea of what schools should teach. They do know what they want to do.

Reading specialists say that they want to teach reading so that children can survive. They say that people must read labels to buy food and must read and fill out forms to get a job. Special educators say that their charges must learn to keep clean and how to behave around others. Health instructors say that someone has to break the self-destructive habits of Americans.

In short, my students agree that teachers should fight evil. While they do not agree which evil is the most dangerous, they can divide up the evils in such a way as to assign one to each teacher and thereby promote cooperation with each other and outside specialists.

I call the predisposition of my students to fight evil and their inability to define the good they wish to promote a pathological mind-set, because they are more aware of what is wrong or sick than they are of what is good or healthy. In part, this pathological mind-set developed from their belief that tolerance and the acceptance of differences are crucial to a peaceful and fruitful life. My students hold open-mindedness so aggressively that it has destroyed their ability to hold traditional values or any value other than tolerance. This attitude threatens any form of community. But my students have worked out an uneasy compromise. They agree to fight things that everyone agrees are evil. In this way, they have a sense of community without anyone's imposing any belief on his compatriots.

This is an illusion of community, because it is not based on a common understanding of deeply examined values. By itself, though, such an illusion may not be bad. The real danger appears when my students try to act on it. They tend to use extremely powerful and sophisticated means of fighting their various evils. It is at this point that the medical model becomes important. When my students use the medical model to achieve their shallowly defined goals, the means they employ can transform the ends they seek.

My students are representative of most educators. Most educators spend their time developing innovative techniques to teach. Few think deeply about their aims. And many assert that their avoidance of ultimate ends encourages other individuals to hold divergent views. In fact, it does seem paradoxical to say that the drive for tolerance and security leads to oppression, but that is what I showed can happen in the cases described earlier.

What should we do? We must avoid the tendency for the procedures implied by the medical model to become mechanical. As long as the teacher does not succumb to this tendency, the procedures may prove useful.

Individual educational programs are required in most school districts. The intentions behind the plans may be good. But they are not for all children, and the teachers should not use them in a way which avoids the responsibility of determining the curriculum. So, too, the teacher should not resist cooperating with a team of experts and parents on the grounds that setting up the curriculum is his responsibility. A course of study in a democracy must be flexible and must be the product of cooperation. My point is that an individual educational program can reinforce an absolute view of learning as much as a dogmatic teacher can. If the objectives on an individual education plan are taken as guides rather than fixed plans, they can provide a structure upon which the teacher and student may improvise.

Although the teacher should not avoid any tendency to think about the child's physical health as an explanation of behavior, I would favor teachers' ignoring or actually resisting any suggestion that children would profit from behavior-modifying medication. If we have a democracy, some limits have to be placed on efforts to control classroom behavior, just as we place limits on what behavior is acceptable in a classroom.

Most importantly, if teachers are to resist the tendency to abuse the medical model, they have to trust their own intelligence. To some extent this means they have to develop it. This does not mean that they do not have any. It means that, if teachers are to teach others to grow, they must provide an example for their students of what it means to learn and grow. They cannot provide such an example if they are compliant members of a committee. They cannot provide such an example if they expect physicians to provide the answers to classroom problems. And they cannot be such an example if they think shallow thoughts about the goals they seek and let such thoughts affect their choice of methods.

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THE ROLE OF COERCION IN THE TEACHING ENTERPRISE

H. Michael Skolow
Illinois State University

I. Introduction

Throughout the histories of Social Philosophy and Education, coercion, although a popular issue, has been taken as a necessary element, or at times evil, of social institutions. Typically, educators have attempted to reduce, or at least reduce the visibility of, coercion by "structuring the learning environment" or by other such tactics to engage the student's interest.

Recently, educational scholars have taken an acute interest in the moral education of the young. Yet, if moral education occurs via our methods of teaching and our treatment of youngsters, and if we do rely upon coercion in some aspects of the teaching enterprise,¹ then we should pay close attention to its role and the justifications given for it. Here I hope to show some of the places where or reasons why coercion enters into much of what the public school teacher does and the role that philosophers of education and other educational scholars have to play in any discussion about coercive tactics as teaching methods.

II. Coercion and the Acts of Teaching

In the literature of what has been called by Jane Roland Martin, "the rationalist theory of teaching,"² we see an emphasis upon concepts which either have reason at their cores or are important because of the implied absence of an appeal to reason. This rational emphasis is elucidated by Scheffler:

To teach, in the standard sense, is at some points at least to submit oneself to the understanding and independent judgment of the pupil, to his demand for reasons,³ to his sense of what constitutes an adequate explanation.³

Yet, if we must appeal to reason at some point, we might well be concerned with "other points." In order later to elucidate some of these other points, I turn first to the relationship between the concepts 'coercion' and 'teaching' and its related concepts.

In "The Modes of Teaching,"⁴ Thomas Green shows the relationships among 'teaching,' 'indoctrinating,' 'training,' 'conditioning,' and 'instructing' by employing the criteria of the extent of the appeal to reason and the end-product sought; i.e., shaping belief or shaping behavior. 'Indoctrinating' and 'instructing' aim at shaping belief, whereas 'conditioning' and 'training' aim at shaping behavior. 'Instructing' and 'training' seem to embody an appeal to reason, while the other two concepts do not.

Because Green's analysis is concerned with 'teaching someone that' and 'teaching someone to,'⁵ the analysis focuses upon certain acts of teaching rather than on the enterprise of teaching;⁶ i.e., the focus is on certain acts in which teachers engage when trying to shape particular beliefs or behaviors rather than upon a view of teaching within which some activities are undertaken for reasons not directly related to shaping particular beliefs or behaviors. Green's analysis, then, has as its background what he has called the logical and the strategic acts of teaching.⁷

Consider the concept 'coercion' and its place in Green's analysis. First, 'coercion' is both vague and ambiguous. It is ambiguous in that some kind of force or compulsion is a necessary feature of it, although the nature of the force may be physical or psychological; e.g., X may be threatened by physical harm, shame, or guilt if X does A. The concept is vague because it is not clear

just how much threat there must be for us to use the term 'coercion.' A search for the precise place where we cease to call something a warning and begin to call it coercion seems to show this.⁸

'Coercion' fits quite nicely on the side of Green's continuum which deals with shaping behavior. Just as we speak of conditioning X to do Y, we also speak of coercing X to do Y. However, because we also speak of coercing X into doing Y, 'coercing' seems to fall between 'conditioning' and 'training.' The 'into' in 'coercing into' displays that coercing is less mechanical than conditioning. For, in one sense of "appeal to reason," someone who coerces X tries to get X to consider rationally certain cause/effect relations: e.g., "If you do that, I'll kill you." However, 'coercing' is similar to 'conditioning' because the coercer hopes that the coercive tactic will cause X to act on the basis of a learned or natural reaction to fear or harm.

The relationship between 'coercing' and 'instructing' and 'indoctrinating,' which are concerned with shaping belief, is problematic. At first glance, "coercing X to believe Y" seems awkward. Nevertheless, if someone were to say to X, "If you don't believe me then I'll never talk to you again," we might find X saying, "I believe you; I really do." This points out that people can be coerced into making belief statements. However, to say that X thereby has acquired the belief encompasses all of the problems that any verbal theory of belief must face.⁹ Put simply, we are suspicious of such miraculous conversions. Yet, 'coercion' seems to be related to 'indoctrinating' in that it attempts to achieve certain results through a change in beliefs for reasons that do not aim at justification. As Green says:

...[i]n teaching when we are concerned only to lead another person to a correct answer or correct belief without a corresponding concern that they arrive at that answer or believe on the basis of good reasons, then we are indoctrinating as contrasted with instructing.¹⁰

Although Green is concerned with concepts that are logically related to 'teaching,' and 'coercing' is rarely used in place of the concept; we might use the verb 'to teach' where coercion is implied. For instance, people often say, "I'll teach you to do that," or "That will teach him to put his hand in the cookie jar." More is claimed here than merely that one is punishing someone else. Indeed, the distinction between 'punishment' and 'coercion' is made in the next section of this paper. This use of 'teach' seems to imply that the "teacher's" activities can bring about learning on the part of another that unpleasant consequences can be expected if one undertakes certain activities. This use of 'teach' is not metaphorical, for it literally describes activities that public school teachers undertake. Also, this usage signals that coercion might play some role in the acts of teaching if we look at the use of the verb from an ordinary language point of view rather than from a normative perspective.

III. The Role of Coercion in the Teaching Enterprise

In order to show that coercion plays a role in the teaching enterprise and to delineate the points at which it enters into it, I will address three issues in the following section: 1. the distinction between 'punishment' and 'coercion'; 2. the formal authority of the teacher and the actual authority of the teacher; and 3. respect for persons. In this section, I use the work of R. S. Peters to set the stage for the points I wish to make.¹¹ For clarity and convenience, I offer a stipulative definition of 'teaching enterprise' until we reach the discussion of that enterprise: by 'teaching enterprise' I mean "the various goal-related acts that a public school teacher engages in in order to get a student to learn something."¹²

A. 'Punishment' versus 'Coercion'

In *Ethics and Education*, Peters delineates the distinction between 'punishment' and 'discipline' in the section entitled "The Meaning of Punishment."¹³

After noting that the "proclivity to punish people is often confused with discipline"¹⁴ in a school situation, he contends that discipline "conveys the notion of submission to rules or some kind of order,"¹⁵ whether these rules are about what is learned or are necessary for something to be learned. For instance, the rules may be rules of grammar, the former type, or rules about silence, the latter type. 'Discipline,' then, is seen by Peters as "a very general notion which is connected with conforming to rules."¹⁶

In contrast, Peters tells us that 'punishment' is a more specific notion and is usually only appropriately applied where there is a breach of rules. Furthermore, in distinguishing 'punishment' from 'spite' and 'revenge,' Peters cites three criteria for the appropriate use of the term: "(i) intentional infliction of pain (ii) by someone in authority (iii) on a person as a consequence of a breach of rules on his part"¹⁷ 'Punishment' therefore implies retribution given these criteria. Also, Peters points out that a teacher's demand that a student repeat homework done poorly falls under the concept 'discipline' and not under the concept 'punishment.'

Given Peters' analysis, 'coercion' and coercive tactics seem to fall under 'discipline' and not under 'punishment.' When we speak of coercing X to do A or into doing A, we want to get X to perform some action or to conform to some rule through the use of a threat or unpleasant treatment. The difference between 'punishment' and 'coercion,' then, is that coercion aims at conformity and performance and does not include the notion of 'retribution.'

Nevertheless, the concept 'coercion' in its activity sense is narrower than the concept 'discipline' in its activity sense for two reasons. To see this, we first draw a distinction between unpleasant treatment and treatment that X regards as unpleasant. If I respectfully ask X to repeat the homework assignment, X may regard this as unpleasant, although we would not call it unpleasant treatment. This would be a case of disciplining X, but not of coercing X, which shows us that 'coercing' seems to include unpleasant treatment, while 'disciplining' may not. 'Coercing' also seems to be narrower because it covers acts that seemingly cause X to engage in the disciplining activity. I can discipline X by making him repeat his homework, but the phrase "making X repeat" is where 'coercing' comes into play. The disciplining of X involves many different acts and decisions which I do and make, while my coercive acts will involve only the threats I pose or the pain I inflict, either of which constitutes the "making."

This analysis points out at least one role of coercion in the teaching enterprise. Insofar as I cannot discipline X through pleasant requests and appeals to reason, I may have to resort to coercing X in order to discipline X. More bluntly, insofar as X is a recalcitrant student, the potential success of my disciplining X may be dependent upon my willingness to use coercive tactics.

B. The Teacher and Authority

Other factors, besides recalcitrance, may contribute to the use of coercive tactics either by contributing to the recalcitrance of students or by posing difficulties to the teacher's accomplishment of goals or the fulfillment of responsibilities.

Peters' distinction between formal authority and actual authority gives us a useful tool by which we may look for these other factors. Formal authority is defined by the normative rules which relate to the position one holds, but actual authority relates to the actual exercise of authority in practice:

Formally speaking, a schoolmaster, for instance, can be in authority over the class; but in fact he may not be able to exercise authority over them. He has a right to give orders, but no one in fact obeys them.¹⁸

Perhaps, then, problems in either area might lead public school teachers to employ coercive tactics in order to accomplish certain goals or to fulfill

certain responsibilities.

1. Formal Authority and Coercion

Peters cites various problems which teachers historically have had with formal authority. In the United States, he tells us, "the notion of the teacher being 'an authority' on some aspect of culture has very limited application...."¹⁹ Two of the factors he cites for the diminished authority of the public school teacher are: 1. colleges of education have been set apart from universities and have been despised by them; and 2. the room in higher education for a great number of students creates less pressure for academic achievement and specialization on the high school level.

This lack of formal authority contributes to the promotion of coercion and unethical practices in the public school setting. For example, most teachers have no formal authority to supervise or dictate students' activities outside of the classroom. Yet, where minimal competency is mandated, teachers and school systems are evaluated at least partly on this basis. Hence, if students do not outside the classroom engage in the appropriate activities, such as reading, etc., which are necessary to acquire such competencies, the teacher is placed in a position where coercion becomes a feasible and likely alternative in order to accomplish the mandated objectives.

Moreover, Keith Thompson's discussion of the conceptual link between 'authority' and 'responsibility' points to another place where coercive tactics may enter into the teaching enterprise. Thompson tells us that although it is logically impossible to say that a person has been given responsibility for something without saying that the person has been granted the authority to carry out the responsibility, teachers do face situations where this happens to them.²⁰

An example of this is the prevailing attitude on the part of the members of many communities that teachers have the responsibility for changing the moral attitudes and actions of students. Much, of course, depends upon parents' willingness to back a teacher's actions. Clearly, though, in many such cases as this, coercion through the use of threats, embarrassment, and regrettably, lowering of grades may and does come into play. Coercion plays a role where responsibility is assigned without the co-assignment of authority to carry out that responsibility.

2. Actual Authority and Coercion

The connection between coercion and the teacher's authority is strongest when we speak of the actual authority of the teacher. Peters points out that before the teacher even enters the classroom, some factors diminish the potential for actual authority: 1. the pupils have had no say in the selection of the teacher; 2. they have been compelled to attend school; 3. they may not be initially interested in the subject matter; and 4. they may be hostile to the subject matter because their parents "set so much store in it."²¹

For Peters, enthusiasm and mastery are the keynotes so that students identify with the teacher's concerns and the aims of the school: "After students become infected with the excitement . . . other forms of encouragement can help to lead them on." Here the metaphor obscures exactly what is at issue. When I want a student to do Y, I may hope that the student will "catch" some enthusiasm for the task (just as the student might catch jaundice). However, because I know that the student must perform Y in order to learn Z, I will try to get the student to undertake the task, although the student may suffer from a "rash of obstinance."

The issue of what the teacher ought to do becomes more difficult where students refuse to satisfy such preconditions of teaching and learning as listening to what is being said. A teacher may, in fact, have some good ideas on how to "infect" the student with enthusiasm for a specific topic. Yet, how does a teacher "infect" a student with enough enthusiasm to make him stop talking to a friend during a math lesson? Certainly, coercion comes into play where such behavior occurs repeatedly.

Although Peters arrives at one conclusion with which I disagree, he nicely portrays the dilemma of the teacher who faces students who have been raised within a tradition of violence and punishment. To teach at all, the teacher may have to do "quite a bit of whacking," but "such techniques do no good at all to offenders and serve simply to alienate the boys further from genuine education."²³ Peters' conclusion is that the conditions of such schools should be changed and that the teacher faces "an unenviable practical dilemma of which no philosopher can provide a satisfactory solution."²⁴ If Peters means by this that the philosopher of education cannot give the teacher the correct solution to the dilemma, he is right. Yet, in another sense, the philosopher of education can aid the teacher by discussing factors that contribute to the use of coercion, the methods of coercion used, and possible justification for such methods. Further, since coercive tactics can be evaluated empirically in terms of their intended and unintended consequences, other educational scholars have roles to play in this matter. Certainly, if the teacher knows of both types of evaluation, the teacher is aided in reaching a satisfactory resolution.

3. Respect for Persons and Coercion

Perhaps what had traditionally made us queasy about the use of coercive tactics by teachers is that we want teachers to act with a respect for persons. Although the vagueness of "respect for persons" is evident, if we clarify the notion, we will see that the use of coercion does not presume a lack of respect where certain forms of coercion are used within the teaching enterprise.

Peters holds that a lack of respect for persons implies that one treats people as lacking the capacity to direct their own destinies through their own choices, intentions, appraisals, etc., and interferes with or nullifies their capacities for self-direction.²⁵ As Peters states, it is irksome to be treated as a moron.

Do certain coercive techniques presuppose a lack of respect for persons? If we interpret Peters' account broadly, much of education presupposes this since we often curtail the decisions and choices of students so that they do not "operate effectively." In fact, we aim at nullifying some students' choices. Hence, we must interpret this account in some narrower sense.

From Peters' discussion of brainwashing and conditioning, we see that the correct interpretation must be based upon procedure: "There is, of course, a moral objection to them because they involve a lack of respect for persons; but this moral objection obviously depends upon the nature of the processes involved."²⁶ So the processes used and the nature of the coercive tactics adopted become the foci of our investigation.

Let us see if there are some coercive tactics that do not presume a lack of respect for persons. While teaching *Huckleberry Finn* and discussing Huck's reasons for not turning Jim in, a teacher hears a student say that Huck's decision was wrong because "Jim was Black." What is the teacher to do if the student utters racial slurs even after the teacher attempts to reason with him or her and to show the class that the position is misled? Suppose the teacher becomes enraged at some point and that such anger teaches or convinces the student at least not to utter racial slurs in public. Furthermore, what would we say if the teacher decided to instill such fear in the student by screaming at him or her? Would this show a lack of respect for persons?

The rationalistic philosopher of education will say that the student's beliefs about Blacks were not changed because the student's reason had not been appealed to. With this I agree. Earlier I said that it is peculiar to speak of coercing X to believe something. Surely, though, something worthwhile was taught. Respect for persons was one reason that the teacher chose to use a coercive tactic. The question remains with the procedure and the treatment of the student. In one sense, the teacher has chosen not to allow the student's decisions and appraisals to operate effectively. Again, though, it is not the nullification per se that implies a lack of respect for persons, since we nullify

students' appraisals all the time. Furthermore, this teacher assumes that the student can make choices, since the coercive tactic is aimed at getting the student to choose silence over the fear of the consequences of such utterances.

Above, then, we seem to have a use of coercion in the teaching enterprise that does not presume a lack of respect for persons. I caution the reader, however, that this is not always (or usually?) the case. The evaluation of the coercive tactic involves the evaluation of the tactic itself and the principles of procedure. The importance of the goal may have much to do with our willingness to employ such tactics. Where the goal is not of extreme importance, we would probably refrain from the use of these tactics and "try again next time," in some other way. Hence, my analysis in no way implies that such tactics ought to be used regularly, although it does imply that they may be used where the presumption of respect for persons is maintained.

IV. The Teaching Enterprise and Types of Coercion

At this point, I turn to Jonas Soltis' discussion of the concept 'teaching enterprise' to set the stage for some distinctions I wish to make about types of coercion. In discussing the enterprise and the acts of teaching, Soltis says that an act is evaluated by its immediate purpose and "its relation to other acts taken as parts of the enterprise viewed as a whole."²⁷ Some acts aim at securing a bit of learning that is part of the general learning goal; other acts may serve as vehicles for getting to a general learning goal, although they are not part of the general learning goal aimed at.²⁸ The latter type of act reminds me of the teacher who, wearing a swim suit underneath his pants, dropped them in front of his class in order to provoke students into writing. Regardless, Soltis concludes that "there are many ways to set the stage for learning . . . [T] here are two related elements in all teaching acts . . . the immediate goal and the appropriate tactic."²⁹

Now, "setting the stage for learning" is ambiguous in that it can refer to setting a context for the subject matter or to securing such preconditions of teaching and learning as paying attention, etc. Both are related to the learning goal although the preconditions are related to the activity of learning rather than to the subject matter itself. Although we may be more inclined to support coercive tactics which aim at securing the preconditions of learning than those that aim at getting the student contextually ready to learn the subject matter, we at least see that there are two places in the teaching enterprise where coercion can play a role and different justifications may be called for in terms of each.

Peters' distinction between status-oriented commands and task-oriented commands allows us to say more about this. Peters says that the dignity or indignity of status-oriented commands depends on whether they arise from the nature of the situation or the whim of the person whose role backs such commands.³⁰ Correspondingly, what I call status-oriented coercion applies to securing the preconditions of learning, and the dignity or indignity of them seems to rest upon the same criteria as status-oriented commands. For instance, my role backs my use of coercion to get students in their seats when polite requests do not work. Yet, the dignity or indignity of it depends upon the coercive tactic I use and whether it is employed at my whim or where it is appropriate to the situation.

Task-oriented coercion aims at securing a bit of learning that is relevant to a particular task, just as Peters' task-oriented commands are based upon directions and prohibitions for the performance of a task.³¹ In order to get a student to engage in a particular task to promote learning, a coercive tactic might be employed. Hence, a task-oriented coercive tactic may be necessary to the performance of a task just as Peters' task-oriented commands are. To rephrase an earlier speculation, we are probably more inclined to support status-oriented coercion than task-oriented coercion. The status-oriented coercion which we would be most likely to support is one not based upon whim. Task-oriented coercion would likely only be justified where we deem the thing to be learned to be of greatest importance.

V. Conclusion

I have attempted to show the role of coercion in the teaching enterprise, the place where it does play a role, some reasons for its role, and some types of coercion in that role. Beyond attaining some clarity in a difficult issue and proposing some potentially useful distinctions, my goal is to provoke philosophers of education and other educational scholars into pursuing this difficult, albeit important, practical issue. Although I do not wish to promote the use of coercion in public schooling, I believe that educational theorists and researchers must begin to look closely at the points at which coercion enters into public school teaching if the unjustified use of coercive tactics is to be eliminated from the classroom.

NOTES

1. Jonas F. Soltis, *An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts*, 2nd edition, (Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), pp. 68-79.
2. Jane R. Martin, *Explaining, Understanding & Teaching* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 89.
3. Israel Scheffler, *The Language of Education* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1960), p. 57.
4. Thomas F. Green, *The Activities of Teaching* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 21-39.
5. Green, p. 22.
6. See Soltis, p. 69, for this distinction.
7. Green, p. 4.
8. See Robert Nozick, "Coercion," *Philosophy, Science and Method*, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser (New York: St. Martin's, 1969), p. 453, for a discussion of the distinction between threats and non-threatening warnings.
9. See Israel Scheffler, *The Conditions of Knowledge* (Atlanta: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1965), pp. 76-83, for these problems.
10. Green, pp. 31-32.
11. R. S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (Atlanta: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1966).
12. See Soltis, pp. 68-79, for a more extensive discussion.
13. Peters, pp. 173-175.
14. Peters, p. 173.
15. Peters, p. 173.
16. Peters, p. 174.
17. Peters, p. 174.
18. Peters, p. 153.

19. Peters, p. 161.
20. Keith Thompson, *Education and Philosophy: A Practical Approach* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 122.
21. Peters, pp. 164-165.
22. Peters, p. 166.
23. Peters, p. 181.
24. Peters, p. 181.
25. Peters, p. 132.
26. Peters, p. 41.
27. Soltis, p. 71.
28. Soltis, p. 75.
29. Soltis, pp. 75-76.
30. Peters, p. 170.
31. Peters, p. 170.

THE FINE LINE BETWEEN
EDUCATION AND ITS ANTITHESIS:
COMMENTS ON WATRAS AND SOKOLOV

Ralph C. Page
University of Illinois

At their best, educators are involved in the creation of persons. Outside of some religious contexts, the phrase "creation of persons" reflects a tension that mirrors one of educators' most serious dilemmas: persons must (in both logical and moral senses) create themselves. Thus, as educators become involved in one of their most important callings, they risk destroying the object of their deepest concerns. Joseph Watras and H. Michael Sokolow have squarely faced certain aspects of this educational dilemma.

One of the twentieth century's most tempting solutions to this educational dilemma involves seeking refuge in the control and objectivity associated with science. If we must tamper with this growth of persons, then we are tempted to say that at least we should do it efficiently and without infusion of our "own" values. Just as Watras has told us, it is easy to be seduced by the mantle of respectability surrounding contemporary medicine, and thus to believe we can avoid, through focusing on the elimination of scientifically conceived pathology, the responsibility of working toward a defensible conception of goodness.

This is a tempting escape from responsibility because it is not altogether implausible, even as we admit that medical theory may be no more sophisticated than educational theory. We can admit that the respectability medicine gains from putative relationships with natural science veils serious theoretical problems. Modern medicine was born in heated disputes regarding the possible relevancy of biochemistry, physiology, and bacteriology to clinical knowledge and practice. Robert Kohler, Gerald Geison and Russell Maulitz, respectively, have analyzed the disputes, past and present, involving each of these natural sciences and medicine.¹ Beyond these theoretical tensions between scientific and clinical understanding, other recent research has indicated that part of the pressure to force a fusion between medical practice and natural science was created by suspect financial interests.² We can admit all this and more, just as thoughtful members of the medical profession do, and still believe that clinical understanding has served us well in some ways and may help improve certain aspects of education. With all this surely Watras would agree, for he takes care to argue that a particular medical model in particular circumstances "frustrates thought rather than expands it." Watras does not intend to present a general indictment of medical approaches to educational matters.

Watras outlines several often-related dangers lurking in some attempts at medical solutions to educational problems. Some of these dangers pertain to abridgment of democratic requirements in educational processes; others pertain to abridgment of sound scientific methodology. Democracy can be threatened because discussion of classroom difficulties in medical terms can prevent parents from taking their rightful roles in educational planning. Lay people are usually not conversant in medical terminology (and presumably lack conceptual skills reflected by use of that terminology). Children can be disenfranchised, too, because the medical model tends to focus upon disability or illness. This focus upon the child's physical person, and away from the total classroom situation, tends to suggest remediation and drill as solutions to classroom problems, thus serving to alienate the child from the school process.

The dangers pertaining to sound scientific practice are implicit in almost all that Watras says. If he thought that all the problems indicated by the medical model *actually* were rooted in disability or illness as best understood by specialized medical concepts, then he would object neither to the disenfranchisement of parent and child, nor to remediation. He might regret the necessity of these things, and attempt to alleviate the problems associated with medical treat-

ment of them in much the way that some medical people are now attempting to alleviate similar problems associated with hospitalization. Watras objects, rather than just regrets, medical approaches to certain educational problems because he believes they distort both the problems and our participation in their solutions. The specialized terminology blocking lay participation is not necessary, and the focus upon remediation distracts us from the actual social and experiential roots of student dissatisfaction and misbehavior.³

Sokolow does not warn us about routes into our practices and judgments that may be taken by unnecessary anti-educational influences. Rather, he shows us that what may often be taken to be anti-educational, namely coercion, can be an appropriate and sometimes necessary part of educational teaching. With Watras showing us needless dangers, and Sokolow showing us necessary scrapes with marginality; educative practices, there is a sense in which these two papers are mirror opposites. There is another sense in which the messages are the same. Both papers indicate the need for precise and well-examined conceptual tools, without which we may be undone by the educational dilemma mentioned earlier -- undone by the necessity of coming so close to destroying the object of deepest concern. If we proceed with naive trust in scientific detachment and control, or with a superficial understanding of authority, respect, and coercion, then our educational efforts can become ineffective, or effective at the expense of our most basic principles.

Sokolow argues that insofar as discipline of a student cannot be accomplished "through pleasant requests and appeals to reason," then when discipline is educationally required coercion may be justified. Sokolow also argues that coercion may be necessitated, perhaps regrettably so, when "responsibility is assigned without the co-assignment of authority to carry out that responsibility." Sokolow is not attempting to promote coercion; rather he is attempting to examine the teaching enterprise through carefully developed concepts, and to report the roles for coercion which he finds in this way.

Like Watras, however, Sokolow does not want to be swept away with unreflectively "efficient" solutions to practical contingencies, thus losing sight of basic educational values. Hence, Sokolow takes care to evaluate coercion in teaching while considering the principle of respect for persons. Sokolow identifies two different kinds of coercive tactics, each requiring its own justification, and each justification turning on at least two points: the means used to accomplish the coercion, and the merit of the learning sought through the coercion. The first kind of coercive tactic is directed toward "securing the preconditions of learning," and the second kind is directed toward "getting the student contextually ready to learn the subject matter."

Sokolow's analysis is largely indebted to the shared concepts which make our public experience possible. Exploration of such shared concepts is akin to exploration of the social and ideological elements which are inextricably woven into the fabric of any existence we can know. Not too long ago, this type of ordinary language investigation was the object of severe criticism from certain quarters of the "radical left," but more recently these quarters have begun to acknowledge the importance of this inquiry.⁴ Sokolow and Watras give us reasons, at least implicitly, for not ending our development of educational concepts at this point. If Watras is right about the respectability of the medical model, and its growing preeminence in educational judgment, it is possible that today's specialized medical model will be part of tomorrow's shared experience. (Indeed, Sokolow claims to find in ordinary language yesterday's specialized concepts such as "conditioning," which come from a body of theory as suspect, and for similar reasons, as that examined by Watras.) If the medical model contains the dangers attributed to it by Watras, we will have to hope that tomorrow's educators bring some critical perspective to bear on their publicly shared concepts. What is a good recommendation for tomorrow may be a good one for today.

Sokolow's paper points to another type of reason for extending our analysis beyond publicly shared concepts. He suggests the possibility of differences among cases of "curtailing the decisions and choices of students" depending upon when, how and for what ends we do this curtailing. If our concern is for the freedom

and self-direction of others, as implied by Watras's references to democracy and Sokolow's to respect for persons, then we might turn to theorists developing distinctions among cases involving desires stemming from inadequacies of knowledge and reasoning. There are good reasons for believing that, with respect to freedom, there are important differences between overriding desires spawned in certain types of ignorance and those more closely linked to capacities for understanding self, other, and environment. Perhaps more importantly, we could turn to theoretically developed distinctions between "authentic" and "inauthentic" choices -- that is, choices which do, or which do not, stem from a person's developed and stable personality. The complexities of certain medical diagnosis and treatment, and the pain, fear and drugs often associated with hospitalization, can produce in hospital settings fleeting "choices" based upon ignorance of the situation and temporary disorientation. Thus, it is not surprising that medical theoreticians attempting to protect patient freedom and democratic ideals within hospital settings are working with just these types of distinctions.⁵ With the theorizing done by such medically interested people, we might find ways to protect the strengths of appropriate medical models while safeguarding against similar-looking but abusive imitations, and we might simultaneously develop ways to make the distinctions pointed to by Sokolow.

Integrating this work in medical and moral science might be a good way, for reasons in addition to those just advanced, to carry on the jobs begun here by Watras and Sokolow. Medical theoreticians have argued strongly that presence of pathenogens (even in "clinically significant" quantities) or functional irregularities of particular organs cannot capture the sense of "illness" which directs clinical judgment. These distinctions between illness and disease, and irregular functioning and illness, along with other considerations, have been used to argue that conceptualization of illness cannot be accomplished without conceptualization of health.⁶ This kind of argument would begin to meet some of the objections raised by Watras, and guide us to medical understanding which could be used to help rather than hinder educational practice. Sokolow's very topic, coercion in educative teaching, brings to mind the problems associated with moral theory, especially that often gathered under the rubric "forcing people to be free" and associated with work of Rousseau. Within this kind of work, and debates circling around it, we may find the conceptual refinement necessary to negotiate the narrow path through dilemmas which are basic to education.

NOTES

1. In *The Therapeutic Revolution: Essays in the Social History of Medicine*, ed. Morris J. Vogel and Charles E. Rosenberg (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 1979). This is a topic recognized as central by many medical theorists. For example, in the inaugural issue of *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* (March 1976), Edmund Pellegrino and Stephen Toulmin discuss the relationship between scientific and clinical understanding. An entire subsequent issue, 2, 1 (March 1977), of this journal is devoted to the topic, Clinical Medicine as Science.

2. For example, E. Richard Brown, *Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

3. Some other recent critics of the medical model in education have also argued that factual and practical distortion is involved. See, for example, Asa G. Hilliard, III, "A Medical Model for Educational Assessment?" *The Journal of School Health* 1 (May 1980).

4. For example, Herb Gintis closes a recent essay with an argument for the necessity of a Wittgensteinian analysis of language within any full critique of social

life: "Communication and Politics: Marxism and the 'Problem' of Liberal Democracy," *Socialist Review* #50-51 (March-June 1980). A more fully developed argument along the same lines has been presented recently by Anthony Giddens in *Central Problems in Sociological Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979): especially pages 246-253. Of course, authors such as Karl Otto Apel and Ragnar Rommetveit have argued similarly for over a decade, and others have demonstrated the similarity between Marx's and Wittgenstein's conception of language. On this last point see, for example, A. R. Manser, *The End of Philosophy: Marx and Wittgenstein* (Southampton, England: The University of Southampton, 1973), and Ted Benton, "Winch, Wittgenstein and Marxism," *Radical Philosophy* 13 (Spring 1976).

5. See, for example, Eric J. Cassell, "The Function of Medicine," *Hastings Report* 7,6 (December 1977).

6. See, for example, Christopher Boorse, "On the Distinction between Disease and Illness," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 5 (Fall 1976), and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "The Concepts of Health and Disease," in Vol. 1 of *Philosophy and Medicine*, ed. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., and Stuart F. Spicker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974). The entire issue of *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 1,3 (September 1976) is devoted to the topic, Concepts of Health and Disease.

7. See, for example, Henry David Rempel, "On Forcing People to Be Free," *Ethics* 87, 1 (October 1976).

CREMIN'S CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION

Robert J. Skovira
University of Houston Victoria Campus

In these days of competency-based teaching and learning and accountability, back-to-basics and computer-teaching, vouchers and busing, there is a need for a definition of education. Professor Lawrence Cremin has been using for some time an interesting definition of education as an intentional activity.¹ This, of itself, is nothing new. But Cremin is also advocating a de-schooling of the conception of education. This paper is a discussion of what Cremin means when he defines education as an intentional activity. Two other points to be explored are whether or not Cremin's definition is a normative one and if Cremin gives a picture of worthwhile education.

In order to discuss these points, this essay will concern itself with Cremin's definition of education and, more specifically, with his meaning of intentionality. Cremin pictures the educational process as consisting of many intentional processes arranged in configurations which include the efforts both of individuals and of social institutions. In his view, individuals, families, television, advertisers, churches and poolhalls educate intentionally. They, in effect, have curricula. This essay will discuss what Cremin means by configuration and curriculum later.

However, is Cremin's definition of education a normative one? At least one critic, Professor Douglas Sloan, argues that it is not.² He has argued that Cremin's definition of education can not be used to evaluate the worthwhileness of an educational process, since it can be used to describe as education any process such as indoctrination or propagandizing.³ This brings to mind the many discussions about whether or not such processes as indoctrinating, training, or propagandizing are educational processes. Thus, Cremin's definition may be normative but not at the level Sloan wants it to be. In Cremin's perspective, indoctrination and the like may or may not be worthwhile, but one can not really ask this question unless it is admitted that indoctrinating and the like are intentional activities. So, it would seem that Sloan's argument misses what Cremin is trying to get at. Cremin has given a norm for deciding what counts as teaching and learning.

But is Cremin's definition normative in the sense of providing a picture of what counts as desirable teaching and learning? Frankena states that education has several meanings. It can refer to "the activity of educating," "the process of being educated," the actual or intended consequences of either educating or being educated, or the field of study of these processes.⁴ Cremin's conception of education includes all of these as long as they are intentional. In any event, education is an idea used to describe a series of standards to which a group of activities should conform.⁵ While this may be true, Peters further states that both "the activity of educating" and "the process of being educated" are affairs which should be desired and valued.⁶ The question here with regard to Cremin is if the intentional quality of Cremin's definition provides a normative basis to judge what is desirable and worthwhile education. Thus, we return to Sloan's criticism. As Peters writes:

'Education' . . . picks out a family of processes culminating in a person being better; 'Education' picks out a family of processes culminating in a person having an outlook and form of life that is in some way desirable.⁷

Thus, by stating that in order for a teaching or learning process to be education, it has to be intentional, Cremin seems to be giving a normative conception of education. But, is an intentional process enough reason for deciding that what is being taught and learned is worthwhile? And, is the intentional process itself desirable?

What, then, is Professor Cremin's definition of education? He writes in *Public Education*:

I have found it fruitful to define education as the deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort to transmit, evoke, or acquire knowledge, attitudes, skills, or sensibilities as well as any outcomes of that effort. The definition stresses intentionality, though I am well aware that learning takes place in many situations where intentionality is not present. It makes room for study as well as instruction, thereby embracing the realm of self-education. And it acknowledges that behavior, preferences, and tastes are involved, as well as knowledge and understanding. It sees education as a process more limited than what the sociologist would call socialization or an anthropologist enculturation, though obviously inclusive of many of the same phenomena.⁸

In two different works, *American Education: The Colonial Experience 1617-1789*⁹ and *Traditions of American Education*,¹⁰ the definition remains basically unchanged. However, in a recent article, Cremin puts a different ending to the definition adding, "and any learning that results from the effort direct or indirect, intended or unintended."¹¹

It is immediately apparent that the definition is pluralistic and possibly inclusive of many experiences. It covers an individual's attempts at self-educating as well as any social institution's or society's attempts at shaping personal growth. It covers, in terms of things to be learned or taught, what anthropologists of education call culture,¹² when, as Spindler put it, culture includes "skills, knowledge, attitudes, and values, as well as discrete elements of behavior."¹³ It includes the various modes of educating by saying that transmission, eliciting or acquisition are merely different ways of doing education. There are many ways of educating that result in both "hidden" and perceived outcomes. And, throughout everything, the activity is intentional.

According to Cremin, educating is an effort; it does not merely happen. When the term "effort" is used, a certain quality of behavior is dignified. We are actively and consciously engaged in the business at hand. We are concerned with setting up, arranging, thinking of goals, structuring and evaluating behavior or mental states.

Cremin further describes that effort of educating as deliberate, systematic and sustained. What does he mean? Education is a deliberate effort when people are aware of learning or teaching something. It is a self-conscious affair. To be deliberate in our actions suggests that our behavior has a purpose. It is no longer merely behavior but an act aimed at some fulfillment.¹⁴ If we describe some human behavior as deliberate, we are stating that it is not accidental or incidental. It is intentional behavior. For example, when a lunch proctor accuses a student of deliberately throwing jello across the cafeteria, the specific reason for the act is not at issue. It is enough to claim that the act appeared to be done purposefully, and not accidentally.

A deliberate act is also a careful act. There is concern for what is going on; there is a watchfulness. What we are doing becomes our project. It becomes our project because we value what we are either doing or aiming at accomplishing. In fact, we have already decided upon some desired outcome. This imposes a certain order or structure on our activity and the immediate environment. Effort is put into the activity's direction, its flow, and its circumstance.

Deliberateness merges with being systematic. According to Cremin, educating as an intentional process is also a systematic effort. Being systematic suggests that a particular pattern has been imposed upon experience. There is a certain design, rationality, given to things. That is, experience is molded by a particular logic. This does not preclude any type of organization of experience of the things of experience emerging from the situation. If we are systematic in our effort of educating, we are to be conscious of the function and role of activities, procedures, context, content, actors and roles.

When Cremin refers to the educational process as a systematic effort, he is referring to the teacher's or the student's conscious exertion to value one way of managing a learning situation over another. The choice of a particular order makes the situation less haphazard. Being systematic suggests that we value certain relationships, goals, people and things and, for the moment, devalue all else in experience. That is, we consciously decide upon a worthwhile way of educating and this we show by our intentional organization of it.

Another quality of educational effort as understood by Cremin is that it is sustained. All behavior occurs within time, but a conscious act, a deliberate and systematic effort, happens with an awareness of its temporality. That is, in order to work, a teaching or learning strategy manipulates time. To develop a point, hand out materials, rearrange chairs, etc., takes time.

Just as being deliberate means concern, and being systematic means organization, so a consciousness of time means a sense of continuity in the educational experience. The continuous teaching or learning of something maintains the intentional force of the activity. Continuity here means that the experience has a certain direction to it. It is not accidental but moves toward a goal or goals. A sustained effort in a teaching or learning context suggests conscious striving in a particular direction.

While intentionally educating or being educated begins with activity which demonstrates a certain consciousness of orderliness, organization and continuity of any process of teaching or learning, it is not yet fully intentional. However, Cremin is making a statement about what should be counted as education, and, for openers, he is giving a rule by which we judge an activity to be educational. This rule is that in order for a process to be educational it has to be intentional and that intentionality, to this point, consists of a "deliberate, systematic and sustained effort." For Cremin, this effort is made in the midst of complementary and contradictory processes. He writes about these in terms of configurations.

For Cremin, the educational process appears as a series of configurations or patterns of educating and being educated.¹⁴ Although society and social institutions educate, individuals also educate themselves. An educational situation is generated, in a Deweyan fashion, by the interaction of individuals and institutional practices. The educational process consists of a dynamic linkage between a person's striving for his own goals and any institution or group of institutions trying to shape the individual to group goals.

In its most general sense, the process of education is on the one hand a series of transactions between an individual with a particular temperament and life history and one or more institutions of education that tend to relate to one another in configurations, and on the other hand a series of deliberate efforts toward self-development.¹⁵

It is important, therefore, to see that Cremin posits not only social institutions but also the individual as essential to his view that education is an intentional activity. It is the individual's drive toward self-understanding, acquisition of new occupational skills or the updating of old ones, or the fulfillment of felt needs that places that individual within an educational situation. This is what makes the situation educational. Every person has a private and subjective agenda, peculiar learning routines and personal goals; each individual, in other words, has a curriculum.¹⁶ For Cremin, this purposeful activity of the individual in whatever manner, for whatever reasons, and about whatever subject matters is called "propriate striving." Following Allport,¹⁷ Cremin uses "propriate striving" to signal the intentional process of self-education.¹⁸ Experience becomes educational when the individual consciously directs the force of that experience for his or her own good.¹⁹

The law, literature, and the arts inevitably shape human beings, willy-nilly, for good or ill. But it is only when lawmakers, authors, and artists become deliberate and self-conscious about

the efforts, with concepts in mind of desirable outcomes in human beings, that they become true educators. And, obviously, it is only when citizens come self-consciously to the law, literature, and the arts, with the aim of their own self-development in view, that their efforts become truly educative. In the absence of such intentionality and self-consciousness about goals and processes . . . there is no education merely influence.²⁰

Following Dewey, Cremin is saying that individuals have goals in mind when they go about the business of education. Whether it is self-education or the educating of others, if it is to be considered intentional, the educators must have aims in mind. However, as Cremin states, the aims or the results of the aims should be desirable. Being intentional about educational strategies, practices and behavioral objectives means that these affairs should shape individuals to valued dispositions. In other words, education is intentional because the educators are engaged in doing something which they consider to be worthwhile.

Cremin says that as "propriate striving" is to the individual, so *paideia* is to a society.²¹ Just as individuals are motivated to learn about themselves, their world or their occupations and, in so doing, intentionally go about the business of education, so too social institutions and society are motivated to shape citizens or members to certain aims. A society and social institutions have cultures which they purposefully teach. The configurations generated by the interaction between individuals and social institutions are patterns of intentional educational processes. At the societal level, such intentional educational processes reflect a society's *paideia*.

A society's *paideia* is ultimately concerned with those things which the society considers worthwhile to be both taught and learned. A society's, or a public's educational configurations are intentional when the society or the public actively and consciously strives to mold its citizens to the valued and desired outcomes asking those questions which will demonstrate the public's intentional educational system. As Cremin writes:

I would maintain that the questions we need to raise about education are among the most important questions that can be raised in our society, particularly at this juncture in its history. What knowledge should 'we the people' hold in common? What values? What skills? What sensibilities? When we ask such questions, we are getting at the heart of the kind of society we want to live in and the kind of society we want our children to live in. We are getting at the heart of the kind of public we would like to bring into being and the qualities we would like that public to display. We are getting at the heart of the kind of community we need for our multifarious individualities to flourish.²²

Therefore, along with the criterion for intentionality of "deliberate, systematic and sustained effort," there is Cremin's notion that an awareness of desired or valued consequences of the effort also constitutes intentionality. Again, while this provides a general rule about what counts as education, it leaves openended the discussion of what results or outcomes, overt or covert, are worthwhile. In Cremin's definition, education consists in the learning or teaching of "knowledge, attitudes, skills or sensibilities, as well as any outcomes." Beginning at the societal level, it seems that we are talking about the learning or teaching of a culture. At the institutional level, this does give a standard of intentionality if the institution has explicitly expressed its goals in terms of desired outcomes. These valued outcomes are specific "performances" of behaviors in terms of the "knowledge, attitudes, skills or sensibilities" representing the institution's *paideia*. However, it is not clear which skills, what knowledge and what sensibilities and attitudes are desired or worthwhile and should be a part of the educational process. Perhaps by looking at how the subject matter, the *paideia*, is expressed we may find some rule for evaluation.

Usually a society's, institutions's or individual's intentional pursuit of desired knowledge, skills, attitudes and sensibilities and outcomes is manifested in a curriculum.

In the educational arena, "curriculum" is another name to describe the experiences or subject matters that teachers purposefully teach and students are supposed to learn purposefully. Whether tacit or overt, a curriculum means intentional education. For some, it is a deliberate pattern of socialization.²³ Usually, a curriculum means a school, or some type of formal sequential patterning of learning, since it is a planned, organized and temporal instrument of teaching and learning desired subject matter at desired times in worthwhile manners. In these contexts, "curriculum" has been and still is used to refer to "a program of studies," "all school experiences," "intended learning outcomes," and "planned activities."²⁴

How does Cremin use the concept of curriculum? An institution or an individual formulates a curriculum either covertly or overtly when there is a conscious attempt to inculcate and pass on, or learn, those sensibilities, values, attitudes, skills, and knowledge which are perceived as essential or valuable for living, and necessary or desired for the development of a particular type of personality. Cremin claims that individuals, families, professions, political parties, ethnic groups and other social institutions have curricula. All are different although they can function in configurations. The idea of curriculum is used broadly and pluralistically to indicate the intentionality of the various educational processes.

Every family has a curriculum, which it teaches quite deliberately and systematically over time. Every church and synagogue has a curriculum, which it teaches deliberately and systematically over time -- the Old and New Testaments, after all, are among our oldest curricula, and so are the Missal and the Mass, and so is the Book of Common Prayer. And every employer has a curriculum which he teaches deliberately and systematically over time . . . ²⁵

For example, A Ukrainian steelworker teaches his son, growing up in a mill-town in Western Pennsylvania, not only the Ukrainian language but also Ukrainian songs, sayings and prayers. He teaches him also to dislike and distrust other groups, e.g., the Polish living in the same town, because of historical events in Galicia. He instills memories of wrongs to be avenged. He is, in effect, teaching his son what it means to be a Ukrainian (even in the United States). This has been done intentionally. That is, it has been done deliberately, and systematically over time and with certain desired outcomes in mind. According to Cremin, this father and family possess a curriculum which has been both taught and learned. As Cremin writes:

. . . family life does educate, religious life does educate, and organized work does educate; and, what is more, the education of all three realms is as intentional as the education of the school, however different in kind and quality.²⁶

Thus, all experience, whether in, of or by television, banks, advertising or an occupation, is educational if there exists a conscious effort to generate and form an individual's personality, if there is growth through learning. A social institution or society in terms of its culture is a modality of experience. For its members it is a curriculum to be learned. For Cremin, then, the term "curriculum" means an intentional teaching or learning activity. A curriculum is a conscious plan for the development of human nature and a way of living. With a larger configuration, it is a society's *paideia*; with a smaller configuration, a person's self-education.

In conclusion, Cremin has stated that while education is socialization, not all socialization is education. For him, education ends in learning but not all

learning is a consequence of education; education is growth but not all growth is the result of education.²⁷ Cremin has given a norm by which he, at least, differentiates teaching and learning processes. The rule is that education is intentional. This discussion has presented what he means by "intentional." In order for a teaching or learning situation to be intentional, there should be a concern for purpose, for organization and for continuity. Furthermore, there should be a conscious striving for desired goals and outcomes on the part of individuals and social institutions. For Cremin, "propriate striving" and "paidia" mean education. They combine and recombine in configurations, sometimes complementary, sometimes at loggerheads, but always reflecting the private and public curricula of people.

Therefore, Cremin does make a normative statement about what counts as education, thereby forcing not only the historian of education, but other workers in the vineyard, to see education occurring in places other than the schools.

However, this is only a partial answer to Professor Sloan who is concerned with determining that a specific aim or goal is desirable and worthwhile. Cremin seems to be satisfied that when people claim they are educating, they are conscious of desirable and worthwhile outcomes. This is to be, for him, part of the public debate over the *paidia* of a society. It may be that the determination that these outcomes are worthwhile is not the province of a definition of education. It may, however, be an essential part of a concept or theory of education.

NOTES

1. Lawrence A. Cremin, *Public Education* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976), p. 27.

2. Douglas Sloan, "For the Record," *Teachers College Record*, vol. 79, no. 1, (September, 1977), p. 5.

3. Used with the premission of Dr. David E. Engel from an unpublished interpretation entitled "Seven Problems in Education and Society," of an unpublished speech by Professor Douglas Sloan delivered to the program committee for Education in the Society of the National Council of Churches at Stoney Point, New York, March 9, 1978, p. 3.

4. William K. Frankena, *Three Historical Philosophies of Education* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1965), p. 6.

5. R.S. Peters, "Aims of Education-A Conceptual Inquiry" in *The Philosophy of Education*, ed. R.S. Peters (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 15.

6. R.S. Peters, "What is An Educational Process?" in *The Concept of Education*, ed. R.S. Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 4.

7. Peters, 1973, p. 15.

8. *Public Education*, 1976, p. 27.

9. Lawrence A. Cremin, *American Education: The Colonial Experience 1607 - 1783* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), p. viii.

10. Lawrence A. Cremin, *Traditions of American Education* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1970), p. xiii.

11. Lawrence A. Cremin, "Family-Community Linkage in American Education: Some Comments on the Recent Historiography," *Teachers College Record*, vol. 79, no. 4 (May, 1978), p. 701.

12. John Singleton, "Implications of Education as Cultural Transmission," in *Education and Cultural Process*, ed. George D. Spindler (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974), pp. 7-8.
13. George D. Spindler, editor, *Education and Anthropology* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 7-8.
14. *Public Education*, 1976, p. 30.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
17. Gordon W. Allport, *Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 47-50.
18. *Public Education*, 1976, pp. 38-39.
19. Lawrence A. Cremin, "Public Education and the Education of the Public," in *History, Education, and Public Policy*, ed. Donald R. Warren (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1978), p. 33.
20. *Public Education*, 1976, p. 93.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Lawrence A. Cremin, "Public Education and the Education of the Public," *Teachers College Record*, vol. 77, no. 1 (September, 1975), p. 11.
23. Audrey James Schwartz, *The Schools and Socialization* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1975), pp. 1-2.
24. Robert S. Zais, *Curriculum: Principles and Foundations* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., Inc., 1976), pp. 7-10.
25. *Public Education*, 1976, p. 22.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 41-42.

DOES THE "HIDDEN CURRICULUM"
CONCEPT WARRANT RECONSIDERATION?

John Scahill
University of Kentucky

Apprenticeships in educational theory are not characterized by a uniform set of intellectual experiences, largely because the burning issues of one era typically consume the fuel that fired them and fail to incend again in a later era. The early period of my own graduate training was a hot era for the issue of the hidden curriculum. Subsequently, the concept of the hidden curriculum has receded to the realm of a commonplace store of ideas relevant to educational theory. Called upon to review the issue as it caught on back then, I would say that the essential thrust of the matter had to do with the reproduction and legitimation of an authoritarian culture. Certain attitudes and dispositions were cultivated and reinforced in the activities of schooling which helped integrate the young into a conformist culture. In other words, the concept of the hidden curriculum pointed to a process of collective self-deception regarding notions of honor, duty and country which were instrumental to the perpetuation of cultural tendencies toward intolerance, repression of sensuous experience, ostentatious displays of loyalty to traditional institutions, and moral crusades to suppress emergent cultural tendencies perceived as subversive.

The mechanics of the hidden curriculum involved the acquisition of several character traits or conditioned response patterns:

1. unquestioning respect for authority,
2. willingness to accept teachers' definitions of work and play,
3. a disposition to perform meaningless work with great regularity,
4. dependence for approval on authority figures rather than on peers, and
5. high valuation of extrinsic rewards for work (grades, credits).

These character traits facilitated entry into adult social roles. The discipline and routine of the school experience extended to the workplace, civic and domestic life.

Correspondence theories, such as that of Bowles and Gintis, demonstrate the shaping influence that the authoritarian organization of work had on authoritarian schools. Correspondence theories also clarify the degree of awareness among political and business elites of the convenient fit of the hidden curriculum and the interests of dominant groups. Orchestrated mass self-deception is a more apt term than simply self-deception to describe what took place before the mid-sixties.

If the concept of the hidden curriculum seems as dull to many of us as yesterday's newspaper, it is because the Victorian culture that it helped to sustain is long behind us, and, after all, the latent functions of schooling were never all that hidden anyway. What was truly hidden from the educators that promulgated the hidden curriculum in the past was a vision of how things might be otherwise. But that insight does not inform us as to the usefulness of the concept of the hidden curriculum in the 1980s.

In the area of curriculum studies, thanks to Michael Apple, Henry A. Giroux and others, the hidden curriculum concept is alive and well and enjoying a comeback. The entire winter (1980) issue of the *Journal of Education* is devoted to that subject and, in the words of the editorial preface, to the encompassing issue that "relationships exist among schooling, power, ideology and social control." A principal focus of the work of these curriculum theorists is on redefinition of the workings as well as the problems associated with the concept.¹

A central problem, as they see it, is that the concept has been an essentially functionalist one in that it treated schools as "black boxes" that produced particular outcomes like a well-tuned mechanical device. These curriculum theorists want to treat the political nature of schooling in such a way as to "bring new comprehension to the complex ways in which schools both produce and resist the ideological forces that dominate the larger society." This more dialectical theoretical framework represents an effort to go beyond simplistic social control theories that promote an oversocialized view of schooling. Among the reasons for the premature shelving of the hidden curriculum concept, in recent years, has been its association with social control theories that conceptualized fixed character structures and fixed states of consciousness derivative from school-related socialization factors. The authoritarian personality as a national character type would be a case in point.

Both Apple and Giroux cite the research of British sociologist Basil Bernstein and his French counterpart, Pierre Bourdieu, as inspirational for their own efforts in America toward understanding the relationships among ideology, culture, knowledge, and power. In Bourdieu's reproduction thesis they see an encouraging step towards a theoretical justification for revitalizing the nature of schooling so as to assist a wider range of students to enhance their expectations of power and their capacities to exercise it. The undergirding assumption in this quest is that an adequate theoretical explanation of the role of schooling in the reproduction of a society characterized by a high degree of social and economic inequality will open the way toward conceiving educational policies that will modify or eliminate such reproductive outcomes. The point I wish to make in the remaining space is that it is not clear that Bourdieu himself makes such an assumption.

Bourdieu's central concern in *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* is to show how, in France, social structure shapes educational phenomena which in turn function to reproduce social inequality. He argues that educational institutions play a significant but largely unrecognized role in the reproduction of class stratification. The emphasis on the hidden or unrecognized nature of this process plays a vital part in his reproduction thesis.

Here he is no doubt indebted to Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), the Italian political theorist who coined the phrase "cultural hegemony." Gramsci wrote at length about the ideological role of education. His concept of cultural hegemony refers to the power of dominant groups to work through institutions like the church, schools, and private organizations to maintain social control by encouraging subordinate groups to interpret their everyday experiences in ways compatible with dominant ideologies. Cultural hegemony sets limits on what is thinkable and unthinkable regarding the legitimacy of the social order, thus freeing dominant groups of the necessity of defending their positions by means of overt repression. Gramsci made it clear that hegemonic control in fascist Italy was not simply imposed by Machiavellian elites, but was reproduced in the daily mental activities of the masses.

Cultural hegemony effectively shapes common sense perceptions of reality to the extent that it is an unchallenged, unanalyzed, and unrecognized network of interpretations of historical and immediate group experience. Concealment of the etiological constitution of hegemonic influences as they affect popular perceptions constitutes the principal barrier to awareness of, and critical reflection on, those influences. Popular perceptions of education, what it does, and what it can do, will play a role in the larger scheme of the constraints on the thinkable and unthinkable concerning the social order.

Bourdieu takes a similar position and refines it with his concept of the *habitus*, referring to durable dispositions, about which more will be said later in the paper. As Bourdieu puts it, "Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the naturalization of its own arbitrariness."² That is, every established order will seek to reproduce itself by promoting the perception that it springs from the inevitable natural order of things rather than from arbitrarily imposed and preserved arrangements.

The established order may take a new form in accordance with objective necessity, promoting change in what is thinkable and unthinkable about the history of the social order -- and dominant ideologies will accommodate to the new situation -- but the inevitability of the order in the present is always an unquestionable principle. That is, a hegemonic reality principle sets limits on what is rational and practical mental activity, as opposed to quixotic venture or superfluous utopian speculation.

There is something unmistakably law-like in Bourdieu's reproduction thesis. In his foreword to the original French edition of *Reproduction*, it is strongly implied that schools will always serve hegemonic ends more than not. The balance of influence, he seems to be saying, will always, in the long run, be in favor of hegemonic ends. What then is the purpose of his investigations? Again in the foreword, Bourdieu says that he wants to answer empirically "the sociological question of the social conditions which must be fulfilled before it becomes possible to state scientifically the social functions of an institution" like education.³ If my reading is correct, he is saying (a) that schools are likely to serve hegemonic ends, (b) the latest phase of that function in a dynamic society is likely to go unrecognized, and (c) therefore, the proper question for a sociologist to ask is: Under what conditions can the reproductive function of education be made apparent? In other words, he posits two law-like propositions: in class-stratified societies educational systems contribute to the reproduction of the relations between the classes; secondly, in advanced societies wedded to democratic ideologies the school plays an increasingly important role in social reproduction and at the same time better conceals the function it performs as it must be able to fulfill that function effectively. Therefore, the proper question for a sociologist to ask is: What sort of research methodology is adequate to the task of demonstrating the hegemonic and reproductive role of the school system? He then proceeds to critique the limitations of traditional and radical methodologies.

Nowhere in *Reproduction* does he claim that such a pursuit can serve to alter the law-like propositions. His purpose, he says, is to "oblige the truth of power relations to come into the open, if only by forcing them to mask themselves further."⁴ His goal is a modest one -- not to negate the reproductive function but to develop a sociology of education that does not contribute to the concealment of that function by relying solely on methodologies that "understand the system as the system wishes to be understood."⁵ This is a reference to what he calls technocratic sociology which he claims is incapable of analyzing simultaneously the system of functions of the educational system -- technical, social and ideological functions relative to a given state of the structure of class relations.

Bourdieu maintains that some historical periods are more ripe than others for exposing power relations; he also speaks to the prerequisite conditions for a fruitful application of a comparative method for demystification of the reproductive function of education in particular cases.⁶ But he consistently implies that it is highly unlikely that schools will be permitted to play a counter-hegemonic role in any class-stratified society long enough, or for enough people, to undermine seriously the sponsoring social order. Neither will schools be permitted so to alter the social selection process as to deny the children of dominant groups an edge in the competition for prestigious credentials.

The curriculum theorists mentioned earlier are suggesting that since schools both reproduce and resist the ideological forces that sustain hegemonic social control, redesign of schools can contribute to more resistance and less reproduction and thereby ultimately contribute to the realization of a more democratic society. My reading of Bourdieu's reproduction thesis leads me to suspect that he has less faith in the prospects that schools can serve counter-hegemonic ends than those who cite his work as supportive of their redesign strategies. In fact, as far as I can determine from the corpus of his translated works, he has little to offer in the way of concrete programmatic reforms.

If Bourdieu is misunderstood in this regard, the source of the problem

seems to lie in his rejection of correspondence theories and functionalist theories that conceive of schools as "black boxes" that produce fixed character structures and fixed states of consciousness which in turn serve to reproduce cultural hegemony and perpetuate patterns of social inequality. He categorically states "... that there is no society in which the educational system is reduced to the role of an industrial enterprise subject to exclusively economic goals..."⁷ Following Durkheim in *The Evolution of Educational Thought*, Bourdieu says that the educational system, while subject to external demands, maintains a relative autonomy in the sense that it "retranslates" and "reinterprets" external demands in accordance with the norms associated with its own history as an institution.

To grant the educational system the absolute independence which it claims or, on the contrary, to see in it only the reflection of a state of the economic system or the direct expression of the value system of 'society as a whole,' is to refuse to see that its relative autonomy enables it to serve external demands under the guise of independence and neutrality, i.e. to conceal the social functions it performs so to perform them more effectively.⁸

Some theories, he says, err in reducing the three interrelated functions of the educational system to its technical function; i.e., the social selection function and the ideological function are said to follow from the technical function of output of skilled personnel in relation to the needs of the labor market. These theories deny the autonomy of the school system, an antithesis to views that see only autonomy and good faith.

For Bourdieu, the school system's power to retranslate external demands and the power of educators to resist bureaucratic definitions of their tasks does not alter the *essential function* of the educational system -- the inculcation of durable dispositions of one sort or another.⁹ On the contrary, these forms of resistance can serve better to facilitate the essential function. He admonishes the reader that just as the refusal to recognize the autonomy of the "state apparatus" leads one to ignore the hidden services this apparatus renders to centers of economic power by checking unrestrained competition and mediating disputes, so does the refusal to recognize the relative autonomy of the school system obscure the process by which schools serve reproductive ends.¹⁰

If the essential function of any school system in a class-stratified society is the inculcation of durable dispositions, the pertinent question becomes not whether a hidden curriculum exists, but what sort of dispositions are inculcated? And what sort of differential dispositions are inculcated in different groups?

There are three aspects to his notion of durable dispositions -- the *habitus*, *class ethos* and *cultural capital*. Bourdieu's concept of the *habitus* is the key to his understanding of the issue of freedom and determinism regarding the socialization effects of schooling. The concept of the *habitus* grew out of ethnographic studies Bourdieu conducted in Algeria. The *habitus* refers to "a generative unifying principle of conducts and opinions..." and "the site of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality." It is an organizational principle which logically orients an individual to adaptive behaviors. Anthony Giddens explicates this difficult concept in his review of *Outline of a Theory of Practice*.

Social life, Bourdieu emphasizes, has to be treated as expressed in concrete practices located in time, and organized through the generative skills of its participants. Even the most ritualized forms of behavior leave place for strategies whereby actors seek to control the form and outcomes of interaction. Social rules are 'the product of a small batch of schemes enabling agents to generate an infinity of practices adapted to endlessly changing situations, without those schemes ever being constituted as explicit principles.'¹¹

As in the case of behavior shaped by an all-pervasive and unanalyzed cultural hegemony, the *habitus*, a product of primary socialization with a generative energy of its own (not unlike a sense of identity) shapes but does not wholly determine behavior.

The *habitus* refers to individuals' dispositions. Class ethos refers to the orientation of groups of individuals subject to common histories. Applied to the phenomena of lower-class self-elimination from academic competition, Bourdieu explains that durable dispositions are inculcated early in life by objective conditions which are intuitively grasped by members of that class.

... The most improbable practices are excluded, either totally without examination, as *unthinkable*, or at the cost of the *double negation* which inclines agents to make a virtue of necessity, that is to refuse what is anyway refused and to love the inevitable.¹²

These dispositions, based on estimations of objective probabilities, are not unlike scientific calculations except that scientific estimations are corrected after each experiment while these intuitive estimations give disproportionate weight to early experiences. Early negative experiences in school for those most distant from academic culture tend to become durable dispositions to reject academic work and discipline.

The school system does not produce the *habitus* nor the class ethos, but it does provide those with a disposition to adhere to its demands an opportunity to accumulate cultural capital which can facilitate social mobility or secure inherited privilege. Efforts to maximize the productivity of pedagogic work in the early years of schooling for lower-class children, he says, would necessarily involve the inculcation of a different relation to language and culture -- a formidable task.¹³ About the prospects of this happening in France he says, "only a school system serving another system of external functions, and, correlatively, another state of the balance of power between the classes, could make such pedagogic action possible."¹⁴ In other words, as long as the school system functions to select a limited number of persons to meet the technical requirements of an industrial society, it is unlikely to take on the task of attempting to go to the roots of inequality of educational opportunity. Hence his neglect of concrete programmatic reforms.

In summary, it has been argued that Bourdieu does reject the oversocialized view of the effects of schooling on consciousness and national character types. And he does maintain that the school system resists to some extent external demands from the economic sphere. He does not deny that among the unintended consequences of schooling are individual insights into the reproductive functions of the system. Nor does he deny that individual educators can promote penetration into the hegemonic influences of the larger culture. But he does not suggest that these aspects of resistance can be appreciably stimulated either by voluntaristic efforts or by curriculum reforms so as to alter the reproduction function of schooling while the given structure of class relations prevails.

Nevertheless, there are a number of good reasons for resuscitating the hidden curriculum concept on grounds other than those in dispute above. The works of Apple, Giroux, et. al., speak for themselves; there is little point in belaboring the justifications here. Let me conclude with the suggestion that even if full equality of educational opportunity and counter-hegemonic schooling are impossible goals, it is vital to understand, in each successive phase of historical development, the generalizable effects of schooling on the psychopolitical development of the young. The best conceived educational reforms, as much as the most reprehensible policies, will have unintended and contradictory outcomes. If such outcomes cannot be entirely controlled, they can be understood and foreseen. Given the objective limitations of the power of schools to promote reason and social justice, it is better to recognize those limitations than to contribute to them unwittingly.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that recent commentaries on narcissistic character structures by Christopher Lasch, Richard Sennett and others, are rich in suggestions about a hidden agenda in contemporary school policies and activities. Those suggestions remain largely unexamined. At stake is the further atrophy of what Sennett calls "public space" as a realm of creative political action and a medium of human growth and development. Educational policies and programs oriented to human development via practical career planning, or learning to overcome the last vestiges of Victorian repression, and other psychic self-improvement panaceas for alienation, quite likely will have the unintended consequences of further concealing reasonable strategies for empowering people to lead the best possible lives objective conditions will allow.

NOTES

1. *Journal of Education*, vol. 162, no. 1 (Winter, 1980).
2. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 164.
3. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (London: Sage Publications, 1977), p. xii.
4. *Ibid.*, p. xiii.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 159, 178-179.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
11. Anthony Giddens, "Review of Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice*," *Political Politics*, vol. 26, no. 1 (1978), p. 176.
12. *Outline*, p. 77.
13. Explication of the phrase "a different relation to language and culture" would require a lengthy explanation of the subject of cultural reproduction.
14. *Reproduction*, p. 127.

COMMENTS ON SKOVIRA AND SCAHILL

Michael J. Carbone
Ball State University

Professor G. Max Wingo has made the point that for all of the organizing and reorganizing in education, the rehabilitation, and the research correspondent with a flurry of new gadgetry, one question remains seldom raised. Yet he contends that this very question is strategic beyond all others. Simply stated the question is: What are the aims and purposes of education? To what end do we want to educate?¹

It is within the context of this important but simple question that Professor Skovira's explication of Cremin's concept of education becomes an important contribution. In trying to determine if Cremin's definition of education suggests or provides insight into what is worthwhile education, in other words education to what end or for what purpose, we are forced to handle the larger discussion of the aims, values and goals of our society. Clearly Professor Skovira's paper is a call for a much larger debate, the scope of which extends far beyond the realm of the institutional school and extends well into the very fabric of the larger society and the everyday experiences of the individual. While recognizing that not all experience is educational, Professor Skovira reminds us that education is not confined to schools. Skovira stresses that Cremin's definition is pluralistic and inclusive of many other activities so that we become immediately concerned in an educative sense with various institutions and society in general. He writes, "At the societal level, such intentional educational processes reflect a society's *paideia*." All institutions have a curriculum which they intentionally use to promote individual growth.

The need for a definition of education becomes imperative when we consider, almost in an Illichian fashion, that schooling is not synonymous with education. Illich agrees that most people acquire most of their knowledge outside of school . . . (and) children learn most of what teachers pretend to teach them from peer groups, TV, comics, etc. We learn to speak, to think, to love, to feel, to play, and to work without interference from a teacher.² Anyone who has taught high school students in the last ten years is all too familiar with the limits placed upon the school and teacher's role by other educational configurations and curricula.

Cremin has written of this "revolution" that has occurred in education. This revolution has witnessed the advent of diverse, pervasive, and interrelated "multitudinous education forces and agencies" which have an impact tremendous enough to alter the tasks of traditional educators, the family and the community. This revolution has also given rise to new educational services from child guidance to media of all sorts. If in fact Cremin is correct then it becomes possible that this revolution of curricula can be harnessed and provide new opportunities and ways of looking at education or can become destructive as fragmentation and competition of these various curricula seriously undo, limit, contradict or destroy each other.³ However, the question that Professor Sloan raises remains: by what criteria are this revolution in education to be governed?

It would conceivably be possible for society to have mastered the complexity of the educational situation and to have successfully ordered and related the multifarious agencies of modern education efficiently and productively, and still have the question remain, To what end? . . . They even speak of creating the totally educative society in which every institution in perfect coordination with all others fulfills its education functions. It is here that some normative conception of education becomes crucial, for without some such standard how are we even to distinguish between the totally educative society and the totalitarian educational society?⁴

Educators, as Professor Skovira mentions at the beginning of his paper, need a definition of education which will lend some direction and guidance to educational reform in this age of gimmicks and schemes of all sorts. And the need increases as schools come increasingly under fire. Skovira's work with Cremin's concept of education can serve as a springboard to debate and in this sense does provide a mode of explicating, or discovering norms.

Since beginning my studies in education at the master's level and the doctoral level, I have been struck more and more by the parochialism of discussion concerning schools and education. The major focus has been on issues predicated upon a notion that the larger questions have been solved, the bigger picture understood. The questions dealing with the school and the context of the society with which it functions and the interrelation of the two are seldom taken-up, so much have we become enchanted with program development, modern trends and the subject of pedagogical reform. All of this, as Sloan has said, reveals educators "unquenchable passion for measuring achievements, specifying competencies, controlling behaviors, programming instructions and maintaining systems."⁵

However, Professor Skovira, while expanding Cremin's definition and conception of education, still leaves us with the notion that the bigger questions are not settled. The duality between school and society which Dewey sought to eliminate still rears its head today, exaggerating fragmentation and lack of community.

Perhaps this duality between school and society has only been bridged in the economic sense in the consumer culture of today. Insofar as school is seen as the ticket to the merchandise mart, and, as some revisionists suggest, produces efficient consumers, we do see an integration of some educational configurations. Yet ironically this integration is built upon disintegration, for it further fragments man from his culture and has led to Illich's notion of our "schooled up" society. The moral and spiritual bankruptcy of such a common denominator, or end, between schools and society can be seen in the decline of the liberal arts: as no economic reward accrues to their pursuit, so do they diminish.

We must be forced to recognize that in order to restore a unity of learning -- an integration of man with his work, his leisure and his culture -- we are going to have to discuss education (in its broadest possible sense) and the ends to which we intend to direct it. Sloan's apprehension about whether Cremin's definition or concept of education provides a guide and standard is in part answered by Skovira: by reopening public debate concerning the *paideia* of our society we will be intentionally concerned with our various curricula. Although it does not give us specific goals or desirable aims, the initiation of alternative ways of looking at education and just what educates and where is the first step in determining specifics. In a discussion of *paideia*, or lack of it, we will begin to define an end for education and to formulate a common curriculum or core of skills, experiences, knowledge, attitudes and values we deem necessary or valuable for living. The trick will be to maintain diversity and a dialectical relationship between curricula while at the same time defining a norm or norms.

The key to understanding Cremin's notion of deschooling his concept of education lies in the process of public debate. Skovira has noted that "a society's or public's educational configurations are intentional when the society or the public actively and consciously strives to mold its citizens to the valued and desired outcomes which characterize the ideal citizen . . . Cremin seems to be satisfied that when people claim they are educating, they are conscious of desirable and worthwhile outcomes. This is to be, for him, part of the public debate over the *paideia* of a society."

This public must consist of educators, professionals, workers, men and women who recognize that education does occur in places other than the school and they must have the freedom to debate openly contexts and outcomes. Dewey's definition of democracy becomes important for he knew that democracy must mean more than participatory government. It must mean a reintegration of man with his society and culture in such a way as to put him in control of means and ends. Paul Goodman has referred to this as putting things in human scale again.

A debate over *paideia* is a debate over our idea of the good public, to which we can then begin to speak of education for citizenship. I have become much interested in the question of community and its absence in the 20th. century. My chairman, Professor Richard Brosio, has done extensive work on this question in relation to schools and the forces which have mitigated against the emergence of democratic community in the modern age.⁶ This is one of the larger questions that needs to be asked and discussed. Cremin's concept of education may well help us begin. We should be mindful that it may not be the definition of education but rather a definition that in this instance will be useful in calibrating discussion. "All foundations scholars should be aware of the various purposes of definition, and remember that just because an author admits to a broad definition of his subject, he is not obligated to reflect all instances possible . . ."⁷ Cremin's concept, while not exactly prescribing specifics, can begin, as Professor has shown, to help facilitate a much larger debate. I look forward to this study as I begin my career in the Foundations of Education.

In considering the question, "Does the Hidden Curriculum Concept Warrant Reconsideration?", we might do well to recall the words of Clarence Karier as he reflected upon the state of revisionism in American education historiography. Karier argued that, "interpreting the world realistically is in itself the first act of changing it." He goes on to state that it is not always necessary to have a specific alternative world view in mind in order to criticize the political, economic, social or moral order, whether in the present or the past.⁸ Scahill has taken an analogous view in considering the idea of the hidden curriculum. Some in the area of curriculum studies believe that "adequate theoretical explanations of the relationship of schooling to ideology and power will open the way toward conceiving educational policies that will begin to allow the school to become a positive force for social change."

However, if this is not to be the case, as Scahill suggests in his reading of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Karier's points are well taken.

While prescriptions or concrete programmatic reforms may not be the immediate consequence of studying the hidden curriculum, one of the most important reasons for studying it may well be that before any change or alternatives accrue to the study of cultural hegemony and schooling, the sheer weight of analysis must occupy many of our efforts in determining the relationships between power, ideology, and schooling.

Perhaps history has shown us that the school can never be an agent for radical social change. Current revisionism has pointedly demonstrated the school's subservient role to the power structures and economic arrangements in its development in America, particularly since the turn of the century. Revisionists have also dealt at length with the failure of liberal reform in general, and liberal educational reform specifically to bring about a more just and equitable society. If this is the case, and I think it is, then all the more reason to investigate the causes of this failure. As Harvey Kantor observes:

The main thrust of Karier's critique is that progressive social thought supported the amelioration of conflict and social ills without questioning the class nature of their origin . . . by placing progressive ideology in its class context, he (Karier) has reminded us that ideas are rooted in the social structure and are bound up with the power inspirations of social and economic groups.⁹

Perhaps given the notion of the hidden curriculum, Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony, and Bowles and Gintis's reproductive and correspondence theories, we can begin to realize that the forces for a better and more democratic society and education lie not in schools but in political forces in which schools can only play a part.

Gramsci saw the school's task in this preparatory, tool-giving function not as passive and fatalistic performance of a particular adult role, but in providing the intellectual equipment and

disposition required for continued adult (political) education [It was, according to Gramsci.] unrealistic to look to schools for radical counter-hegemonic education. The burden of such an enterprise lies squarely in institutions for adult education, especially in those political associations dedicated to social change and in economic associations. . . .10

In a real sense here again we become concerned with the idea of *paideia* and even find further importance in the need for understanding its educative function in Cremin's sense of the concept.

Just as we must begin to think of education in its broadest terms we also must begin to consider the idea of "cultural hegemony" in similar ways. The emergence of a more democratic community and a more just and equitable society must be conceived and debated in these terms. We are speaking of structural/institutional and political/ideological terms of which the school must be an integral part, a product of and reflection of, while at the same time reproducing a reality consistent with the status quo. Michael Apple has maintained in the introduction to *Ideology and Curriculum* that education/schooling is not a neutral act, but rather a political one and must be considered as such. We must not forget that things outside the schools matter even more than the things inside, and these interpret and govern the things inside.

With establishment and explication of schooling and its relationship to power and ideology in the larger society via the hidden curriculum, Educational Foundations can make a significant and practical contribution to teachers in the classroom. More and more teachers find themselves at a loss to explain the disruptions and problems in their work place. The criticisms of education are falling increasingly upon the teacher who is viewed as the reason why Johnny can't read or write. By helping teachers fit their daily and discrete phenomenon into a larger picture, we can help them begin to define problems in political rather than in purely educational or academic terms. Henry Giroux's article, "Schooling and the Culture of Positivism: Notes on the Death of History,"¹¹ is just such a contribution. As a former teacher and continuing student of American History, I have been acutely aware of the "death of history," the "loss of interest in history," and have lamented all too often that Americans have for the most part no sense of their past, no connection to the development and thought of Western man. Giroux's perspective of the relationship of the curriculum to the ideology and political structure of society, however, has effectively demonstrated to me that he is correct in asserting that this problem is not academic in nature (curriculum structure, etc.) but rather is political-- "that history has not become irrelevant but rather that historical consciousness is being suppressed."

Clearly a reorganization of content, a new elective program or efforts to "pep up" history by playing to the theme of popular culture will do nothing but obscure the problem and further mask its true nature. Teachers need to see this or at least be aware of this explanation, need either to accept or reject it.

We must, as Professor Apple maintains, "situate education in a larger arena of economic, ideological, and social conflict." The reproductive function of education must be understood at a deeper level of analysis and made evident. The result may not suggest reform or in easily recognized methods to counter hegemonic education. Yet I am in agreement with Scahill that "it is vital to understand, in each successive phase of historical development, the generalizable effects of schooling on the psycho-political development of the young." The hidden curriculum does warrant reconsideration.

NOTES

1. G. Max Wingo, *Philosophies of Education: An Introduction* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1974), p. 345.
2. Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (New York: Harrow Books, 1971), pp. 19, 42.
3. Douglas Sloan, "For the Record," *Teachers College Record* 79, 1, (September, 1977), p. 4.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
6. See Richard Brosn, *The Relationship of Dewey's Pedagogy to His Concept of Community*, University of Michigan Monograph Series, 1972 and *The Frankfurt School: An Analysis of the Contradictions and Crises of Liberal Capitalist Societies*, Ball State Monograph Series, No. 39, 1980.
7. J. Christopher Eisele, "Defining Education: A Problem for Educational History," *Educational Theory*, 30 (Winter, 1980), pp. 32 and 33.
8. Clarence H. Karier, "The Quest for Orderly Change: Some Reflections," *History of Education Quarterly* (Summer, 1979), pp. 170-171.
9. Harvey Kantor, "Stories Left to Tell: Progressivism Revisited," *Educational Theory*, vol. 28 (Summer, 1978), pp. 8-9.
10. Harold Entwistle, *Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 176-77.
11. Henry A. Giroux, "Schooling and the Culture of Positivism: Notes on the Death of History," *Educational Theory*, vol. 29 (Fall, 1979), pp. 263-284.

A MODIFIED "KELLER PLAN" CURRICULUM FOR INTRODUCTORY ETHICS

Craig K. Lehman
University of Kentucky

"Keller plan" courses have in recent years become fairly common in sciences such as psychology, physics, and mathematics. However, applications in "softer" areas such as the humanities, fine arts, and philosophy (other than logic) have been far less frequent.

In the Spring of 1980, I attempted such an application in three sections of introductory ethics at the University of Kentucky. In what follows, I describe this class and discuss some of the educational issues it raises. In section I, I briefly characterize the Keller plan and a little of the theory behind it. In section II, I explain and argue for the modifications I made for teaching introductory ethics. Finally, in section III, I describe some of the course details, suggest some possible changes for future offerings, and evaluate the success of the class.

I

The main features of the Keller plan, as described by Keller himself on numerous occasions,¹ are as follows:

- 1) The course material is divided into a number of small units, each with a definite reading assignment and some sort of study guide, exercises, etc. All essential materials are available in permanent, easily accessible media.
- 2) As soon as a student thinks that he or she has digested the material in a particular unit, a quiz is taken. If it is passed, the student goes on to the next unit. Taking of quizzes is done *at the student's own pace*.
- 3) A standard of near-perfection is set for passing quizzes. However, there is no penalty for failure. The student may repeat similar quizzes covering the same material until the "mastery" level is achieved.
- 4) Lecturing is of minimal importance. The idea is to put all essentials of both teacher-student and student-teacher communication in writing. When lectures are given (a few times per semester), they are for enrichment and inspiration and are open only to students who have completed the appropriate background units.
- 5) The quizzes are administered and graded by "proctors," who are typically just students who have done well in previous offerings of the course. Evaluation of the quizzes takes place in conference-type sessions immediately after the quiz is taken.

Though Keller originally developed this format for use in rather special circumstances, it has broad theoretical underpinnings in behaviorist theories of learning and reinforcement (Keller's own field).² The breakdown of the material into small units, for instance, follows the behaviorist principle that the most effective way of teaching a complex pattern of behavior is to break it down into "atoms" which allow frequent reinforcement at appropriate junctures. The "instant grading" feature corresponds to studies which show the effectiveness of reinforcements declining drastically as the time between the desired behavior and reinforcement lengthens. The feature of allowing students to retake failed quizzes without the consequence of a lowered grade corresponds to observations of the counterproductive by-products of negative reinforcement (i.e., the threat of low grades on traditional do-or-die exams). And so forth.³

Nevertheless, one need not be a behaviorist in order to find the Keller plan attractive. Many of the desirable features of the plan I will be alluding

to below involve only the pragmatics of good teaching or considerations of fairness. Ultimately, though, I think the appeal of the plan has to be in the following sort of consideration. As the leading researchers on the effectiveness of the Keller plan express it:

Differences between PSI [Personalized System of Instruction, a generic near-synonym for the Keller Plan in educational jargon] and lecture courses were not only large enough to be statistically significant, they also appeared to be large enough to have practical significance. In a typical published comparison, PSI and lecture means on final exams are separated by about 2/3 of a standard deviation. How large a difference is this? Let us take an average student, Mary Smith, who may take her introductory physics course, for example, by either a conventional method or PSI. If she takes a typical lecture course, her achievement in physics will put her at the 50th percentile on a standardized test If she takes the same course in a PSI format, she will achieve at the 75th percentile on the standardized test. This increment is what PSI has to offer the individual student. If you take this effect and multiply it by 100, the number of students a typical teacher has in a term, you have some conception of what PSI has to offer to an individual teacher.⁴

II

I now want to compare and contrast the class I offered with the archetypal Keller plan sketched above. I will begin with the similarities. I too broke my course material down into a number of small units: there were individual reading assignments and study questions for each class day, and fourteen quizzes. As in the Keller plan, there was a "mastery" standard for passing quizzes and an opportunity to retake failed quizzes as many times as necessary with no penalty. However, there were also substantial departures. 1) Although there was a stress on the written word in both directions of student-teacher communication, lectures were not de-emphasized. 2) Since the course was being taught for the first time in this format, there were no trained students available to be proctors; and thus, since I had to grade all the quizzes myself, feedback was not instantaneous. And 3) Though no penalties were ultimately assessed against those who did not take or retake a quiz by a certain date, the course was not purely self-paced: quizzes were given for the first time in class, unannounced, and students who fell behind in taking or retaking quizzes were strongly "nudged" by the threat of a cutoff date.

All this might seem to be quite a radical "modification" of the Keller plan; after all, three of Keller's five main points were either tampered with or eliminated altogether. However, I claim that the features I retained were the essential and valuable ones while the alterations were less significant and at any rate justifiable.

Take, first of all, self-pacing. Although this has seemed to many to be the heart of the Keller plan, recent research (six different studies) has indicated *no difference* in performance for students in self-paced vs. teacher-paced Keller plan classes (as measured by end-of-course tests, retention tests given up to 15 months later and performance in subsequent courses). Further, to cite some anecdotal evidence, a colleague of mine who used a Keller plan format for logic had problems with student procrastination; and some of my own students' comments suggested even more stringent guidelines than I used for encouraging a steady pace. Thus, self-pacing seems to be a dispensable and perhaps even undesirable feature.

Keller's rationale for downgrading lecture seems to me to be the weakest part of his program, especially if one is thinking of applying it in philosophy. Describing the characteristics of his plan, Keller refers in the same breath to de-emphasizing lecture and "the *related* stress upon the written word in

teacher-student communication" (my italics); but there is no reason why an emphasis on the written word has to bring a corresponding de-emphasis of lecture. It is one thing to put all essential course material in writing, and I agree with this (at least as an ideal); but it is quite another thing to say that there will only be a few lectures, that they will be by invitation only, will cover only topics above and beyond what is covered in reading, etc.

In fact, I think there is a special need for lecture (i.e., including class discussion) in introductory philosophy classes. Beginning-level textbooks in philosophy are fairly difficult reading for most freshmen; even those who do comprehend adequately have to work at it, I think, and many more are outright deficient in basic verbal skills. Lecture is necessary just to help these students understand what they read and get comfortable thinking abstractly. (A large number of my student evaluations contained comments such as "class helped to decipher the book"). Further, good class discussion can stimulate the interest of students who will not be initially attracted by written philosophical materials. (Consider whether the typical introductory student will be more intrigued by textbook discussions of, e.g., ethical relativism and psychological hedonism, or by classroom give-and-take between the instructor and the inevitable true believer). Finally, unless one's text happens to "fit" perfectly with what seems like the best set of quiz questions (or one is prepared to write their own text), there are going to be some "gaps" that lecture will be needed to fill. (I said above that "all essentials in writing" seemed like a fine ideal to me, but it is difficult to put into practice completely.)

(Now, admittedly, two studies have shown no further improvement in the performance of Keller plan students if attendance at lecture is made an additional requirement. But these studies do not include philosophy classes; they certainly do not indicate a negative correlation, nor do they show any motivational benefits from using lectures only as incentives; and they are only as impressive as the assumption that everything a student gets out of a class can be measured by these tests.)

My rationale for not having utilized proctors is more pragmatic and after-the-fact, for I probably would have used them if they had been available. Indeed, studies have shown that the use of proctors is a crucial variable in the effectiveness of Keller plans, primarily because they are a mechanism for providing quick feedback on quizzes. And, entirely apart from proof of educational effectiveness, the method seems desirable for a reason cited by Keller:

the fact that any differences in social, economic, cultural, and ethnic background are completely and repeatedly subordinated to a friendly intellectual relationship between two human beings throughout a period of fifteen weeks or more . . . a lonesome, ill-favored, underprivileged, badly schooled or otherwise handicapped boy or girl can be assured at least a modicum of individual attention, approval, encouragement, and a chance to succeed.⁵

So, given a chance to teach the course again, I would certainly want to use proctors. Nevertheless, in retrospect, I think that it was valuable to me as a teacher to have had the experience of doing all the work for the course the first time through. One needs an awareness of which questions work well and which elicit confusion, what comments work best in preparing students retake quizzes, what devices students use in order to avoid rethinking the material, etc., in order to give future proctors useful advice, and I cannot see how to gain such an awareness without working through the difficulties oneself. Thus, particularly given the problems of adapting the Keller plan to the less cut-and-dried nature of philosophical subjects, I think there is much to be said for doing without proctors the first time through.

So much for my departures from the standard Keller format. I also want to argue that the features I did retain are the valuable, essential ones. First, the breaking down of the material into small units. Here again, research has shown that this increases the effectiveness of the Keller format. But apart from

the research results, one can intuitively sense several advantages to this approach. For one thing, it keeps the instructor on the track: if there is a pre-set schedule of specific material to be covered each day, one is less likely to ramble on about one subject for too long and then wind up cutting back on the time for other equally important topics. Further, pre-composed daily study questions serve as good lecture outlines, as opposed to the cart-before-the-horse approach of giving lectures and then wondering what test questions to ask. Students appreciate this, too: a number of my evaluations expressed gratitude for clear, advance specification of exactly what they were supposed to learn. And, of course, appreciated or not, the small units encourage regular study habits as opposed to cramming for massive exams. Finally, I can hardly convey the pleasure of coming to the last week of class with the realization that one is (say) 14/15's finished, instead of having the ordeal of taking or grading a gigantic final hanging over one's head.

Some might object that this breaking down of the material into small units runs counter to the philosophical objective of seeing "the big picture" -- i.e., the relationship between different ideas, or the synthesis of several. But there is a two-part reply to this. In the first place, how much of the material in (particularly) introductory philosophy courses really is inseparably connected to all the rest? In my ethics class, for instance, we devoted a substantial amount of time to the "dialectic" of classical utilitarianism, a Kantian critique, and the attempts of Ross and the rule-utilitarians to provide some sort of reconciliation -- certainly a "big picture." But a necessary preliminary to appreciating this synthesis is an understanding of just what the utilitarian analysis of morally right actions says, what a counterexample is, how Kant's universalizability criterion works, etc. Such preliminaries would presumably be separate questions, even on a massive exam; why is the understanding of each of them supposed to be inseparable from the others? The second part of the reply is simply that nothing in the Keller plan forbids a separate quiz on the relationship of all the building blocks.

For all the value I see in small units, however, I think the centerpiece of the Keller plan is surely the mastery requirement and the associated feature of allowing students to retake quizzes until mastery is achieved. Here again, studies have indicated greater effectiveness if a mastery criterion is used rather than some lesser standard; but again, there are also intuitive considerations which supplement these results.

These considerations come out most clearly, I think, in the following kind of case. Over the years, I have had several not-exceptionally-bright but very conscientious students in my traditionally-structured courses who consistently made enough mistakes on exams or other assignments to pull their grades down to B's or C's, but who also consistently stayed after class, came to office hours, etc., and got their misunderstandings ironed out. My intuitions say these students deserved A's: they wound up learning just as much as the students who got A's; tests are, after all, supposed to be part of an educational process; and, since no communication is perfect, their misunderstandings may have been at least partly the fault of me or the textbook.

Now I think that the best argument for the Keller retake-until-mastery procedure is just that it provides an orderly system for putting these intuitions into practice. One can, of course, make *ad hoc* allowances for conscientious students such as I just described; but institutionalizing the process is less arbitrary and encourages students to develop the desired attitude. Hence the following sort of comment on my student evaluations: "I feel one really good thing about this course is how we are able to make up our quizzes. It really helps me to want to learn the material. It sort of gives me an 'incentive' to learn."

Another argument for the mastery-and-retake system is that it combats the most undesirable effects of grade inflation. The problem with grade inflation, as I see it, is less a decline in the quantity of work required for a given grade (you can always require more courses or degrees) than a decrease in quality.

One finds oneself giving relatively higher grades for poorly written impressionistic work that fails to hit the nail on the head, rationalizing this on the grounds that higher standards of precision would be unfair in the sense of requiring more work than is necessary for an equivalent grade in a similar-level class. The Keller plan's mastery requirement counteracts this tendency: if grades are based on the number of units mastered by the end of the semester, then one can set the cutoff points at whatever level seems to represent a fair amount of time devoted to the class, while still having the satisfaction of knowing that at least some of the course material was really mastered. Again, this observation was borne out by evaluation comments: "Having to retake an unsatisfactory quiz rather than merely failing it inspired me to really learn the material." "... the testing structure forced me to master the material more."

Finally, supporting the behaviorist theorizing about counterproductive by-products of negative reinforcement mentioned above, the retake-until-mastery system seems to create, or help create, a much more pleasant (though business-like) classroom atmosphere. I sensed this, and it too was confirmed in a number of evaluation comments; e.g., "I like this method of taking a lot of little quizzes. It takes the pressure off learning, thus it becomes more interesting to me."

III

So far I have been focusing almost exclusively on the structure of my class, rather than the content. My main objective has just been to analyze what makes the Keller plan tick; I see no reason why the method could not be adapted to practically any subject matter. But I now want to describe some of the details of the class.

The basic course plan was simply to discuss, in turn, the major theories of normative ethics: divine and social approval theories, act-utilitarianism, Kant's universalizability criterion, Ross' system of *prima facie* duties, rule-utilitarianism, the social contract theory, and egoism. This was supplemented by some tangential but relevant topics such as a discussion of what is intrinsically good, the distinction between psychological and ethical hedonism, and a reading of the central sections of Plato's *Republic*. The basic text was John Hospers's *Human Conduct*.

The discussion of each major normative theory followed the same basic plan: first a clarification of exactly what each of the basic formulae ("an act is right if and only if _____") entailed; then a discussion of the pros and cons of each view. For instance, the first topic discussed under the heading of the divine-approval theory was, à la Plato's *Euthyphro*, whether the theory means that acts are right because God commands them, or God commands acts because they are right. We then proceeded to a discussion of problems about how one could know what God commanded. Similarly, the discussion of act-utilitarianism began with a clarification of what the injunction to maximize happiness means (whether this takes distribution of happiness into account, the factors in Bentham's hedonistic calculus, etc.), followed by an investigation of problem cases about promising, punishment, obligations to future generations, etc.

Such topics were the basis for most of the Keller small-unit quizzes. These were of two types: essay and short answer. The *Euthyphro* problem, for instance, lent itself very well to an essay question (basically, explain the difference between the two interpretations), while the meaning of the utilitarian formula was a natural for short-answer questions describing problematic situations and asking what, if anything, a utilitarian would prescribe. Usually, quizzes were given after the material had been discussed in class, but, occasionally, when the material was straightforward and covered very clearly in the text, quizzes were given before class discussion. (This was intended to provide an incentive for doing the reading in advance.)

Retakes and makeups of these quizzes (a total of fourteen) were administered by a senior philosophy major who was available for a total of ten hours at various

times and places during the week. In the case of essay-type quizzes, the retake/makeup question was the same as the question originally asked in class; in the case of the short-answer quizzes, however, different versions with essentially similar questions were used. Students were allowed to use their original quizzes (and, in the case of essay questions, an outline) for reference when retaking quizzes. Grades for the course were assigned on the basis of the number of quizzes passed by the end of the semester: 100% of the quizzes for an A, 80% for a B, 60% for a C, and 40% for a D.

Now for a few observations about the successes and shortcomings of the class.

First, the texts and subject matter. I was basically satisfied with this aspect of the course. A survey of the main types of normative ethical theories is, in my opinion, a requirement for any adequate introductory course in general ethics, and I am quite sure that my students would up understanding this material much better than in any traditional format class I have ever taught. (Oh, for a standardized test to verify this intuition!) I have, admittedly, contemplated substituting more discussion of "contemporary moral problems" (e.g., abortion, preferential treatment, sexism) for the Plato next time out, but I am ambivalent about this. Some student evaluations indicated disinterest and even positive dislike for the *Republic*, and this was also the area in which I had the most difficulty in composing good quiz questions. But other students enjoyed the Plato, and I am not sure it would be any easier to develop good study guides and quiz questions on contemporary moral problems. Some students registered dissatisfaction with Hospers, too; but again, there was also strong support. The upshot is that I will probably give my materials at least one more chance before experimenting with alternatives.

My dissatisfaction with the quiz-retake procedure was greater. The problem was primarily with the essay-type quizzes: frequently, and particularly towards the end of the semester, the rewrites of some students tended to be only minor revisions of the original unsatisfactory essay, despite the fact that I put rather extensive comments on the originals and required that the originals be turned back in with the retakes. Perhaps it was only the paranoia of a weary instructor, but in some cases there did seem to be a deliberate strategy of breaking down my resistance: "he can't keep rejecting this forever, so if I just keep turning it in, eventually it'll get by." I am afraid I probably succumbed to this strategy on a few occasions.

However, I think there are ways of dealing with this. One would be not to let students use their originals for reference, at least after the early weeks, and perhaps also to require the submission of a thorough outline for retakes. Another would be to do what some composition teachers do: make a numbered list of standard errors ("topic sentence needed," "unclear example," etc., including errors in philosophical content) and then just jot numbers indicating the type of error in the margin. Subsequent retakes which failed to deal with problems could then be dealt with very quickly. Indeed, if enough proctors are available in the future to do all the grading, some system of this sort will probably be necessary to make the criteria of mastery relatively uniform.

Finally, I was satisfied with the grading system, although it produced a very high curve: a total for the three sections of 43 A's, 18 B's, 14 C's and 5 E's (failure). This is, however, not unusual for Keller plan courses: Keller himself reports almost identical distributions. Nor should this seem shocking if one considers the claim (cited in section I) of an average two-thirds standard deviation superiority for Keller plan students. Such distributions do undermine the utility of the grading system for ranking or comparing student aptitudes, but there are better, more objective methods for this sort of evaluation that do not take up the time or misuse the special skills of educators.

In summary, then, I was quite pleased with the results of using the Keller plan for introductory ethics, both in terms of how much I think my students learned, and how they learned it. Evaluations seemed to indicate that they were pleased, too.⁶

I have deliberately left out a number of the very specific details about the course. Nevertheless, I have no trade secrets, and anyone who would like a copy of the current course material, is welcome to them. In fact, I would welcome any correspondence about similar curricula.

NOTES

1. His classic exposition is "Goodbye, Teacher . . ." *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis*, 1 (1968), pp. 79-89.
2. See, e.g., his very lucid introductory monograph *Learning: Reinforcement Theory* (New York: Random House, 1962).
3. For more on these and related themes see, e.g., B.F. Skinner, *The Technology of Teaching* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968).
4. Kulik, James, Chen-Lin Kulik and Beverly Green, "Research on the Personalized System of Instruction," *Programmed Learning and Educational Technology*, XIII (1976), pp. 23-30. All further references to research results are documented in this paper.
5. Keller, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
6. I am grateful to Don Howard (the above-mentioned colleague who has used a Keller format for logic) for a number of valuable suggestions, both on this paper and during the course of my class.

THE TEACHING OF ETHICS

Bernard Rosen
Ohio State University

Professor Lehman has set out to do three things: describe the Keller Plan, describe the Lehman Modifications of it for his ethics course, and provide an evaluation of his own class.

I have some doubt whether Professor Lehman has described has described the Keller Plan's essential elements, so I shall presume to do again what Professor Lehman has done, as my first task, before commenting on whether his own course was an instance of a Keller Plan course. I shall then provide some additional comments of my own about Keller-type courses.

The following are at least some of the essential elements of a Keller Plan course:

1. Small units. The course material is broken into self-contained units involving the material of the course.¹
2. Students need to demonstrate proficiency in a unit before going on to the next unit.
3. In addition to each proficiency test (the one that counts), there is a readiness test that determines whether the student is advised to (or allowed to) take the test.
4. The proficiency test and readiness tests are administered and graded by a student proctor.

I follow Professor Lehman in presenting only a partial outline of the Keller Plan, drawing attention to features that are of interest given the subject before us. I agree with Professor Lehman, for example, that the role of the lecture may be more significant in a philosophy course than in other types of courses.

A problem of sorts occurs when we are allowed to talk of a unit of time as if that were the same as a content unit. Let me draw the distinction. Professor Lehman tells us that he had a small number of units because he had reading assignments and study questions for each class day. It is true, of course, that some daily assignments consist of a self-contained unit of content, but some do not -- especially not in an ethics course. We do not have Professor Lehman's syllabus so we do not know for sure about this, but it is likely that some of those daily units are only units in virtue of being a time unit and not a content unit. For example, a discussion of Utilitarianism, in Lehman's terms:

... began with a clarification of what the injunction to maximize happiness means (whether this takes distribution of happiness into account, the factors in Bentham's hedonistic calculus, etc.), followed by an investigation of problem cases about promising punishment, obligations to future generations, etc.²

It is not clear how many of these topics were taken up during one period, but we can be sure that not all of them were. We can all agree that if the discussion the first day only covered the distribution of happiness (which would be quite a philosophical "chunk"), that would not be a very happy philosophical unit to be tested on. The understanding of these topics and the ones that follow in the quote are *all together* a content unit, viz. Utilitarianism. Now, you will say, we can provide Lehman with some other description of a unit, a description which will allow for dividing the units into one-day lengths. Well, you might be able to, though I would not be sanguine about it. For it is not a trivial

task. The Keller Plan seems to require self-contained content units, not just time units. Professor Lehman's talk about daily assignments is quite misleading, for we are led to think his units are those very one-day units. That, however, is hard to believe.

A second point of departure from what I am inclined to think are essential features of the Keller Plan is the lack of readiness tests. This is a somewhat unclear feature of the Keller Plan, but here is a description of it from the *Keller Plan Handbook*:

The next step is the important one. The proctor, with you beside him, grades your readiness test. First he scans the test quickly, check-marking each wrong answer with his pen. If he finds too many, the grading operation stops right there and you are advised to study further before coming to be tested again and graded; this test, your proctor tells you, will not be counted.

Lehman admits that since he did not have proctors or any assistance the "feedback was not instantaneous."⁴ My concern is not to show that Professor Lehman was lazy, for he could not do what the proctor is supposed to do in such a situation. Even if there were a proctor or a Teaching Assistant, this instantaneous feedback may not be possible for the kind of quizzes Professor Lehman gave. He tells us (p. 13) that he gave essay and short-answer quizzes. Neither of those can be graded in quite the instantaneous manner described in the *Keller Handbook*. Even short answers have a "somewhat right" quality to them, and when you read essays this is magnified. The point, or a point at any rate, of the feedback is to tell the student "you are not ready; I won't even put a grade on this. In light of what you don't know, study this (whatever it is) more before you come back for more testing." Professor Lehman apparently could not, from what he tells us, treat any of his quizzes as proficiency quizzes in the Keller Plan sense because of the related problem of the feedback time gap.

Answers to philosophy quizzes are not just wrong, they are wrong because . . . A large part of teaching philosophy is showing what is wrong with an answer. This is not a problem in teaching Morse Code certainly, and not much of a problem in teaching logic or physics. Any adoption of a Keller plan must allow for this feedback. Elimination of immediate feedback would mean a significant modification of the proctor function in the Keller Plan.

Keller says, "the use of a programmed text, a teaching machine, . . . or a computer is possible under PSI. It may even be desirable at times."⁵

In my view this is one of those times. At Ohio State we teach our lower-level logic course with the aid of a number of computer tutorials. Students are not allowed to take the test that counts until they have achieved a high enough level of proficiency on what Keller would call the readiness test. This program is not perfect, but it requires the student to talk with the T.A. monitor about the low score and why it is being received. These computer tutorials have the equivalent of short-answer questions, besides other purely logical questions, but certainly no essay questions. I would think that one could solve the problem of immediate feedback with a computer or unlimited funds for proctors. Given the state of the educational world today, computers are a better bet.

Before I heard of Keller I tried a variation of Professor Lehman's system in an ethics course. One big difference was that there were more than 200 students in the course, and I had T.A.'s teaching sections. I used multiple-choice tests and had paper topics for the parts of the course where I expected the students to learn what ethics is. One conclusion from my experience in that course was that such a course can't be done without a computer assist. I have, since that time, developed some but not all of the programs needed. With a small grant for a knowledgeable programmer, I think I could produce programs that would fulfill Lehman's aim in his course, and for any other course so conceived.

What is that course plan? ". . . To discuss, in turn, the major theories of

This brings us to an important fork: there are those who think you can begin the discussion of competing normative ethical theories without saying what a normative ethical theory is, and those who don't. My impression is that Professor Lehman is one of the latter, as am I, so he would need a unit of meta-ethics consisting of a theory about the nature of normative ethics to provide a common problem or framework for each of the examined competing normative ethical theories. Professor Lehman does not tell us what his framework is, and he is not to be faulted for leaving out a good deal of what he does in his course. However, there must be a common framework for there to be any comparison, let alone the 'reconciliation' of Utilitarianism and Kantianism that Lehman talks about. It is a criticism of Lehman's use of a Keller plan to point out the need to carry out such a reconciliation, though it is difficult to foresee a self-contained unit on a reconciliation.⁷

There are many topics on which I agree with Lehman. I agree, for example, that not everything can be put in writing. I have written the clearest text that can be written, after all, and students still have trouble understanding a passage here and there.⁸ Lehman gives reasons for needing lecture, which are:

1. Difficulty of reading material.
2. Stimulating interest.
3. Offering positive reinforcement.
4. Filling in gaps.⁹

I would offer another reason, viz. the dialectical nature of philosophy. To understand philosophy you have to be aware of someone disagreeing with you. This requires, in turn, a real person to defend a view or take the part of someone with whom you disagree. This cannot be had by reading a book. Perhaps this reveals the Morse Code teaching origins of the Keller Plan, but I think the dialectic-opposition element is essential to philosophy teaching and especially ethics teaching as Lehman and I conceive it.

As a long-time advocate of a *no final examination* approach to teaching philosophy I find myself in a strange position of putting forth the merits of a final examination or its equivalent. I agree with Lehman that cramming for a massive final does not help to teach what we want students to learn;¹⁰ however, for the comparison function you need a format that somehow allows consideration of two or more views at the same time. A reconciliation function would require something more elaborate. I have usually had some sort of paper topic that calls on students to show that their selected normative ethical theory (e.g., Utilitarianism) is better than a rival I select for them (e.g., Kantianism). This, I am confident, cannot be done in a quiz, short-answer or multiple-choice, and an essay examination is not very desirable. We want their evaluation to be as thoughtful as the press of other studies, social life, etc. allow. I am willing to be convinced otherwise, but I think that a non-Keller Plan assignment is necessary to accomplish this.

Professor Lehman talks about his resistance being worn or broken down by many rewrites. He is not alone in having this problem, and that is another reason not to put the essay quizzes on the Keller Plan.

I have offered some criticisms of the Keller Plan as applied to ethics courses, but have agreed with many of the features. Let me offer a plan that makes use of many Keller plan features but is, I think, better suited to ethics courses and all philosophy courses for that matter.

1. Quizzes, on the Keller model, for basic concepts and reading.
2. Papers or essay exams for understanding or application.

3. Final paper or final examination for defense of student's own view against chief rival.

The use of multiple-choice quizzes to test for understanding of basic concepts and to ensure that the reading is done is clear enough to everyone. The second element in my plan is more controversial. In my department there is strong sentiment to eliminate comparison of normative ethical theories in our basics ethics course in favor of discussion of moral problems. We would, on this view, discuss abortion or capital punishment without having any prior or concurrent discussion about Utilitarianism or Kantianism. I require students to apply their chosen ethical theory to a problem either on an exam or in a paper. But this approach still has its primary focus on the main competing normative ethical theories, as does Professor Lehman's course. Here, I think, is a stronger contrast than that between those who use some version of the Keller Plan and those who do not. Finally, I require students to respond to the chief criticisms of their own theory and attempt to show that their view is better than that of a selected rival. For example, the Mill-type Utilitarians have to argue for their view over Kantianism, and vice versa.

I wish Professor Lehman well in future development of his ethics course, and welcome his willingness to share his material. We would do well to follow his lead.

NOTES

1. This and the following came from chapter 3 of *The Keller Plan Handbook*, Fred S. Keller and J. Gilmour Sherman (W.A. Benjamin, Inc., 1974).
2. "A Modified 'Keller Plan' Curriculum for Introductory Ethics," Craig Lehman paper read at O.V.P.E.S. Autumn 1980 meetings, p. 130.
3. *Handbook*, p. 18.
4. Lehman, p. 127.
5. *Handbook*, p. 19.
6. Lehman, p. 130.
7. Lehman, p. 129.
8. See B. Rosen, *Strategies of Ethics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin, 1978).
9. Lehman, p. 128.
10. Lehman, p. 129.

PART IV

RECORDS AND REPORTS

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Hyatt Regency
Lexington, Kentucky
November 21-22, 1980

1. The meeting was called to order by Richard LaBrecque, President, at 11:00 a.m., November 20, 1980. The minutes of the 1979 meeting as published in *Proceedings* of OVPE were approved. An interim Treasurer's report was presented by Eleanor Kallman Roemer, Treasurer. Gerald Reagan moved acceptance of the tentative budget; the motion, seconded by David Denton, passed.
2. John Carter, editor of *Proceedings*, spoke about the problem of increasing costs and suggested increasing subscriptions and making available for sale back issues through ERIC and university microfilm publications.

In response to the need for additional funds, David Engel proposed that membership dues be raised from \$5.00 to \$10.00, graduate students from \$2.50 to \$5.00. Gerald Reagan seconded; the proposal was approved by the membership.

It was decided that the cost of *Proceedings* for institutions remain \$6.50 although the editor has the discretionary power to raise the price, if increasing costs would warrant such action.

John Carter announced that Indiana University, the new location for publishing *Proceedings*, will probably be able to absorb some of the costs. Several possibilities regarding this matter will be explored with that institution.

David Engels commended John Carter for his work as editor of *Proceedings*. That the outgoing President commend John Carter and his work in letters written to John Carter and his key administrator was proposed by Richard Pratte, seconded by Dave Engels, and approved by the membership.

3. President LaBrecque announced that the Nominating Committee was composed of the following members: Clinton Collins, Chair; David Engels; John Carter; Phillip G. Smith.

Clinton Collins made the motion to nominate the following persons as OVPE officers in 1981:

John E. Carter	President
Walter Crabtree	President Elect
William A. McKenney	Secretary-Treasurer
Richard LaBrecque	Executive Board Member (Immediate Past President)
Paul Black	Executive Board Member (To 1981)
Jerome Popp	Executive Board Member (To 1982)
Eleanor Kallman Roemer	Executive Board Member (To 1983)
Dennis Senchuk	<i>Proceedings</i> Editor (and <i>ex officio</i> member of the Program Committee)
Richard Angelo	<i>Proceedings</i> Associate Editor

The motion was seconded and the nominations were accepted. The Nominating Committee's slate of officers was unanimously elected.

4. Richard Pratte moved that letters of appreciation be sent to:
 - a. Eleanor Kallman Roemer, past Secretary-Treasurer, as well as her administrative officer;
 - b. The members of the program committee--Richard Angelo, Chair, Richard Brosio, and Joseph L. Devitis, as well as their respective administrative officers;
 - c. Harry Barnard, Associate Dean, College of Education at the University of Kentucky, for his welcoming remarks and for the hospitality provided by the University of Kentucky;
 - d. David Denton, Hospitality Chairman.

The motion was seconded and approved by the membership.

5. John Carter, new President, recommended that a letter of appreciation be sent to Richard LaBrecque, immediate past President of OVPES. The motion was made, seconded and passed.
6. John Carter announced that a letter of appreciation to the University of Pittsburgh for the \$500.00 contribution made to OVPES in 1979 had been sent.
7. The new President also announced that a membership committee would be appointed in order to locate people in each state, included in the OVPES region, and encourage their membership.
8. Richard LaBrecque was recognized by the new President. At this time he again thanked the Society for the opportunity to serve as President and thanked David Denton, Eleanor Kallman Roemer and John Carter.
9. Gerald Reagan moved that the President be authorized to contribute up to \$150.00 to *Educational Theory*. This contribution is contingent on the funds available after the *Proceedings* is published this year. The motion was seconded and passed.
10. The location and meeting date for the 1981 OVPES meeting were discussed. The meeting will be held at Indiana University. While there was concern expressed about the way in which the OVPES meeting date conflicts with other important events, Everett Jarboe, Conference Chairman for OVPES for 1981, was entrusted with the task of selecting the date, which will be announced later in the year.

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

December 31, 1980 Treasurer's Report

BALANCE: January 1, 1980 1,302.50

Receipts

Membership Dues Received Before the	
1980 Annual Meeting:	145.00
Sale of <i>Proceedings</i> :	182.00
Monies Collected at the 1980	
Annual Meeting:	388.00
Contribution from University	
of Pittsburgh	500.00
Interest - Service Charge	8.08

TOTAL RECEIPTS: 1,219.08

Disbursements

Cost of Announcements:	80.00
Conf. of Phil. Society	10.00
Postage for Mailing	120.00
Postage for <i>Proceedings</i>	105.05
Copyright fee for <i>Proceedings</i>	10.00
Cost of Printing <i>Proceedings</i>	750.00
Cost of 1980 Meeting Rooms:	0.00
Cost of Annual Meeting Program:	0.00
Coffee:	67.02
Contribution to <i>Education Theory</i>	150.00
1979 Hotel Fee	
(error in 1979 budget total)	95.36
Other	0.00

TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS:

1,987.43

NET BALANCE AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1980

1,134.20

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
LIST OF MEMBERS

Alcock, Barry T.
195 Ramsayer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Alexander, Jr., Richard T.
Ball State University
Muncie, Indiana 47306

Allen, David
Springville IN 47462

Allred, Mildred
1568 Meadowbrook Wy.
Temperance, MI 48182

Allameh, Joy
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Al-Rubaiy, Abdul
Dept. Ed. Foundations
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Altenbaugh, Richard J.
901 C.L.
CAS Adv. Center
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Ames, Jr., Russell E.
Educational Psychology
Department of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Anderson, D.
606 Teachers College
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, OH 45221

Anderson, William E.
Dept. of Education
University of Sydney
N.S.W. 2006
Australia

Angelo, Richard
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Baker, Bruce
School of Education
University of Missouri --
Kansas City
Kansas City, MO

Baldino, Peter
College of Education
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, OH 44503

Baldwin, Robert H.
44 Greenville Avenue
Clarion, PA 16214

Barnes, Donald
College of Education
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Berrett, Terry
College of Education
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Berken, Emmet
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101

Berlowitz, Marvin
College of Education
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, OH 45221

Bhola, H.S.
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Biddle, James R., Chrm.
Education Dept.
Cedarville College
Cedarville, OH 45314

Billman, David
The House of the Good Shepherd
Champlin Avenue
Utica, New York 13502

Lane F. Birke1
Teachers College
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Bishop, Julie
121 Ramsayer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Bjork, Robert
Peabody/Vanderbilt
Nashville, TN

Black, Paul
School of Education
Slippery Rock State College
Slippery Rock, PA 16507

Bleyer, John F.
126 West Point Drive
Greensburg, PA 15601

Broidy, Steven
Dept. of Teacher Education
Southwest Missouri State
University
Springfield, MO 65602

Brownson, William
746 Harvard Bend
Woodland, CA 95695

Brosio, Richard
Teachers College 801
Annex 202
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Brown, Dennis
11117 Kirkwood
Tacoma, WA 98498

Brown, Arthur E.
College of Education
Wayne State University
Detroit, MI 48202

Brown, Glenn
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Bryant, John
Dept. of Education
Wilmington College
Wilmington, OH

Buckland, Roscoe V.
Berea College
Berea, KY 40403

Bunyan, Ruth
College of Nursing and Health
University of Cincinnati
William Cooper Procter Hall
Cincinnati, Ohio 45219

Burnett, Joe R.
College of Education
University of Illinois
Urbana, IL 61801

Burnside, Ronald
304 Etler Avenue
Englewood, OH 45322

Byars, Lauretta
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Calvert, John
1015 Hillstone, Apt. 1
La Grange, IL 60525

Campbell, David H.
Dept. Ed. Foundations
School of Education
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Malcolm B. Campbell
Department of Educational
Foundations and Inquiry
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Carbone, Michael C.
Ball State Teachers College
Muncie, IN 49306

Carey, Karen
723 Melrose Avenue
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40502

Carter, John E.
Grad. Dept. of Education
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Chweh, Cristopher
University of Pittsburgh
Johnstown, PA 15900

Clark, Ralph W.
College of Education
East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Coffey, Betsy B.
207 Hiawatha
Frankfort, KY 40601

Cole, Donna
Dept. of Ed.--Blair Hall
Wittenberg Univ.
Springfield, OH

Cole, Henry P.
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Collins, Clinton
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Crabtree, Malden
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Devico, Maria Isabel
Peabody/Vanderbilt
Nashville, TN

Deeb, Norman
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101

DeHoop, Wietse
Special Education
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Denton, David E.
144 Taylor
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Derr, Richard L.
School of Education
Case Western Reserve University
Cleveland, OH 44106

Dayoung, Alan
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Dickoff, James
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44240

DiIulus, Frank P.
Behav. & Humanistic Studies
Buffalo State College
1300 Elmwood Avenue
Buffalo, NY 14222

Dye, Charles M.
2999 Chamberlain Road
Akron, OH 44313

Edge, Findly
Southern Baptist Seminary
Louisville, KY 40206

Edgington, Lee
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Eisele, Christopher J.
602 H Allen
Education Department
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506

Engel, David
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Felker, Donald W.
822 N. Salisbury Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906

Ficht, Joseph
127 Broad Street
Harbor Beach, MI 48441

Finchum, George
Box 24440
College of Education
East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Foult, Gary J.
Dept. of Philosophy
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Frazier, Gordon E.
School of Education
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822

Freiberg, Jo Ann
Ed. Foundations
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Gallagher, Carol
121 Johnston Blvd.
Lexington, KY 40503

Garrett, Candy
Institute for Child Study
Bypass 46
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Geiger, John
Dept. of Foundations
School of Education
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

Gendreau, Bernard A.
Philosophy Department
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Georgeoff, John
Department of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Gibbs, Leonidas
1309 Woodlawn Avenue
Wilksburg, PA 15221

Gillespie, Patrick J.
4533 Winterset Drive
University Station
Columbus, OH 43220

Glasser, Richard
85-09 Radnor Street
Jamaica, NY 11432

Griffin, Willis H.
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Grise, Robert M.
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Haddaway, Shan
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Hainer, Frank
617 Bigelow Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15207

Hamm, Russell
School of Education
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Hanson, Karen
Dept. of Philosophy, Sycamore 026
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Harawa, Bernard
Dept. of Found. of Educ.
School of Education
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

Heiney, Terry
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Hendricks, James
Northern Michigan Univ.
Marquette, MI 49855

Hogle, Homer
309 Education Building
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Holland, Donald
303 Peach
Dyer, TN 38330

Hume, Bonnie
Dept. of Education
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

James, Patricia
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44240

Jarboe, Everett
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Johnson, Henry C.
2218 Reckley Bldg.
Penn State University
University Park, PA 16802

Johnson, Tom
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Joseph, Ellis A.
Dean, School of Education
300 College Park
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

Kapitan, Tomis
1601 Circle Drive
Bloomington, IN 47401

Kay, Steve
183 Park Avenue
Lexington, KY 40508

Keleman, Steve
21314 Vellicata Street
Woodland Hills, CA 91364

Kirchner, Frederick
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Klein, Lawrence D.
Dept. of Curriculum Research
Cent. Connecticut St. College
New Britain, CT 06050

Klein, J. Theodore
Dept. of Philosophy and Religion
Urbana College
Urbana, OH 43078

Knecht, Bruce
3526 Bowen
Toledo, OH 43606

Krause, Theodore
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

LaBrecque, Richard
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Lester, Wade N.
44 Marion Drive
Fort Thomas, KY 41075

Leverenz, Theo
A.C.S.H.
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Rev. F.W. Lewis, S.J.
School of Education
Fairfield University
Fairfield, CN 06430

Lindsey, Richard A.
Box 381
Middle Tennessee State University
Murfreesboro, TN 37130

Lozier, Gilbert C.
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Ludlow, Glenn
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Lycum, Roger
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Maguire, James R.
129 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Makruski, Edward D.
2043 Tuka Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201

Mason, Robert
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville, IL 62025

McKenney, William A.
McCombs 406
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Mehl, Bernard
College of Education
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Mercer, Jr., Drewey
Campbellsville College
Campbellsville, KY 42718

Merryman, John E.
I.U.P.
Uhler Hall
Indiana, Pa. 15701

Min, Pyong Gap
302 Morrow Road, Apt. 59-A
Forest Park, GA 30050

Minter, Thomas J.
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43619

Money, Richard W.
Indiana University-Purdue University
Columbus Center
Indianapolis, IN 46205

Mannin, Lloyd M.
Clark Technical College
570 E. Leffels Lane
Springfield, OH 45505

Mitchell, John G.
Route 4, Box 391
Cleveland, GA 30528

Moore, Thomas D.
School of Education
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44242

Nash, Ronald H.
Dept. of Philosophy and Religion
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101

Ohana, Deena
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

O'Neill, John J.
68 Sixth St.
Dover, NH 03820

Page, Ralph
2040A Orchard Street
Urbana, IL 61801

Parkinson, Daniel S.
355 McGuffey Hall
Miami University
Oxford, OH 45056

Partridge, Milton A.
Education Department
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Petrack, Joe
121 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Petrone, Louis
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Petry, John
3120 Dumar
Memphis, TN 38118

Phillips, Gene D.
Division of Education
Indiana University at Fort Wayne
2101 Coliseum Blvd., East
Fort Wayne, Indiana 46805

Phillips, Trevor J.
Educ. Foundations & Inquiry
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Popp, Jerome
1809 Monticello
Edwardsville, IL 62025

Pounds, Ralph L.
R.R. #2
Glouster, OH 45732

Pratte, Richard
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Pritscher, Conrad
Educ. Foundations & Inquiry
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Quantz, Richard
Miami University
Dept. of Educ. Leadership
Oxford, OH 45056

Raitz, Keith L.
Dept. Ed. Foundations
School of Education
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40208

Reagan, Gerald M.
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Rice, Irvin K.
3507 Mount Ranier
Louisville, KY 40222

Rider, Wanda
254 Buena Vista
Memphis, TN 38112

Riegle, Rodney
Dept. of Ed. Admin. & Found.
Illinois State University
Normal, IL 61761

Ries, Joanne
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Rivage-Seul, Margaret
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Berea, KY 40404

Roemer, Eleanor K.
School of Education
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Rosen, Bernard
Dept. of Philosophy
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Russel, R. Terry
Christian Education Dept.
Scarritt College
Nashville, TN 37203

Salehi, Saeed
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Saslaw, Rita S.
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Scahill, John
330 E. High Street
Lexington, KY 40507

Schultz, Frederick M.
Dept. Ed. Foundations
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Schweikert, Roman
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Scott, Linda P.
Inst. for Appalachian Studies
Eastern Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Senchuk, Dennis M.
203 Ed., Phil. of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Shear, Jonathon
Inst. for Adv. Study
2540 Vera Avenue
Cincinnati, OH 45237

Sheldon, Mark
Philosophy Dept.
Indiana-Purdue University-Ft. Wayne
2101 Coliseum Blvd. East
Fort Wayne, IN 46825

Schenk, Richard
111 Goodrich Avenue
Lexington, KY 40506

Sherwis, Samuel S.
Dept. of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Shockley, Foster
Peabody/Vanderbilt
Nashville, TN

Shunk, William R.
Dept. of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Skipper, Charles
Miami University
350 McGuffey
Oxford, OH 45056

Skovira, Robert
Div. of Education
University of Houston,
Victoria Campus
2302 - C Red River
Victoria, TX 77901

J. Bernard Smith
School of Education
Duquesne University
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Smith, Philip G.
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Smith, Philip L.
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Snyder, Samuel R.
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Sokolow, H. Michael
Dept. of Ed. Found.
Illinois State University
Normal, IL 61761

Southerland, Mittie
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Spangler, Sr. Mary Michael
Ohio Dominican College
Columbus, OH 43219

Spencer, Thomas E.
Teachers College
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Stanwyck, Douglas
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
Georgia State University
Atlanta, GA 30303

Steinberg, Ira S.
Dept. of Education
Oberlin College
Oberlin, OH 44074

Stephens, W. Richard
Vice-President for Academic Affairs
Greenville College
Greenville, IL 62246

Stewart, Marilyn G.
648 Lathrop
Columbus, OH 43206

Straumanis, Eric R.
337 N. Pearl Street
Granville, OH 43023

Sullivan, Nate
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Tavell, David
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Terrell, Burnham
Dept. of Philosophy
395 Ford Hall
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455

Thompson, Charles L.
School of Education
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN 37916

Thompson, Jerry
1437 Central
Memphis, TN 38104

Tuimman, Jaap J.
Institute for Child Study
Indiana University
Bypass 46
Bloomington, IN 47401

Tudor, Brenda
1367 Mulford Road
Columbus, OH 43212

Turner, Marcia M.
3345 Commodore Drive
Lexington, KY 40502

Udok, G.H.E.
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Vail, Beth
Dept. of Elementary Education
Teachers College
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Varga, Kurt
121 Ramsayer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Vaughan, William G.
Route 4, Box 197
Paris, KY 40361

Verble, David
771 Sherwood Drive
Lexington, KY 40502

Warren, Richard L.
Social and Phil. Studies
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Matras, Joseph
Dept. of Found. of Educ.
School of Education
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

Watson, Jacqueline
College of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Weaver, Janice F.
148 Pearl Croft Road
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034

Wertheim, Sally H.
Dept. of Education
John Carroll University
Cleveland, OH 44118

Wheeler, Margaret S.
Teachers College, 218-C
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47304

Wilkie, Raymond
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Wilhoite, Robert
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Willers, Jack
Peabody/Vanderbilt
Nashville, TN

Yeazell, Mary
West Virginia University
Route 7, Box 149B
Morgantown, WV 26505

Young, Bernadette
1090 Warwick Terrace
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Zigler, Ronald
M.I.U. Education Department
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